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Introduction 
 
Let me introduce my thesis with a short story.  
There is a guy who wants to spend the little money he has by doing a trip. Following 
the tips of a ‘friend’, he decides to visit the city of God-Land, a poor small city-state 
with an extreme scarcity of resources. When the guy arrives in God-Land, he 
searches in vain for a comfortable hotel in order to stay closed in his room for the 
rest of his holiday. While he is desperate and very close to cry, a fascinating woman 
starts a speech in the dusty central square of the city. In fact, although a theocratic 
authority governs the city-state and imposes everything to citizens, it leaves them 
free to take public speeches about political issues. The guy is encouraged to listen to 
the good-looking speaker who recommends a set of normative prescriptions to 
enforce liberal-democratic institutions and to warrant free access to basic resources.  
The speech is quite passionate, and it would be highly desirable to implement the 
proposed prescriptions. However, our guy is sceptical. So, he decides to intervene in 
the debate. “I think your proposal is highly desirable. Unfortunately, it seems not 
feasible to me to enforce liberal-democratic institutions and free access to basic 
resources in this city”, hysterically claims the guys. Controlling her embarrassment, 
the speaker asks: “Interesting! Why do you think my proposal is not feasible?”. The 
guy seems surprise for that apparently ingenuous question, and self-fomenting his 
superiority complex replies: “Come on! It is obvious! The recommendations of your 
prescriptions and the ways to implement them clash with facts characterizing this 
city. Hence, those facts affect the feasibility of your proposal”. The foreign guy 
annoys the speaker, but she maintains her self-control and, smiling at him, she asks 
again: “Which facts do constrain the feasibility of my proposal?” 
 
The aim of my thesis is to answer to this last question. That is to say: which facts 
affect the feasibility of normative political prescriptions?  
 
In order to answer this question, I structured this thesis in five chapters.  
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In the first chapter, I will provide normative reasons to hold that normative political 
theories should satisfy feasibility requirements. Furthermore, I will roughly define 
when prescription(s) are feasible. In the first part of the second chapter, I will 
introduce some shared standpoints about feasibility; then I will show that we need an 
adequate criterion to select feasibility constraints and to distinguish them from 
simple facts. In the second part of the second chapter, I will introduce two normative 
criteria for the selection of feasibility constraints and I will show that they are both 
inadequate. In the third part of the second chapter, I will introduce a practical 
criterion for the selection of feasibility constraint. Although this criterion needs some 
further refinements, I consider it adequate. Thanks to this criterion, I will conclude 
that social facts (institutions, culture and economy), which are usually considered 
feasibility constraints in the relevant literature, do not qualify as such.. In the third 
chapter, I will conclude that feasibility constraints are: logic rules, physical and 
biological laws, certain motivations (others’ motivations), lacking material resources 
and human needs. 
More precisely, in the first chapter, I will argue that normative political prescriptions 
should be in a certain sense feasible since they can imply sanctions for people 
transgressing them. I will maintain that normative political prescriptions can imply 
legal rules, and legal rules are coercible. I will assume that it would be morally 
unacceptable to sanction people who do not act in accordance with a (set of) 
prescription(s) if it was impossible for those people to act in accordance with that 
(set of) prescription(s). Consequently, I will conclude that normative political 
prescriptions should adhere to a certain specification of the maxim ‘ought implies 
can’ (‘OIC’). In particular, this means that  that a normative political prescriptions 
does exist in a hypothetical set of ‘all normative political prescriptions’ only if 
people can satisfy it. 
Thanks to the analysis of ‘OIC’,I will argue that the term ‘can’ could assume two 
meanings: ‘can as being possible’ and ‘can as being able to’. Although, as I will 
show, only the first meaning is adequate for the logical validity of the maxim ‘OIC’ 
related with normative political prescriptions, such a double meaning of ‘can’ is 
fundamental to move on to the analysis of feasibility conditions. I will argue that 
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both meanings of can play a role in the definition of feasibility when normative 
political prescriptions are at stake. Therefore, I will conclude this chapter by 
claiming that feasibility is a necessary requirement for normative political theories, 
demanding that: it be possible for human beings to act in accordance with a 
prescribed (of forbidden) course of action; or that human beings be able to act in 
accordance with a prescribed (or forbidden) course of action.  
In the second chapter, I will mainly review the state of art concerning the analysis of 
feasibility and I will criticize it in some regards.  Here, I will introduce terms and 
commons standpoints found in the literature about the feasibility of normative 
theories. Then, I will pay attention to the list of facts that are usually considered to be 
feasibility constraints. Feasibility constraints will be distinguished between hard 
feasibility constraints (logic rules, physical and biological laws) and soft feasibility 
constraints (mainly: state of technology, institutions, economy, culture, human 
beings’ features). 
I will show that hard constraints represent the conditions of universal possibility, 
while soft constraints are conditions of contextual possibility or probability. This 
means that, if a (set of) prescription(s) is not compatible with the former set of 
constraint, it is unfeasible for all human beings, in any place, at any time. Therefore, 
it cannot exist in a hypothetical set of all normative political prescriptions.  
Differently, if a prescription is not in accordance with all or some soft constraints, it 
is not possible in a certain context to perform the prescribed actions, or it is not 
probable that human beings (or groups of human beings) are able to perform the 
prescribed actions. Therefore, I will say that it has not a full degree of feasibility. 
In order to provide a clear understanding of these constraints, I will emphasize the 
import of the concept of feasibility by introducing the notion of strict feasibility: a 
requirement demanding that normative political prescriptions be compatible with any 
hard constraint and any soft constraint existing in a certain context. The introduction 
of the strict feasibility requirement will give me the opportunity to underline the 
main problem that investigations about feasibility try to solve: the selection of soft 
constraints. Thanks to the strict feasibility requirement, I will show that normative 
political prescriptions should not be compatible with all facts currently characterising 
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a certain context. Accordingly, dealing with soft constraints does not mean to care 
about any fact currently characterizing a context. Hence, we should distinguish 
between simple facts and facts that are soft feasibility constraints. In order to draw 
this distinction, I will suggest that it is necessary to find out an adequate formal 
criterion for the selection of soft feasibility constraints.  
In the following two chapters, I will propose two different kinds of criteria for the 
selection of soft constraints, namely normative and practical criteria. These criteria 
propose different ways to distinguish facts affecting the feasibility of prescriptions 
from simple facts. 
In the third chapter, I will propose two normative criteria different kinds of criteria 
for the selection of soft constraints. The hypothesis behind normative criteria is that: 
‘all and only normatively (or morally) valuable facts should be considered soft 
constraints’. I will criticize normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints for 
two reasons. First, these criteria are sensitive to controversial implications that do not 
fit with my definition of feasibility and with the common sense definition of ‘feasible 
as capable of being successfully used’. That is to say, by adopting normative criteria 
we could conclude that a certain fact is not a feasibility constraint even if it 
undermines or influence the success of a (set of) prescription(s) and even if it 
undermines or influence human beings ability to act in accordance with that (set of) 
prescription(s). Second, I will argue that they lead to viciously circular arguments for 
the selection of soft feasibility constraints and that, for this reason, we should not 
accept them. That is to say, by selecting soft constraints through normative criteria 
we could maintain that a fact is and is not a soft constraint depending on the 
normative theory we adopt. Therefore, I will conclude that normative criteria are not 
adequate to select soft feasibility constraints 
In the fourth chapter, I will consider a practical criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints. This criterion selects soft constraints paying attention to the influence 
that certain facts have on the success of certain prescriptions. Although it needs some 
refinements, I will show that this criterion is consistent with the commonly accepted 
definition of feasibility and with my own definition of feasibility. Therefore,  I will 
consider it adequate to select feasibility constraints. Thanks to this criterion, I will 
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criticize one of the main tenets of the literature about feasibility. That is to say, I will 
conclude that institutional facts, cultural facts and economic facts should not be 
considered feasibility constraints since they are not independent from what people 
want. Hence, I will show that these social facts, which are usually and incontestably 
considered soft constraints, do not matter for the feasibility of normative political 
prescriptions. 
In the last chapter I will propose an answer to the research question.  
The chapter is structured in four parts. In the first one, I will refine the previous 
practical criterion for the selection of soft constraints. In the second part, I will 
analyse the notion of feasibility and its relation with the notion of ability. This step is 
necessary to understand which facts could indeed affect feasibility. I will hold that 
those facts excluding some actions from the agents’ option set and those facts 
affecting the agents’ ability to be motivated to perform certain actions could be 
feasibility constraint. In the third part, I will suggest that lacking material resources 
could exclude some actions from agents’ option set. Therefore, lacking material 
resources could be feasibility constraints.  In the fourth part, I will suggest that 
frustrated human needs could influence the agents’ ability to be motivated to 
perform certain actions. Therefore, all those frustrated human needs that influence 
the agents’ ability to be motivated to perform certain actions should be considered 
soft constraints. 
In conclusion, I will hold that facts constraining the feasibility of normative political 
prescriptions are: first (hard constraints), logic rules, physical laws, biological laws 
and any other fact undermining the feasibility of a prescription in any place of the 
world at any time; second (soft constraints), others’ motivations, lacking material 
resources and human needs. 
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First Chapter 
Normative reason for feasibility requirements 
 
Introduction 
 
The tension between facts of the world and normative principles is a well-known 
topic in Political Philosophy debate. Criticisms concerning the practical usefulness of 
normative political prescriptions spring from such a tension. Practical conditions of 
the world (natural facts, power distributions in political contexts, state of technology 
and human behaviours in general) seem to constrain the feasibility of those 
normative systems suggested by philosophers. In other words, normative political 
theories proposing highly desirable states of world clash with the common sense 
opinion that considers them unfeasible utopias more often than realistic utopias. 
Normative prescriptions seem generally unfeasible in the real world; unfeasibility is 
a strong limit of prescriptive normative political theories, since they ultimately 
appear useless or dangerous. Many social scientists and politicians recognise that the 
unfeasibility of ideal worlds promoted by normative political theories is a primary 
limit. Many people to whom a philosopher ever tried to explain his/her own ideas 
argue that it is impossible to develop those ‘ideal worlds’ in the real world. Political 
philosophers have to admit that politicians, political scientist and people in general 
are mostly right. 
Tension between facts of the world and norms is the focus of several philosophical 
inquiries. It is the focus of the distinction between utopian and realist political 
theories or between ideal and non-ideal normative political theories. The focus of the 
debate1 characterising the distinctions among utopian, realist, ideal and non-ideal 
                                                
1 A brief overview concerning the relation between facts and normative political theories includes: 
Cohen, G. A. (2003), “Facts and Principles”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31: 211-245. 
Cohen, G. A. (2012), “Rescuing Justice from Constructivism and Equality from the Basic Structure 
Restriction”, in M. Otsuka (ed.), On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Political Essays, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 236-254. 
Estlund, D. (2014), “Utopophobia”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 42(2): 113-134. 
Farrelly, C. (2007), “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation”, Political Studies, 55(4): 844-864. 
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normative political theories is the relationship between facts and norms: the 
relationship between the states of affairs as they are and the states of affairs as they 
ought to be. Thus, it seems there are also good reasons to evaluate normative 
political prescriptions by virtue of their accordance with facts of the world. However, 
it is unclear what ‘to be in accordance with the facts of the world’ means. It seems 
necessary to provide a feasibility requirement listing the practical conditions that 
would warrant the successful implementation and maintenance of normative political 
prescriptions in the real world. 
However, to formalise such a feasibility requirement, the primary step is to discover 
which kinds of facts affect the feasibility of normative political prescriptions. That is 
the aim of my research. The research question is: Which facts affect the feasibility of 
normative political prescriptions? 
 
In this preliminary chapter, my aims are first to provide a normative reason to hold 
that normative political theories should satisfy a certain feasibility requirement; 
second, sketch a definition of feasibility that could be useful to proceed with further 
analysis. I will argue that since normative political prescriptions can imply sanctions 
for people transgressing them, they should be in a certain sense feasible. The reason 
is that it is not morally acceptable to subject to sanctions people that do not act in 
accordance with a prescription if it is impossible for them to act in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                     
Gilabert, P. & Lawford-Smith, H. (2012), “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration”, Political 
Studies, 60(4): 809-825. 
Goodin, R. E. (1995), “Political Ideals and Political Practice”, British Journal of Political Science, 
25(1): 37-56. 
Hamlin, A. (unpublished), “Feasibility Four Ways”, available at: 
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/politics/research/workingpapers/mancep
t/Feasibility%20Four%20Ways.pdf 
Hamlin, A. & Stemplowska, Z. (2012), “Theory, Ideal Theory and the theory of ideals”, Political 
Studies Review, 10(1): 48-62.  
Mason, A. (2004), “Just Constraints”, British Journal of Political Science, 34(2): 251-268.  
Miller, D. (2008), “Political philosophy for Earthlings”, in D. Leopold & M. Stears (eds.), Political 
Theory: Methods and Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29-48.  
Räikkä, J. (1998), “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 
6(1): 27-40.  
Stears, M. (2005), “The Vocation of Political Theory Principles, Empirical Inquiry and the Politics of 
Opportunity”, European Journal of Political Theory, 4(4): 325–350.  
Valentini, L. (2012), “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map”, Philosophy Compass, 7(9): 
654-664. 
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that prescription. To facilitate the reader and to have a provisional standpoint to 
structure this first chapter, I introduce a rough and ‘intuitive’ definition of 
‘feasibility’. I will say that a certain prescriptive normative political theory (a certain 
(set of) normative political prescription(s)) is feasible if and only if human beings 
subject to that (set of) prescription(s) can act in accordance with the prescription(s). 
This means that feasibility is a requirement of normative political theories 
demanding that human beings can act in accordance with normative political 
prescriptions. My wish is to be able better to define the meaning of modality can and 
to inquire its implications in the rest of the thesis. 
Now, I am going to try to identify the kind of normative political theories in which I 
am interested. I am going to specify that normative political theories having 
prescriptive ambitions are the object of my research. So, I am going to pay attention 
to those theories explicitly prescribing rights or duties, which recommend patterns of 
actions for human agents. Differently, I do not pay attention to those theories whose 
aims are conceptual analysis, moral evaluations or descriptions of the world. 
Consequently, I am going to introduce the relation between normative political 
prescriptions and the maxim ‘ought implies can’ (OIC). The OIC analysis will be 
useful to specify which meaning of the term ‘ought’ is relevant for Normative 
Political Theory. Thanks to analysis of the term ‘ought as obligation’, I hold that a 
prescription is not a normative ‘and’ political prescription if it demands actions that 
human beings cannot obtain, given a certain definition of can.  
Furthermore, through OIC analysis, I argue that the term ‘can’ could assume two 
meanings: ‘can as being possible’ and ‘can as being able to’. Although only the first 
meaning is adequate for the logical validity of the maxim OIC, such a double 
meaning of ‘can’ is fundamental to move on the analysis of feasibility conditions. 
So, I am going to argue that normative political prescriptions could satisfy a certain 
feasibility requirement that takes into consideration both meanings of can.  
Thanks to analysis of the term ‘can’, I am going to specify the previous definition of 
feasibility. I am going to conclude this chapter, claiming that feasibility is a 
requirement of normative political theories demanding that it be possible for human 
beings to act in accordance with a prescribed (or forbidden) way; or that human 
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beings be able to act in accordance with a prescribed (or forbidden) way. In other 
words, normative political theory (or a certain normative political prescription) is 
feasible if and only if it is possible for human beings to act as it is prescribed (or 
forbidden) ‘or’ human beings are able to act as it is prescribed (or forbidden). This 
last definition of feasibility leads to the analysis of feasibility constraints. 
 
Prescriptive political theories 
 
To define the boundaries of my research, I try to delineate the kind of normative 
political theories in which I am interested, namely, prescriptive normative political 
theories: those normative political theories aiming to provide a (set of) normative 
political prescription(s). Hence, I pay attention to theories that attempt to fulfil a 
prescriptive task. 
Normative political theories do not necessarily have the ambition to provide 
prescriptions; they could pay attention to conceptual analysis, normative evaluation 
or description of the world2. Roughly summing up, in the first case, the goal of 
normative political theories is to clarify meanings and boundaries of values and 
social and political facts. For example, such theories inquire as to the meaning of 
terms such as freedom, equality, justice, free will and so on. In the second case, 
normative political theories provide standards to test the desirability of certain actual 
or hypothetical institutional settings. For example, they provide the standard by 
which to measure the degree of freedom of certain political systems or they provide 
standard of justice. In the last case, normative political theories aim to provide a 
normatively conscious description of political systems or societies. Especially in the 
non-analytic tradition, political theories try to describe political systems, and they 
purpose moral judgement about procedures and practices typical of those systems 
that they describe. 
                                                
2 For a more adequate overview about tasks and methods of Political Theory see also: List, C & 
Valentini, L. (2014), “Political Theory”, SSRN Electronic Journal, available at: 
 http://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/63741/ 
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Of course, there could be an overlap between tasks and scopes of certain normative 
political theories. A theory trying to fulfil a certain task (to provide a conceptual 
analysis or to purpose evaluative standards or to describe a state of affairs) could 
indeed say something regarding the other tasks. However, here I want to underline 
that these tasks are non-prescriptive tasks, since none of these tasks aims to prescribe 
actions that people ought to obtain3. Non-prescriptive tasks relieve scholars from the 
responsibility of producing prescriptions that could entail rules of people behaviours: 
rules that necessarily must satisfy a certain feasibility requirement (as I am going to 
hold later on) as well as desirability requirement. 
Prescriptive normative political theories have to be both desirable and feasible. 
Where desirability is the requirement of political theories demanding that normative 
political prescriptions are normatively adequate4, feasibility is the requirement of 
normative political theories demanding that normative political prescriptions can be 
implemented and maintained in the real world. Formalising prescriptive theories, 
scholars should respect both these requirements, even if (unfortunately) these 
requirements are mostly in tension with each other. That is to say, trying to formalise 
a highly desirable set of prescriptions, some theories could be unable to satisfy the 
feasibility requirement. For instance, highly desirable theories could demand 
impossible actions of people. In this case, we would conclude that those theories are 
‘utopian’, even if it would be highly desirable to live in a world in which people 
                                                
3 A theory devoted to non-prescriptive task ‘lacks’ the strongest reason to be sensitive to feasibility: 
the potential coercibility of its purposes. 
Probably someone could hold that an evaluative standard of desirability that does not pay attention to 
the feasibility of its parameters is not useful to evaluate currently implemented institutional settings. 
That is to say, if a normative standard suggest that the state of affair x is not desirable, but this 
standard does not take in consideration any element of feasibility; someone could argue that the 
standard is inadequate to judge institutional settings because institutional settings have to face with 
practical problems. This is true, but even if an evaluative standard is not sensitive to the feasibility 
requirement, it has not direct practical implications. So, it does not imply a possible coercible 
changing of the life of people. If our evaluative standard is totally un-sensitive to feasibility and it say 
to us that ‘democratic systems are not desirable’, the standard itself does not imply any prescription 
of alternative political system. So, it has not the normative force to influence the life of people. In this 
sense, there is not a strong argument to hold that such a standard should be sensitive to feasibility 
Later on, I am going to underline the connection between coercibility and normative political 
prescriptions. 
 
4 Pasquali, F. (2012), Virtuous Imbalance Political Philosophy between Desirability and Feasibility, 
Farnham: Ashgate. p. 42 
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follow those prescriptions. On the contrary, trying to formalise a set of highly 
feasible prescriptions, some theories could be unable to satisfy the desirability 
requirement. For instance, highly feasible theories could prescribe states of affairs 
similar to an undesirable currently existing one. Of course, such prescriptions would 
be highly feasible, but they would also be highly undesirable. In both cases, one 
requirement would be unsatisfied. That means that a potential tension exists between 
the convenience (and in some regards, the necessity) to obtain feasible prescriptions 
and the ambition to obtain highly desirable prescriptions5. Therefore, accepting the 
challenge of the prescriptive task, political theorists should find a balance between 
the desirability and feasibility of their prescriptions6.  
Such a tension between desirability and feasibility could be moderate in non-
prescriptive theories: for instance, an evaluative standard might pay attention only to 
the dimension of desirability (being a standard of desirability). However, it does not 
seem usual to split normative political theory from its prescriptive task, and above 
all, it does not seem appropriate.  
Political philosophers often aim to provide prescriptions about desirable rules and 
states of the world. More importantly, it does not seem appropriate that political 
philosophers abandon their prescriptive ambitions. Given that in any case our lives 
are ruled by prescriptions, it is much better if they are normatively justified. Since 
political philosophers can provide normatively justified prescriptions, they should 
not discharge the prescriptive task or the responsibility to suggest how we ought to 
act. Therefore, political philosophers try and ought to try to suggest normative 
political prescriptions. These prescriptions could imply laws in the future; that is why 
political theorists should take feasibility concerns seriously. 
 
My research pays attention to the feasibility conditions of those theories that include 
a (set of) normative political prescription(s), where normative political prescriptions 
                                                
5 Ibidem, p. 47 
6 To find a balance between desirability and feasibility is the main aim of those contributes trying to 
provide rules to achieve trade-off of values, principles and institutional settings or purposing analysis 
of the second best institutional setting. For an introduction of trade-off and second best analysis see: 
Goodin, R. E. (1995), “Political Ideals and Political Practice”, British Journal of Political Science, 
25(1): 37-56. 
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are propositions that explicitly state certain rights and implicitly state certain duties 
or propositions that explicitly state certain duties. So, I maintain that normative 
political prescriptions state rights and duties of human beings, and by doing so, they 
demand that people perform certain actions.  
Propositions of rights and duties usually have the forms: i) ‘individual k has the right 
x’. Explicitly meaning that all individuals having the k-feature have the x-right and 
implicitly meaning that any individual k and non-k have the duty to respect the x-
right of other k individuals; ii) or ‘individual j ought to do y (have the duty y)’. 
Explicitly meaning that all individuals having the j-feature have the y-duty.  
Given their prescriptive content, these propositions demand that certain human 
beings perform certain actions. The demanded actions can be recommended by the 
content of the proposition itself; or, they can be inferred from the content of the 
proposition to make those rights and duties effective.  
In this thesis, I maintain that an action is recommended by a prescription when it is 
an implicit or explicit duty included in the content of that prescription. For instance, 
the content of the prescription ‘you ought to do A in circumstances C’ explicitly 
recommends that you have the duty to perform the action A in circumstances C. In 
the same way, the content of the prescriptions ‘I have the right A in circumstances C’ 
implicitly recommends that you have the duty to perform only those actions which 
respect my right A in circumstances C.  
Furthermore, any of those prescriptions recommending duties and rights could 
demand different actions that certain agents should perform in order to make effective 
those rights and duties. For instance, the prescription ‘I have the exclusive right A’ 
could demand some actions to make effective that right; these actions are not 
recommended in the content of the prescription, but they are still demanded. For 
example, the right A might require a police organisation that secures that nobody 
violate my right A. The implementation and maintenance of that police organisation 
need that someone performs a certain set of actions which are not included in the 
content of that prescription: these actions are necessary to make the right effective. 
To evaluate the feasibility of a certain prescription, means to evaluate the feasibility 
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of both kinds of demanded actions: those actions recommended in the content of the 
prescription; those actions necessary to make the prescription effective. 
 
 
 
Political prescriptions and ‘oughts implies can’ 
 
Given the tension between facts of the world and norms, normative political 
prescriptions should satisfy a certain feasibility requirement. So, normative political 
prescriptions should conform with facts of the world. Anyway, I did not show the 
reasons to hold it. For which reasons, normative political prescriptions should satisfy 
a feasibility requirement? Why is it opportune? 
In order briefly to summarise the reasons to hold that normative political 
prescriptions should satisfy certain feasibility requirements, it is necessary again to 
consider the prescriptive ambitions of normative political theories. Normative 
political prescriptions are propositions purposing rights and duties. By purposing 
rights and duties, normative political theories prescribe the ways in which human 
beings ought or ought-not to act in relation to other human beings (and in relation to 
the ‘external world’ in general): these can give rise to laws. Given that any political 
system has a set of coercible laws and normative political prescriptions can give rise 
to laws; it seems plausible that normative political prescriptions can rule the actions 
of human beings. Such a prescriptive task makes normative political theories much 
more sensitive to the feasibility issue. Prescribed rights and duties have to be feasible 
in order to be justified, because a theory demanding actions that just saints and aliens 
could perform seems to be inadequate to rule the life of human beings. So, feasibility 
seems to be a requirement for normative political prescriptions, if these prescriptions 
want to have political value.  
As Nagel writes: ‘…political theory…differs from ethical theory in arguing not just 
for certain forms of voluntary conduct but for acceptance of the authority of 
institutions over which the individual may have little personal control and which 
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may do things that he would not have chosen, even if he had stuck his ethical 
principles’7.  
Roughly, my argument is this: given that normative political prescriptions can imply 
sanctions, it is necessary that people can perform those actions that prescriptions 
demand. Using a Kantian vocabulary, I could suggest normative political 
prescriptions should satisfy some specification of the maxim ‘ought implies can’ 
(OIC). For this reason, the OIC maxim is taken into consideration by any analysis 
aiming to draw the set of feasibility conditions.  
I try to clarify the meaning of this maxim in relation to Normative Political Theory 
and I try to show its function in my research. In particular, I try to specify the 
meaning of the terms ‘ought’ and ‘can’ in a manner useful for my thesis. At the end 
of this brief (and probably hurried) analysis, I will hold that a prescription can exist 
in the hypothetical set (or world) of normative political prescriptions only if it 
demands actions that can be obtained by human beings. Thus, I will hold that a 
certain specification of OIC drives the research of feasibility conditions. In 
particular, I will show that the term ‘can’ could have a double meaning: ‘can as 
possible’ or ‘can as being able’. So, I will maintain that in order to understand what 
does it mean ‘to be possible to act in accordance with a prescription’ and ‘to be able 
to act in accordance with a prescription’, it is necessary proceed with a more accurate 
inquiry of feasibility. 
 
The debate about OIC is explored especially in moral philosophy and philosophy of 
language. Several authors8 do not accept the validity of this maxim or they accept it 
only by adding some specifications. Criticisms are often related to the definitions of 
terms ‘ought’, ‘implies’ and ‘can’. So, in order to understand the meaning of such a 
maxim it is necessary to clarify the meaning of its terms. 
                                                
7 Nagel, T. (1989), “What makes political theory utopian?”, Social Research, 56(4): 903-920. 
8 See: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1984), “‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies ‘Can’”, The Philosophical 
Review, 93(2): 249-261; Stern, R. (2004), “Does ‘Ought’ implies ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It 
Does?”, Utilitas, 16(1): 42-61; Stocker, M. (1971) “‘Ought’ and ‘can’”, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 49(3): 319-340. 
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Anyway, my aim is not to understand if OIC is an acceptable principle in any 
disciplinary field or in any circumstance of life. My interest is just to understand if 
and how OIC is an acceptable principle for prescriptive normative political theories. 
In other words, I will try to show that OIC is a maxim that i) normative political 
prescriptions should conform with a certain specification of OIC, because politically 
enforceable rights and duties require the possibility of being satisfied in order to 
exist; ii) OIC and in particular the double meaning of ‘can’, inspires research on the 
feasibility conditions of normative political prescriptions.  
 
In order to specify the aim of this section, I suggest to move from a definition of 
‘ought implies can’. Thus, I say that given OIC: if x is a duty (obligation) for i, then i 
can satisfy x. Let us proceed with the specification of the term ought as obligation 
first. 
 
‘Ought’ 
 
The maxim ‘ought implies can’ has been subject to different interpretations, two of 
the most usual interpretations depend on the meaning of the term ‘ought’. In the 
literature, it is possible to distinguish between a strong meaning of OIC and weak 
meaning of OIC. The strong meaning of OIC is related to a definition of the term 
‘ought’ that includes any moral duty. Given this definition of ‘ought’, the maxim 
would state: ‘if m is a moral duty for i, then i can satisfy m’. Accepting this meaning, 
we accept that any moral duty does exist only if agents can satisfy it.  
The weak meaning of OIC is related to a definition of the term ‘ought as obligation’. 
So, those normative duties implying blame, sanctions or punishment for 
transgressors. Given this definition of ‘ought’, the maxim would state: ‘if o is an 
obligation for i, then i can satisfy o’. Accepting this meaning, we accept that an 
obligation (which implies sanctions or blame) does exist only if agents can satisfy it. 
The usual argument to avoid the use of the strong term of ought is that accepting it, 
we should concede that any moral duty that agents cannot satisfy (whatever the 
reason) is not a moral duty for those agents. Even if the strong meaning of OIC 
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would offer us a comfortable argument to justify our immoral behaviours, accepting 
its validity, moral principles would become sensitive to improper ‘relativisation’. In 
fact, accepting the strong meaning of OIC we could exclude the existence of moral 
duties that cannot be satisfied by human beings here and now. However, intuitively, 
we can think that some moral duties there exist even if we human beings cannot 
satisfy them in this moment. In other words, if x is a morally right action, it is 
morally right even if people cannot perform x.  
For example, let us consider the moral principle ‘you ought to provide food to 
everyone who needs it’; of course, we cannot (individually) provide food to everyone 
who needs it. If you believe that ‘to provide food to everyone who needs it’ is 
morally right, however, you are not required to consider the moral principle wrong or 
non-existent simply because no one can satisfy it. The point is that the principle still 
remains a moral principle for you. Hence, moral duties seem to be principles that 
exist independently of the possibility of being satisfied9.  
Despite an interest in analysing the relation between OIC and moral duties, I will 
avoid such analysis here. It is not my intention to argue whether or not the strong 
meaning of OIC is valid. I can avoid such analysis because normative political 
prescriptions are not moral duties or they are particular moral duties. One of the most 
relevant features of normative political prescriptions is that they can imply coercible 
obligations. That is to say, normative political prescriptions define rights or duties 
that can imply coercible laws: obligations by virtue of which human beings 
transgressing them can be considered guilty and can be subject to sanctions. So, 
given that my aim is to analyse the practical conditions of this kind of rights and 
duties, I think it is sufficient to show that we should accept a certain interpretation of 
the weak meaning of OIC. 
 
Lawss that can be implied by normative political prescriptions are clearly obligations 
referred to one or more agents. Such obligations usually imply a legitimate coercive 
                                                
9 Let us suppose that we are hardly catholic and we believe that ‘save the humanity’ is a moral 
principle. However, we believe that just God is able ‘to save humanity’. So, just God is able to satisfy 
the moral principle. That moral principle will remain a moral principle even if we are not able to 
satisfy it. 
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sanction for their transgressors. So, we can assume that coercibility is one of the 
main features of laws10. 
Given the coercibility as one of the main features of laws, we can accept that laws 
should demand behaviours that human beings can obtain. In fact, if we do not accept 
the weak meaning of OIC, it would be the case that ‘people are subject to sanctions 
even when they did not perform actions that they could not perform’. However, 
intuitively this implication is morally unacceptable. That is to say, it seems to be 
morally unacceptable to sanction people because they did not perform actions that 
they could not have performed. So, given the feature of coercibility, the legitimate 
existence of a certain law depends also on the possibility that human beings subject 
to that law can act in a way that satisfies it. Therefore, laws, being coercible 
obligations, do legitimately exist only if they can be satisfied (given a certain 
definition of can).  
For instance, let us assume an Orwelian law such as ‘any fellow citizen must read the 
mind of other fellows or strangers in order to protect the society from dangerous 
intentions’. Of course, no one can act in accordance with this law since it is not 
possible ‘to read’ the mind of others. If we would not accept the weak meaning of 
OIC, we should accept that this law could legitimately exist.  
This argument shows that laws should deal with a certain specification of OIC. 
However, it does not show that normative political prescriptions should deal with a 
certain specification of OIC. So, I still need to explain the reasons to hold that 
normative political prescriptions should deal with OIC, too. Furthermore, I have to 
explain which specification of can I should adopt. I will discuss the term can later 
on. Now, I wish to show that normative political prescriptions, too, imply can; and 
they imply can by implying possible laws. So, rights and duties stated by normative 
political prescriptions aim themselves to rule human actions. For this reason, I think 
that in order to exist, also normative political prescriptions should demand 
behaviours that human beings ‘can’ obtain (given a certain definition of ‘can’).  
 
                                                
10 Despite coercibility is not considered a necessary feature of laws anymore, it is still a feature that 
very often occurs and it has important implications for the stability of laws 
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Formally the argument is the following one: i) if a normative political prescription x 
there exists (in a hypothetical set of all normative political prescriptions), then a law 
rl-x there exists (in a hypothetical set of all laws); ii) if it is possible that a law rl-x 
there exists, then human beings subject to that law rl-x can act in way that satisfies 
the law rl-x; iii) if human beings subject to law x can act in way that satisfies the law 
rl-x, then these human beings can act in a way that satisfies the normative political 
prescription x; iv) therefore, if a normative political prescription x there exists, then 
human beings subject to x can act in a way that satisfies that normative political 
prescription x.  
Premise i) means that a certain normative political prescription implies a certain law. 
That is to say, for any normative political prescription existing in a hypothetical set 
of all normative political prescriptions a (set of) of law(s) deduced from that 
normative political prescription do exist in a hypothetical set of all laws. Premise ii) 
means that a certain (set of) of law(s) does exist (in a hypothetical set of all laws) 
only if human beings can act in accordance with that (set of) of law(s). As I have 
already shown, the reason is that given the coercibility of laws, the fact that human 
beings can act in way that satisfies the law is a necessary condition for the existence 
of that law. On contrary, we would have morally unacceptable consequences. 
Premise iii) means that by definition, in the same moment in which human beings 
can act in a way that satisfies the law; they can act in a way that also satisfies the 
normative political prescription from which the law is deduced. The conclusion iv) 
means that a certain prescription x belongs to a hypothetical set including all 
normative political prescriptions, only if human beings can act in a way that satisfies 
x.  
 
In the same way, by implementing and maintaining a (set of) normative political 
prescription(s) in a certain context through the enforcement of laws, we should be 
sure that human beings inhabiting that context can perform the actions that those 
laws and normative prescriptions demand. 
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The argument is the following one11: i) if a (set of) normative political prescription(s) 
x is implemented and maintained in a certain context, then a (set of) of law(s) rl-x is 
enforced in that context; ii) if a (set of) of law(s) rl-x is enforced in a certain context, 
then human beings inhabiting that context and subject to that (set of) of law(s) rl-x 
can act in way that satisfies rl-x; iii) if human beings subject to law l-x can act in way 
that satisfies the law rl-x, then these human beings can act in a way that satisfies the 
(set of) normative political prescription(s) x; iv) therefore, if a (set of) normative 
political prescription(s) x there exists, then human beings subject to x can act in a 
way that satisfies that (set of) normative political prescription(s) x.  
Premise i) means that in order to implement and maintain a (set of) normative 
political prescription(s) it is necessary to enforce a certain law. Premise ii) means 
that a certain (set of) law(s) should exist in a certain context only if human beings 
subjected to it can act in accordance with that (set of) of law(s). As I have already 
shown, the reason is that given the coercibility of laws, the fact that human beings 
can act in way that satisfies the law is a necessary condition for the existence of that 
law in that context. On contrary, we would have morally unacceptable consequences. 
Premise iii) means that by definition, in the same moment in which human beings 
can act in a way that satisfies the law; they can act in a way that also satisfies the 
normative political prescription from which the law is deduced. The conclusion iv) 
means that a certain prescription x can be implemented and maintained in a certain 
context, only if human beings inhabiting that context can act in a way that satisfies x. 
 
An example helps to understand this argument. 
Let us suppose that somewhere in the world there exists a politically independent 
city-state and that such a city-state is characterised by theocratic institutions. Let us 
                                                
11 The argument is sound only assuming that it is necessary to enforce of rules implying sanctions in 
order to implement and maintain normative political prescriptions in a certain context (first premise). 
It is unsound if we suppose that we can (in certain circumstances) implement or maintain a (set of) 
normative political prescription(s) without enforcing coercible rules (for instance by persuading 
people to act in certain ways). I think that in some cases it is possible to implement and maintain 
normative political prescriptions in a certain context without enforcing coercible rules. Therefore, the 
argument is logically unsound. However, I think it is still a good argument since in the wide majority 
of cases normative political prescriptions are implemented and maintained in certain context by 
enforcing coercible rules. 
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call the city-state God-land. Let us suppose the main political authority of God-land 
is the God-Grand-Vizier. Let us suppose that the God-Grand-Vizier wants to apply 
the moral prescriptions of the Goddist Holy Writ as if they were political 
prescriptions. So, let us suppose that in the Holy Writ, God (the God of Goddist) is 
described as a very fat and greedy transcendent entity, an entity that needs to eat one 
hundred cows per week. Then, let us suppose that one of the Goddist precept dictates 
that ‘every one ought to satisfy God’s needs’. So, let us assume that the Gran-Vizier 
would like to formalise a political prescription G to conform with the moral precept. 
So, he formalises a normative prescription such as ‘God has right to everything s/he 
needs. Therefore, any God-Land fellow ought satisfy God’s food needs’. Then, the 
Gran-Vizier includes G in God-Land constitutions (G becomes a constitutional 
principle). Now, let us finally assume that the Gran-Vizier deduces a law g1 from the 
normative prescription G. g1 prescribes that ‘any citizen of God-land ought to 
sacrifice one cow per month’, in order to warrant that God can eat one hundred cows 
per week. However, let us suppose that it would not be possible to satisfy g1 because 
there are few cows in God-Land. 
Let us assume that the citizens of God-Land cannot perform those actions that are 
necessary to satisfy the rule g1 because they have not enough cows. If we accepted 
that neither the laws, nor the normative political prescriptions have to follow the 
maxim OIC, then it would be morally acceptable that the Gran-vizier prescribes 
these norms and he could sanction God-Land citizens if they do not satisfy g1 and G. 
In other words, in the case that nobody can respect the rule g1, everyone should be 
subject to sanctions for transgression. However, this conclusion does not seem 
morally acceptable: it clashes with our moral intuitions (or at least it clashes with my 
moral intuitions), namely, nobody should be sanctioned to have avoided acting in 
accordance with an obligation in case s/he cannot act in accordance with that 
obligation. In addition, if g1 were the only law that the Gran-vizier should deduce 
from G, then it would be impossible to satisfy G too. Therefore, G would not be a 
normative political prescription: that is to say, G would not exist in a hypothetical set 
of normative political prescriptions. 
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Thus, it seems possible that both normative political prescriptions and laws should 
respect a certain definition of the maxim OIC. This is not yet a necessary conclusion. 
In fact, an alternative conclusion could be laws necessarily should respect OIC, but 
normative political prescriptions should not necessarily respect OIC.  
I argued that laws should respect OIC because they are coercible prescriptions, but 
normative political prescriptions are not directly coercible. Or at least, coercibility is 
not a primary characteristic feature of normative political prescriptions. Coercibility 
is just a potential feature of normative political prescriptions. So, why is it necessary 
that normative political prescriptions respect OIC? 
Let us suppose that g1 is not the only law that Gran-vizier can deduce from G. So, let 
us suppose that Gran-vizier deduces a certain law g2 that respects OIC. In addition, 
we should maintain that the normative political prescription G still does not respect 
OIC. In this case it seems that we can concede that the rule g2 of law does respect 
OIC while the normative prescription G does not; furthermore, it seems this does not 
lead to morally unacceptable consequences since people are obligated to conform 
just to the law (which implies ‘can’). 
Then, the principle G implies the law g2, which respects OIC. For instance, let us 
assume that the Gran-Vizier deduces a law g2 such as ‘citizens of God-Land ought to 
sacrifice whichever animal in order to provide to God seventy-thousand kilograms of 
meat per week’. Let us assume that there are some whales in the ocean next to God-
Land. So, killing a whale per month (or more), citizens of God-Land can satisfy g2. 
In that case, the satisfaction of g2 seems to be possible and we can say that citizens 
can satisfy it. In this case, could we hold that citizens can satisfy the law g2, but they 
cannot satisfy the normative political prescription G? If g2 has been correctly 
deduced from G, could it be true that ‘citizens can pay the sacrifice to God but they 
cannot satisfy God’s need for food’? I do not think so. 
Assuming that a certain normative political prescription implies a certain law, the 
feasibility of the law necessarily determines the feasibility of the normative political 
prescription. In the moment in which a certain law correctly deduced from a 
normative principle can be satisfied, then the normative prescription itself can be 
satisfied thanks to actions that conform to the law. By killing a whale per month, 
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citizens of God-Land satisfy God’s food needs, then they satisfy the normative 
prescription.  
As the third premise states: ‘if human beings subject to law x can act in way that 
satisfies the law x, then these human beings can act in a way that satisfies the 
normative political prescription x’. Given that we supposed that g2 was correctly 
deduced from G, in the moment in which citizens can satisfy g2; then citizens can 
satisfy G. 
Therefore, accepting all the premises I conclude that if normative political 
prescription G exists (is implemented and maintained) in God-Land, then certain 
God-Land inhabitants can behave in a way that satisfies that normative political 
prescription: given a certain definition of term can12.  
                                                
12 Stocker, M, ‘Ought’ and ‘can’, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 49:3, p. 314 argues that the 
maxim ‘ought implies can’ is falsified by a counterexample even when it refers to ‘blameworthy 
obligations’. In other words He holds that there exist cases in which a certain person cannot satisfy a 
certain duty that she ought to satisfy, but it seems to be right to sanction her even if she could not 
perform the actions that she ought to perform. These are the specific cases of culpable inability. In 
these cases, the duty bearer’s inability to act in accordance with her obligation is given by previous 
and voluntary actions of the duty bearer.  
The case can be synthesized in the following way. Let assume that given a certain obligations 
implying blame of transgressors an individual I has to perform the action a-x in circumstance C. Let 
us suppose that the circumstance C will occur in the future time t1 and I knows it at t0. However, I 
perform certain actions at t0 knowing that performing those actions at t0 she could not perform the 
action a-x at t1 (hence, she knows that performing the those actions at t0 she knows that she cannot 
satisfy the obligation at t1). The duty bearer (I) consciously and voluntary act in certain ways in t0 and 
these behaviors preclude the possibility that duty bearer behave in accordance with her obligation at 
t1. Stocker underlines that the agent freely chooses her previous actions and she is also conscious 
about the implications of these actions (she is conscious about the fact that cannot satisfy her 
obligation if she will behave in that ways). So, the agent is responsible of these actions and of these 
implications. Therefore, the agent remains blameworthy (or subject to sanctions) to having 
transgressed the obligation at t1, even if she could not satisfy it.  
In the case of my example, let us suppose that in order to satisfy g1, everyone should bring one cow to 
the taxes office of God-Land by 10.00 AM of Friday. However, let us suppose there has been a one-
month party in God-Land and citizens killed and ate any cow during the celebrations. So, let us 
suppose that citizens cannot pay the tax g1 because of their previous conscious and voluntary actions. 
In this case, Stocker holds that citizens are still obliged to satisfy g1 at 10.00 AM of Friday. So, the 
obligation still exists and it implies sanctions. In this case, it seems that it is morally acceptable that 
God-Land inhabitants be subject to sanction because they transgressed an obligation that they were 
able to satisfy.  
I accept this counterargument. Hence, defining the meaning of can and analysing the conditions under 
which we say that an obligation cannot be satisfied; we should avoid considering culpable reasons 
that make impossible to satisfy an obligation. In this sense, culpable constraints of actions should not 
be considered feasibility constraints. Where culpable constraints are facts making impossible to 
perform a prescribed action; and they are facts that emerging from human beings' conscious actions 
even knowing that they would made impossible to satisfy a certain obligation. 
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In conclusion, here I held that: i) if x is a normative political prescription (if it exists 
in a hypothetical set of all normative political prescriptions) then human beings in 
general can act in accordance with x; ii) if x is a normative political prescription 
implemented and maintained in a certain context (if it exist in a certain context), the 
context-inhabitants can act in accordance with x. 
 
 
 
Can 
 
Thanks to analysis of the term ‘ought’, I hold that those rights and duties stated by 
normative political prescriptions are potentially coercible. Normative political 
prescriptions are potentially coercible because it is possible that they imply laws, 
which are coercible. Hence, normative political prescriptions are coercible when they 
are enforced by laws. Because of the ‘indirect’ coercibility of normative political 
prescriptions, it seems opportune that they demand actions that human beings can 
perform, given a certain definition of can. It is difficult to define can, but it is useful 
in order to address the analysis of conditions of feasibility. 
In this brief paragraph, I try to introduce two different meanings of the term ‘can’: 
the first meaning is ‘can as being possible’; the second meaning is ‘can as being able 
to’. These two definitions of ‘can’ often occur in the literature about feasibility and 
are sometimes used interchangeably. Here my aim is clearly to distinguish them. I 
will conclude this chapter accepting that both of them could play role in the inquiry 
about feasibility conditions (even if just the first meaning is logically adequate to 
characterize the maxim OIC). In the next chapter, I will show that the double 
meaning of can enables me to provide a more complex feasibility requirement: a 
feasibility requirement that pays attention to different kinds of feasibility constraints 
with different implications. So, this double definition of ‘can’ is important in order to 
start the analysis about the conditions of feasibility of normative political 
prescriptions. The reason is that the two definitions of ‘can’ pave the way for two 
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different sets of feasibility constraints. Precisely, I will hold that a set of constraints 
conforms to the definition of ‘can as being possible’ is the subset of the set of 
constraints conforms to the definition of ‘can as being able to’. That is to say, all 
those facts undermining the possibility to act in accordance with a prescription also 
affect the ability of human beings to act in accordance with that prescription. 
However, not any fact affecting the ability of human beings to act in accordance with 
a prescription undermines the possibility to act in accordance with that prescription. 
The first meaning of can that I consider is ‘can as being possible’. Where, ‘being 
possible’ means ‘being metaphysically and physically possible’. Given this 
definition, human beings ‘can’ perform certain actions if and only if it is ‘possible’ to 
perform those actions. So, applying this definition to the outcomes of the inquiry 
about OIC, I could state that ‘a normative political prescription does exist if and only 
if it is possible for human beings to act in accordance with that prescription’. The 
second meaning of can is given by the definition of ‘can as being able to’: human 
beings ‘can’ perform certain actions if and only if they are able to perform those 
actions. So, applying this definition to the outcomes of the inquiry about OIC, I 
could state that ‘a normative political prescription does exist only if human beings 
are able to act in accordance with that prescription’.  
In my opinion, the first definition of ‘can’ is adequate for the maxim OIC. That 
means, a normative political prescription does exist into a hypothetical set of all 
normative political prescriptions, even if it demands behaviours that human beings 
are unable to perform, but that are still possible to perform for human beings.  
In the next chapters, I will show that such a definition of ‘can as being possible’ is 
useful to distinguish a set of all hard feasibility constraints. That is to say, the notion 
of possibility pushed scholars to find out those constraints that would make 
impossible to act in certain prescribed ways in any place of the world and at any 
time. Given the arguments of the last paragraph, this definition of can seems 
adequately to fulfil the maxim OIC. That is to say, all those prescriptions that are 
impossible to satisfy do not exist in the hypothetical set of all normative political 
prescriptions. In fact, if those prescriptions demand impossible actions, then it is 
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morally unacceptable to sanction someone that does not perform those actions. 
Therefore, those prescriptions cannot be considered ‘political’.  
On the contrary, the definition of ‘can as being able to’ is useful to distinguish a set 
feasibility conditions huger than the first one. Precisely, the former set of feasibility 
conditions can be seen as subset of this latter one. Meaning that all those facts that 
constrain the metaphysical and physical possibility to act in accordance with a 
prescription also constrain the ability of human beings to act in accordance with 
prescriptions, but the contrary is false.  
The set of constraints affecting ability to perform certain actions includes both 
necessary conditions and non-necessary conditions of feasibility. If it is not 
necessary that a certain prescription conform to certain conditions, it means that the 
prescription can exist in the hypothetical set of all normative political prescriptions 
even if it does not respect those feasibility conditions. For this reason, the meaning of 
can as ‘being able to’ is not appropriate to discover those conditions that would make 
a prescription impossible and, so far, it is not appropriate for the maxim OIC. Not 
any conditions of this second set determine the existence of a normative political 
prescription. Thus, we can conclude that a normative prescription does not exist in a 
hypothetical set of all normative political prescriptions if it demands actions that are 
impossible to perform.  
Anyway, the double meaning of ‘can’ has a sort of inspirational function for the 
inquiry about feasibility conditions. In other words, considering both meanings of 
can (‘can as possible’ and ‘can as being able to’), I think I could achieve a more 
adequate notion of feasibility. In fact, despite just the first definition of ‘can’ is 
adequate to define the maxim OIC, I think an inquiry about feasibility of normative 
political prescriptions should accept both definitions. 
The reason is that accepting just the first meaning of can (‘can as being possible’), 
we would not take into consideration some facts that affect the degree of ability and 
the contextual possibility that a normative political prescription be satisfied. If 
everything that is physically and metaphysically possible were feasible (without any 
further distinction and without any further inquiry about conditions of feasibility); 
then we would not take in consideration all those facts affecting the degree in which 
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we think agents are able to perform demanded actions. Furthermore, we would not 
consider those non-metaphysical facts undermining the possibility that certain human 
beings implement or maintain a certain (set of) prescription(s) in a certain spatially 
or temporally circumscribed context.  
Thus, any (physically and metaphysically) possible prescription is feasible. However, 
if I did not inquire additional conditions of feasibility affecting contextual feasibility 
or feasibility degree of prescriptions, I would not have the tools to understand the 
possibility and probability of implementing a prescription in a certain context. In this 
way, I would lack the tools to understand why a certain prescription does not work in 
a context even if it prescribes physically and metaphysically possible actions. The 
consequence would be that I would not have any tool to understand why people do 
not act in accordance with certain prescriptions. Then, I would not be able to 
understand if they do not act in accordance with the prescribed way because they do 
not want to or because they are not able to (or if they are lowly able), given their 
situation. So, we could be tempted to argue that they are subject to sanctions even if 
it would be contextually impossible to act in accordance with that prescription or 
even if it would be very difficult to be able to perform those prescribed actions. 
Hence, this is the reason to analyse a broader set of feasibility constraints.  
Differently, accepting only the second meaning of can (‘can as being able to’), those 
prescriptions demanding actions that are just metaphysically and physically possible 
should not be considered ‘feasible’. Thus, they could not be considered normative 
political prescriptions. In this way, I would exclude those normative political theories 
in which prescriptions are possible to obtain even if they demand action that 
currently human beings are not fully able to perform or that they are able to perform 
only in some contexts. Using Estlund’s vocabulary13, I would exclude those non-
utopian but hopeless inspirational theories from the set of normative political 
theories. This means that I would exclude all those theories warranting that 
normative political theory pushes human beings to reach a currently unfeasible state 
of affairs.  
                                                
13 Estlund, D. (2014), “Utopophobia”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 42(2): 113-134. 
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Given these reasons, during the inquiry of feasibility conditions, I think we should 
take into consideration both meanings of ‘can’, because by excluding one of them I 
could obtain an inadequate feasibility requirement. On one hand I would obtain a 
feasibility requirement ignoring those factual constraints that affect for certain 
degrees the feasibility of a prescription or that undermine the feasibility of 
prescriptions only in certain contexts. On the other hand, I would obtain a feasibility 
requirement too demanding: a requirement inappropriately excluding a large amount 
of normative political theories that are feasible in certain possible circumstances.  
Therefore, I ask to accept the following the definition of feasibility. A (set of) 
normative political prescription(s) is feasible if and only if it is possible for human 
beings to act in the prescribed way ‘or’ human beings are able to act in the 
prescribed way. So, feasibility is a requirement of normative political theories 
demanding that it be possible for human beings to act in the prescribed (or forbidden) 
way or human beings be able to act in the prescribed (or forbidden) way.  
This definition is a rough one14. Hence, I will use it just as guideline to address my 
analysis on feasibility constraints because intuitively it conciliates both meanings of 
can: ‘can as being possible’ and ‘can as being able to’. Fortunately, both meanings of 
can are usually accepted in the analysis of feasibility. Anticipating the argument, we 
say that in accordance with the meaning of ‘can’ as being possible’, we can take into 
consideration a set of constraints determining whether or not a prescription is 
feasible; in accordance with the meaning of ‘can’ as being able to’, we can also take 
into consideration a set of constraints influencing the feasibility degree of a certain 
prescriptions. Lawford-Smith labels the double meaning of feasibility as ‘binary 
feasibility’ and ‘scalar feasibility’.  
 
 
 
                                                
14 Probably, the following definition is more sophisticated or refined. Feasibility the capability of 
normative political prescriptions of being successfully enforced in accordance with human beings’ 
ability to perform the actions that prescriptions demand. Here feasibility is the capability of being 
successfully enforced; and such a capability depends on human beings’ ability to perform certain 
actions. Human beings’ ability includes physical and metaphysical possibility but it is not just the 
physical and metaphysical possibility. 
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Second Chapter 
Overview on feasibility 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first chapter, I assumed that the feasibility of prescriptions depends on their 
accordance with adequate feasibility requirements. A feasibility requirement defines 
the conditions needed to obtain feasible prescriptions. They could be expressed by a 
formula such as ‘normative political prescriptions should conform with fact a in 
order to be possible to implement and maintain them. Normative political 
prescriptions should conform to fact b in order to be possible to implement and 
maintain them in a context C. In addition, normative prescriptions should conform to 
fact c in order that human beings inhabiting C be highly able to implement and 
maintain them’. ‘To conform to fact a’, ‘to conform to fact b’, ‘to conform to fact c’ 
are all feasibility conditions. While, ‘the fact a’, ‘the fact b’, ‘the fact c’ are the 
feasibility constraints, and the rule that enables us to say that the facts a, b and c are 
feasibility constraint is the criterion to select feasibility constraints. Next three 
chapters are devoted mainly to an analysis of the adequate criterion for the selection 
of feasibility constraints. 
I will show that through an adequate criterion for the selection of feasibility 
constraints, we can find out feasibility constraints and exclude those facts that do not 
affect feasibility. 
 
In this part of the second chapter, I am going to introduce the terms used in the 
literature about the feasibility of normative political prescriptions. Furthermore, I am 
going to introduce its commonly accepted standpoints. These are necessary steps to 
analyse the criteria for the selection of soft constraints: an analysis that will be the 
focus of the next two parts of this chapter. 
First, I pay attention to two basic notions regarding feasibility, namely, stability and 
accessibility (the literature calls them dimensions of feasibility). I underline that a 
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(set of) prescription(s) is feasible if and only if it is both accessible and stable. 
Where: an accessible prescription is a prescription that human beings can implement 
in a context in which it does not exist yet; while, a stable prescription is a 
prescription that human beings can maintain over time in a certain context. 
Second, I introduce a list of kinds of facts that are usually considered feasibility 
constraints. As it is common in literature, I am going to distinguish between hard 
feasibility constraints and soft feasibility constraints. The first set of constraints 
includes the kinds of facts that make some actions impossible to be performed at any 
time and place in the world. The second set of constraints includes kinds of facts that 
make impossible to perform certain actions in particular contexts or facts that affect 
the ability degree of human beings to perform some actions.  
It is commonly accepted that the set of hard constraints represents the conditions of 
universal possibility, while the set of soft constraints kinds of facts are conditions of 
contextual possibility or probability. This means that if a prescription does not 
conform to a former set of constraints, it is unfeasible for all human beings and 
cannot exist in a hypothetical set of all normative political prescriptions. Differently, 
if a prescription is not in accordance with all or some soft constraints, it is not 
possible in a certain context to perform the prescribed actions, or it is not probable 
that human beings (or groups of human beings) are able to perform the prescribed 
actions.  
In order to give an effective understanding of these constraints, I am going to stress 
the concept of feasibility by introducing the notion of strict feasibility: a requirement 
that normative political prescriptions conform to all hard constraints and all soft 
constraints existing in a certain context. Strict practical feasibility requirement is just 
an explanatory tool to describe soft constraints and to show which kind of feasibility 
requirements we should avoid. In fact, I am going to conclude that dealing with such 
a strict feasibility requirement, it would not be possible to obtain normative political 
prescriptions, the content of which would differ from the status quo. If scholars 
devised their theories and normative prescriptions respecting any fact characterising 
the current context, they would not be able to provide theories or prescriptions 
different from the status quo. Furthermore, if scholars suggested implementing just 
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those prescriptions that do not ‘clash’ with all practical constraints currently existing 
in a certain context, that context could never be characterised by different and more 
desirable prescriptions. Therefore, if we think that normative political prescriptions 
different from the status quo could be feasible, we should not conform them with the 
strict feasibility requirement. 
The introduction of the strict feasibility requirement gives me the opportunity to 
underline the main problem that research about feasibility tries to solve: the selection 
of soft constraints. Thanks to the strict feasibility requirement, it will be clear that 
normative political prescriptions should not conform to all facts currently 
characterising a certain context. So, to deal with soft constraints does not mean to 
care about any fact currently characterising a context. Hence, we should distinguish 
between simple facts and facts that are soft feasibility constraints. In order to shape 
this distinction, I am going to suggest that it is necessary to find a formal criterion for 
the selection of soft feasibility constraints. I am going to anticipate that two different 
kinds of criteria can be devised, namely, normative criteria of feasibility and 
practical criteria of feasibility. I will treat and criticize these criteria in the next parts 
of this chapter. 
 
Feasibility dimensions: stability and accessibility 
 
Normative political prescriptions are propositions stating rights and duties. Such 
rights and duties demand particular actions to human beings subjected to them. 
Furthermore, I have already shown that these prescriptions can imply coercible 
obligations: obligations related to coercive sanctions for transgressors. So, in the first 
chapter, I held that normative political prescriptions should be feasible in some 
regards since coercible obligations can be deduced from them.  
I concluded that a prescriptive normative political theory is feasible if and only if it is 
possible for human beings to act in accordance with its prescriptions ‘or’ human 
beings are able to act in accordance with its prescriptions. Such a formula of 
feasibility leaves open more than one question. Of course, that definition does not 
specify those conditions warranting that a given action be feasible: namely, it does 
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not specify conditions of feasibility. Second, that definition does not specify the 
dimensions of feasibility. To discover conditions of feasibility (or feasibility 
constraints) is the primary goal of my thesis, but in order to pursue this goal it is first 
necessary to distinguish the dimension of feasibility. 
Hence, when I say that a normative political prescription ought to be feasible (or 
must be feasible), I implicitly state that the prescription ought to be both accessible 
and stable. Thus, accessibility and stability are properties of feasible prescriptions. 
Accessibility and stability are reminiscent of well-known philosophical issues: for 
example, the accessibility relation between possible worlds, the different kinds of 
balances of powers warranting the stability of political systems, or the distinction 
between stability simpliciter and stability for the right reasons. All these issues are in 
some regard related to the meanings of accessibility and stability used in the analysis 
of feasibility. Here, I briefly introduce the 'accessibility relations' between possible 
worlds because it is essential to understand what accessibility means when we treat 
the question of feasibility. Then I introduce a definition of stability simpliciter. 
The ‘accessibility relation’ is a basic concept in logic and philosophy of language. It 
is a relation between two possible worlds such as a certain world w’ is said to be 
accessible from a certain world w iff it is possible that a statement that is true in w’ 
be true in w. For example, let assume that the statement ‘it will rain tomorrow’ is 
true in the world w’ (so, it will rain in w’ tomorrow), the world w’ is accessible from 
w if and only if it is possible that the statement ‘it will rain tomorrow’ be true in w. 
Now, let us consider a possible world in which water cannot exist, call it nw. In this 
world, the statement ‘it will rain tomorrow’ is necessarily false. Then the world w’ 
(in which the statement ‘it will rain tomorrow’ is true) is not accessible from the 
world nw. 
Such a definition of the accessibility relation plays a meaningful role in the analysis 
of feasibility. Using the language of possible worlds, to say that ‘a certain 
prescription is accessible’ is equal to say that i) there exists a possible world w’ in 
which that prescription can exist and ii) that possible world w’ is accessible from the 
current world w. For example, to hold that the prescription such as ‘we ought 
warrant basic liberties to everyone’ is accessible means to hold that i) there exist a 
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possible world in which that prescription does exist and ii) that world is accessible 
from the current world. A possible world is accessible if it is in some relevant 
features similar to the current world. These relevant features making accessible a 
certain world are conditions of accessibility (feasibility): those conditions under 
which a world is said to be accessible from the current one. I will analyse them in the 
next paragraphs. 
Although the language of possible worlds is highly fascinating, I suggest using the 
definition of accessibility that is commonly used in the debate about feasibility. So, I 
suggest that a prescription x is accessible if and only if human beings (or a groups of 
them) can move from a state of affairs s0 in which x does not exist to another state of 
affairs s1 in which x does exist. This means that a prescription x is accessible if and 
only if it is possible for human beings to move from a state of affairs s0 in which x 
does not exist to a state of affairs s1 in which x does exists; or human beings (or a 
group of them) are (highly) able to move from a state of affairs s0 in which x does 
not exist to a state of affairs s1 in which x does exist. Rephrasing this definition with 
the previous formula of feasibility: a prescriptive normative political prescription is 
accessible if and only if it is possible for human beings to move from a state of 
affairs in which they do not act in accordance with that prescription to a state of 
affairs in which they act in accordance with the prescribed (or forbidden) way ‘or’ 
human beings are (highly) able to act in accordance with the prescribed (or 
forbidden) way. 
 
The concept of stability in Political Philosophy is famously treated by Rawls through 
the analysis of stability for the right reason. I will clarify in the second part of this 
chapter that the stability for the right reasons could play a certain inspirational role 
when we try to define normative criteria for the selection of feasibility constraints. 
So, I will treat it in the next part of this chapter. For this reason, now I just introduce 
the notion of stability simpliciter (or just stability): that is the notion of stability that I 
will use in the rest of the thesis. 
Here, I mean that a (set of) prescription(s) x is stable if and only if human beings (or 
groups of them) can maintain the existence of x over time. This means that a 
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prescription x is stable if and only if it is possible for human beings to maintain the 
existence of x over time; or human beings (or a group of them) are (highly) able to 
maintain the existence of x over time. Where ‘to maintain the existence of a 
prescription over time’ means that a prescription existing in a context C (space s at 
time t0), will exist in context C (space s at time t1, t2…tn). Rephrasing this definition 
in accordance with the previous formula of feasibility, a prescriptive normative 
political prescription is stable if and only if it is possible for human beings to 
maintain over time a state of affairs in which they act in accordance with the 
prescription ‘or’ human beings are able to maintain over the time a state of affairs in 
which they act in accordance with the prescription. 
 
A commonly-accepted standpoint in the literature about feasibility is that a 
prescription has to be both accessible and stable in order to be feasible.  
This means that i) a prescription demanding actions that are impossible to perform at 
any time and place in the world does not exist in hypothetical set of normative 
political prescriptions; ii) a prescription demanding actions that are impossible to 
perform for a group of human beings belonging to a certain context cannot exist in 
that context. This means that it is not accessible or not stable in that context now or 
in a predictable future. Hence: human beings inhabiting that context cannot move 
from a state of affair in which there is not that prescription to a state of affairs in 
which that prescription does exist; or, human beings inhabit that context cannot 
maintain over the time a state of affairs in which that prescription does exist. Hence, 
that prescription is not feasible in that context; iii) a prescription demanding actions 
that all human beings are hardly able to perform is a prescription existing into 
hypothetical set of normative political prescriptions, but it has a non-full general 
degree of accessibility or stability. So, human beings (in general) do not have a full 
degree of ability to perform those actions that are necessary to move from a state of 
affairs in which that prescription does not exist to a state of affairs in which that 
prescription does exist (independently from the context in which they live). 
Alternatively, human beings in general have not a full degree of ability to perform 
those actions that are necessary to maintain that prescription over time 
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(independently from the context in which human beings live); iv) a prescription 
demanding actions that a group of human being living in a certain context is hardly 
able to perform is a prescription that could exist in that context but probably it will 
not; it has a non-full degree of accessibility or stability. So, human beings inhabiting 
that particular context do not have a full degree of ability to perform those actions 
that are necessary to move from a state of affairs in which that prescription does not 
exist to a state of affairs in which that prescription does exist. Alternatively, human 
beings inhabiting that particular context do not have a full degree of ability to 
perform those actions that are necessary to maintain that prescription over time. 
It should be clear that when I hold that ‘a prescription should demand actions that 
human beings (or group of human beings) can perform’, I do not refer simply to 
those actions that the prescription recommends. As I wrote in the first chapter, 
demanded actions include also those actions that are necessary to make effective a 
prescription. Also those actions that are necessary to move form a state of affairs in 
which the prescription does not exists to a state of affairs in which the prescription 
exists should be feasible. Furthermore, the actions implicitly necessary to maintain a 
prescription over the time should also be feasible. 
Precisely, let us suppose we would like to implement a prescription x such as ‘human 
beings ought to do x’: that is a prescription recommending to human beings to 
perform the action a-x. Then let us suppose that to move from a state of affairs in 
which x does not exist to a state of affairs in which x does exists, someone should 
perform the action a-y: an action that is necessary to make x effective in the context 
C. Then let us suppose that to maintain x over the time, someone should perform the 
action a-w: an action that is necessary to maintain x effective in C. In this case, the 
actions demanded by prescription x are a-x, a-y and a-z. Therefore, it is necessary that 
human beings (or certain groups of human beings) can perform all x, y, w in order to 
warrant that prescription x be feasible.  
For example, let us suppose that we would like to implement a prescription such has 
‘everyone has the right to drink water when s/he needs’. In this case, the explicit 
content of the prescription is that any person is allowed to drink water when s/he 
needs. It is quite obvious that anyone is able to drink water. So, the action ‘to drink 
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water’ is perfectly feasible. However, let suppose that the implicit duty of this right is 
that ‘we ought to warrant to anyone the opportunity to drink water’. So, let us 
suppose that there is a context in which in order to warrant that anyone has the 
opportunity to drink water it is necessary to perform particular actions, actions that 
people living that context cannot perform. For, example we could suppose that the 
context is a desert and to warrant the right to drink water, people inhabiting the 
context should perform the action ‘to build a water spring’. But let us suppose that 
people inhabiting that context cannot build a spring. In this case, the prescription is 
unfeasible not because the recommended action is unfeasible, but because it is 
impossible to perform the necessary actions to make the prescription accessible. In 
other words, the prescription is unfeasible because that particular group of human 
beings cannot perform the necessary actions to implement and maintain the 
prescription. 
Hence, saying that a certain prescription is feasible, means to say that the 
recommended actions are accessible and stable; furthermore, it means that those 
actions that are necessary to make effective the prescription are accessible and stable.  
Being accessibility and stability dimensions of feasibility, their fulfilment depends on 
the extent to which a prescriptions clashes with feasibility constraints. What I already 
wrote about feasibility does not tell us anything about feasibility constraints: nothing 
is being said about those facts constraining the possibility or the human abilities to 
act in accordance with a prescription or a set of prescriptions.  
 
Conditions of feasibility: hard constraints and soft constraints. 
 
In next two paragraphs, I introduce those kinds of facts that constrain or could 
constrain the feasibility of prescriptions. More precisely, I show which facts about 
feasibility are used to consider feasibility constraints in the literature. Despite the 
formal distinction between accessibility and stability, such literature usually assumes 
that kinds of facts affecting accessibility of prescriptions are the same kinds of facts 
affecting the stability of prescriptions. So, I refer simply to feasibility constraints, 
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without distinguish anymore between accessibility and stability when it is not 
necessary.  
I held that a normative political prescription (or a set of prescriptions) is feasible if 
and only if it is possible for human beings to act in accordance with that prescription 
(or set of prescription) ‘or’ human beings are able to act in accordance with that 
prescription (or set of prescriptions). 
Possibility and ability (degree) of human beings to perform prescribed actions are 
given by the accordance between normative political prescriptions and factual 
constraints. That is to say, the feasibility of normative political prescriptions depends 
on their accordance with certain factual constraints. The table below synthesizes the 
relations that occur between the extent to which certain facts do exist (universal or 
general and contextual) and the influence of facts on the two meanings of feasibility 
(possibility to act/ability degree to act). I maintain that universal facts are facts that 
characterize any circumstance of the world (and any place in which human beings 
live and will live) now and in any future; general facts are facts that characterise any 
or some worldwide spread circumstance now and in a predictable future; contextual 
facts are facts that characterise a spatially and temporarily circumscribed context in 
any or some circumstances. 
 
 
 
45 
 
The aim now is to define what kinds of facts X, Y, W and Z are. Authors who 
analyse the issue of feasibility take into consideration two kinds of practical 
constraints: hard feasibility constraints and soft feasibility constraints. 
Hard constraints usually identified are logic rules, physical laws and biological laws. 
Soft constraints usually identified are institutional settings, economic arrangements, 
cultural habits, human motivations and psychological facts, state of technology15. 
The table below summarises the sets of feasibility constraints and their role in 
affecting possibility to act or degree of ability to act. 
 
 
                                                
15 Here I provide some preliminary remarks about the sets of constraints. I will not discuss these 
specific points anymore. Some authors (Estlund, Nagel) usually include human nature in the set of 
hard constraints. Given the widely unspecified definition of the term human nature I prefer to avoid it. 
I think that biological laws can include the biological features of human beings. So, I will say that 
biological features of human beings are hard constraints. Jensen holds that history is a hard constraint 
as well. Nonetheless, he does not define in which sense history is a hard constraint. Since when I think 
that history is a word to refer to the whole set of practical facts, it seems me redundant to separately 
analyse this constraint. Räikkä seems to suggest that psychological facts are hard constraints but it is 
not clear if any kind of psychological fact should be considered a hard constraint. I arbitrarily include 
psychological facts in the set of soft constraints with some exceptions that I will clarify in the third 
chapter. Finally, Lawford-Smith suggests that facts implying the impossibility to perform certain 
actions at any place but in a specific time, should be consider hard constraints. In other words, if a fact 
constrains the possibility to act in a certain prescribed way in any place at certain specific time, this 
fact should be considered as hard constraint. Given that I think that this is still contextual case 
(namely, the action is not possible in the context ‘world at time t0’ and not in the context 'world at any 
time'), I think the right name of this kind of fact is soft constraint. But this is merely a terminological 
question. 
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Hard constraints and impossibility 
 
I begin by analysing hard constraints and their connection to possibility. In my 
account, hard constraints belong only to the first cell of the table; in other accounts 
(as in Gilabert and Lawford-Smith account) they belong also to the second cell. I 
consider hard constraints those facts that undermine the universal possibility to 
implement and maintain prescription. While other authors think that those facts 
undermining the possibility to implement and maintain certain prescriptions in 
certain circumscribed context are also hard constraints. In this paragraph, I consider 
just those constraints belonging to the first cell. 
I briefly describe the hard constraints already mentioned. Logic rules: a prescription 
x must be logically consistent in the sense that it must be valid and true in accordance 
with logic rules. For example, a prescription demanding to people to do both the 
action a and the action non-a is demanding a logically impossible action. So, it is 
unfeasible at any time and place in the world. Physical laws: prescription x must 
respect physical laws in the sense that it must demand actions that are in accordance 
with physical laws. For example, it should be stated in accordance with physic of 
particles, and a prescription demanding to people to create aubergines from the 
vacuum is physically impossible. So, it is considered unfeasible at any time and place 
in the world. Biological laws: prescription x must respect biological features of the 
world in the sense that it must demand actions that are in accordance with biological 
limits. For instance a prescription demanding to warrant an infinite life to human 
beings is biologically impossible. So, it is considered unfeasible at any time and 
place in the world.  
Hard constraints are conditions of impossibility; it is logically and physically 
impossible to perform actions violating these kinds of facts. Given that all human 
beings live in worlds governed by these facts, prescriptions that do not conform to 
these facts demand actions that are impossible for human beings at any time and 
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place that human beings could inhabit16. So, I claim that each prescription that is not 
conform with such constraints is not a normative political prescription, given that it 
is impossible for any human being in any place and at any time to act in accordance 
with such a prescription.  
Let us suppose that a normative political prescription does not conform to one of 
these constraints. For example, let us suppose that in order to preserve the current 
state of affairs, a hyper-conservative argument justifies the desirability of the 
prescription c that demands: ‘we ought to fix the mater in a way avoiding any further 
transformations of it’. In this case, we should not say that we are not able to fix the 
matter but we should say that in accordance with Lavoisier's laws, it impossible to do 
it. So, in any possible world (any world in which human beings could live) this 
prescription is unfeasible, independent from future improvement of technology. 
Now, let us suppose that we decide that c is still a normative political prescription, 
despite it being impossible to perform the action it recommends. Given that from any 
normative political prescription we can deduce a law (see the first chapter), if this 
prescription was a normative political prescription, it would be possible to deduce a 
law from it. Consequently, it would be possible to punish people that do not perform 
a physically impossible action. In order to avoid this conclusion, I suggest that 
prescription c should not be considered a normative political prescription. In other 
words, prescription c does not exist in a hypothetical set of all normative political 
prescriptions. 
Thus, it is commonly accepted that hard constraints define actions that are impossible 
to perform for human beings at any time and place in the world; I add that these 
constraints define what matters as normative political prescription and what does not 
matter as normative political prescription. Hence, if a prescription is not conforming 
to hard constraints, it is not feasible; if it is conforming, it is feasible17. If a 
prescription is not impossible, it can exist in a hypothetical set including all 
normative political prescription.  
                                                
16 Someone could argue that human beings could live in worlds in which nomological laws are 
different, but in this case I think that the burden of proof is on her. 
17 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith call this position binary feasibility assuming exactly that a prescription 
is feasible or non-feasible, given its compliance with the hard constraints above. 
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Any author analysing the question of feasibility accepts this set of constraints and the 
idea that all those prescriptions demanding actions that would clash with these 
constraints are not possible (are unfeasible). In my thesis, I will take for granted this 
set of constraints without analysing them further.  
However, feasibility is not just a matter of logical and physical possibility, it is also a 
matter of degree of ability and contextual possibility. Precisely, a logically and 
physically possible normative political prescription can be more or less feasible and 
its degree of feasibility depends on its accordance with soft feasibility constraints. 
Furthermore, a prescription that is not ‘impossible at any time and place of the world’ 
could be contextually impossible. Contextual possibility still depends on soft 
feasibility constraints.  
 
Soft Constraints and Strict Practical Feasibility 
 
In this paragraph, I introduce a preliminary analysis of soft constraints. Here, I stress 
them through the requirement of ‘strict practical feasibility’ in order to underline the 
‘dangerous’ status quo drift that normative political theory would risk if scholars 
conformed their prescriptions to this feasibility requirement. Strict practical 
feasibility is a feasibility requirement demanding to conform prescriptions to all facts 
currently characterising a certain context and belonging to the categories of facts 
listed in the second table. I conclude that strict practical feasibility requirement 
makes impossible to obtain normative prescriptions relevantly different from the 
status quo; then we should not deal with such a requirement. It is still important to 
keep in mind that strict practical feasibility is just an explanatory tool that I use to 
show: first, which soft constraints the literature takes into account; second, why we 
should avoid that prescriptions conform with all soft constraints. No scholar 
analysing the question of feasibility suggests such a requirement. 
The set of soft constraints is surely more controversial than that of hard constraints. 
In the literature, soft constraints are contingent facts peculiar of one, or more than 
one, context that make it improbable but not impossible to implement and maintain 
certain prescriptions. In my account, soft constraints imply the improbability or the 
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contextual impossibility of obtaining feasible prescriptions. That is to say, a 
prescription demanding an action that clashes with one or more soft constraints is a 
prescription having a non-full degree of feasibility or that it is unfeasible in certain 
contexts. 
Scholars sometimes conflate improbability and contextual impossibility. It is quite 
easy to see that analytically they are not the same thing. Since when, an improbable 
prescription is a prescription demanding an action that is still possible to perform for 
human beings, but that clashes with some facts affecting human beings’ ability 
degree to perform it. While, a contextually impossible prescription is a prescription 
demanding an action that is impossible to perform for human beings inhabiting a 
certain context. Despite this difference, in the literature both cases seem to be 
affected by the same kinds of constraints. In other words, it is improbable or 
contextually impossible that human being are able to perform demanded actions, 
when prescriptions conform with all hard constraints, but they do not conform with 
one or more soft constraints.  
In the table of feasibility, constraints affecting ability, degree or contextual 
possibility belong to the second and fourth cells. The third cell is empty because I do 
not think there is a contribution suggesting kinds of facts affecting the general ability 
degree to perform some actions. Although I think this is an important omission in the 
analysis of feasibility, I do not pay attention to it now. In the third chapter, I will 
show that there are facts affecting general degree of feasibility, these are of course 
general facts: facts that characterise all the world in any or some circumstances now 
and in a predictable future 
The literature usually considers these facts that undermine contextual possibility or 
influence contextual probability: current state of technology and medicine (technique 
skills and scientific knowledge), institutional setting, cultural habits, economic 
arrangements and unspecified features of human beings.  
Let us define them in some detail and stress their role in affecting feasibility through 
strict practical feasibility requirements. 
Current state of technology and medicine – it is commonly accepted that current 
features of environment (rivers, mountains, etc.) can be changed by our ability to 
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manipulate them through new technologies or techniques. It means that the natural 
environment in itself is not a constraint for normative prescriptions; the extent to 
which it affects the implementation of prescriptions depends on human abilities to 
modify it. The influence of technological constraints on feasibility is highly intuitive. 
For example, if inhabitants of the Sahara do not possess the technological ability to 
have sufficient drinkable water, then the availability of water is constrained by 
practical circumstances. Hence, the feasibility of a prescription demanding that 
‘every one ought have free access to water’ is influenced by material circumstances 
that cannot be changed given the current state of technology18. 
Linking such a constraint with strict practical feasibility requirements, we should 
claim that a prescription x is not feasible if we are not able to perform here and now 
the actions it prescribes. So, given the strict feasibility requirement, if the actual ratio 
between technical-technological abilities and features of natural environment 
influences the possibility or the ability degree to perform a prescribed action, then 
the prescription is unfeasible.  
The same hypothesis applies to the state of medicine. That is to say, supposing that a 
prescription demands actions that are impossible to obtain given the current state of 
medicine, that prescription would be unfeasible if we adopted a strict feasibility 
requirement. Therefore, we should not implement it. 
                                                
18 Lawford-Smith (2010) holds that the state of technology is a feasibility constraints only if we are 
referring to the frontier of the state of technology. Where the frontier of technology is the best level of 
technology and technical skills that there exist in the world. So, in her opinion, state of technology is a 
feasibility constraint in a certain context only if: given the frontier of technology and technical skills, 
nobody is able to obtain the necessary material conditions to implement a certain prescription in that 
context (the context could also be ‘the world at certain time’). 
So, let us suppose that in order to implement the prescription x it is necessary to have the technology t. 
Then, let us suppose that i) the group of people inhabiting the context C wants to implement x but has 
not the technology t; ii) only the group of people living in the context C1 has the technology t. 
Obviously, the state of technology is not a feasibility constraint when that should be considered to 
devise the prescription x. Furthermore, the authors suggest that the lack of technology t does not 
constrain the feasibility of prescription x in C. In other words, the lack of t in C is not a feasibility 
constraint to implement x in C, because people inhabiting C can use the technology of people 
inhabiting the context C1. 
This means for example that in case that there exist a German engineering company able to ‘generate’ 
clouds and rain in natural environments such as desert; people living in Sahara would not have any 
technological constraint to implement a prescription such as ‘every one ought have free access to 
water’. Given that inhabitants of Sahara could obtain water using the technology and the technical 
skills of the German company.  
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Institutions– institutions can be defined as the current set of rules and procedures 
ruling the life of human beings belonging to a certain context. This means that people 
belonging to a context characterised by a certain set of rules and procedures are 
unable (or unable for some degrees) to perform actions that are not in accordance 
with those rules and procedures. So, prescriptions demanding actions that clash with 
contextually accepted norms and procedures are contextually unfeasible or lowly 
feasible. 
Let us suppose the case in which the prescription x states: ‘every democratic system 
ought to be a presidential system in order to well satisfy the principle of 
accountability19’. Then suppose that we would like to implement it in a parliamentary 
system. Parliament has to accept or reject this prescription. It is reasonable to think 
that Parliament will try to preserve its sovereignty and then hinder the 
implementation of such prescription. Then, the prescription x will be difficultly 
accessible. It means that given the actual institutional setting, the prescription x is 
constrained by the features of such institutional system.20  
So, if we deal with the strict feasibility requirement, we should conclude that any 
prescription that does not conform to the institutional setting of a certain context is 
unfeasible. So, in that case, we should conform the prescriptions with all institutional 
facts characterising the context. That is to say, we should not implement any 
prescription clashing with (and maybe modifying) the current institutions. 
                                                
19 Here it is not important to know if the prescription is desirable  
20 I do not know if it is plausible to think that institutional constraints work during the implementation 
of normative political prescriptions concerning principles. In order to check strict feasibility of 
principles given the current institutions, I think we should suppose the case in which a constitutional 
principle is not really fitting with actual institutional setting. Obviously, principles does not directly 
imply punishable obligations, they can be just prescriptions to evaluate and define rules. However, I 
claimed that a principle has still a political role. Let us suppose that the principle we would like to 
implement in our constitutional bill is the meritocratic one: ‘everyone has a right to what she 
deserves.’ Now, let us suppose that actual institutions are not shaped by meritocratic rules. Hence, 
suppose that implementing the meritocratic principle the actual institutions would be evaluated 
according to it and perhaps they will be changed in the future. Are there reasons to think that actual 
institutions will accept the principle? Are there reasons to think that current institutions are not a 
feasibility constraint for normative political principles? It seems me reasonable to think that the 
institutions would try to preserve themselves (at least in some cases) and they would reject the 
implementation of the principle. Hence, institutions seem to be a feasibility constraint also for 
political principles. So, a principle that is not in accordance with current institutional setting seems not 
be strictly feasible. 
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Culture – When we use the term culture we could mean both cultural habits and 
cultural beliefs. Cultural habits are actions or set of actions rooted in the cultural 
beliefs of a certain group of people. By contrast, cultural beliefs are socially spread 
beliefs concerning values and customs justifying21 the actions of people. Hence, I 
define the culture characterising a context as ‘the ways of life, customs and beliefs, 
of a particular group of people at particular time’. 
The two faces of culture are obviously interrelated: cultural habits are actions or set 
of actions based on socially shared beliefs about values and about the world. The 
sociologic assumption is that individuals interiorise currently widespread cultural 
beliefs and because of this they act in a certain way. Those actions become cultural 
habits, and it is hard to act in accordance with prescriptions clashing with those 
cultural habits.  
Let us suppose that we want to employ principles and rules of ‘welfare state’ in a 
community in which people act in accordance with libertarian values. Let us suppose 
we want to implement tax imposing to share the income such as ‘everyone has to pay 
a tax equal the 40% of her income’ (that is quite common in systems in which private 
property and welfarism coexist; for example, taxes on charitable contributions). It 
seems reasonable that if people have a libertarian culture and are devoted to a radical 
interpretation of rights of ownership, people will hardly be convinced to pay the tax 
and of sharing their income with others. Then the redistributive tax seems to be 
affected by the culturally spread beliefs and actions of people. In other words, people 
avoid performing those actions that the redistributive prescriptions demand because 
these are inconsistent with their shared libertarian cultural beliefs. In this case, the 
implementation of a welfare prescription is constrained by the fact that people do not 
perform the action ‘to pay taxes’. 
Dealing with the strict feasibility requirement we should not implement prescriptions 
clashing with the current culture. 
Economy – I define economy as the system or range of activities concerned with the 
production, distribution and consumption of goods and services in a country, region 
                                                
21 It is not clear whether beliefs have a motivational force or whether they only play the role of 
justifying a course of actions. 
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or community. It is commonly accepted that the economic system characterising a 
context affects the feasibility of a prescription. That means, a prescription demanding 
actions that are unsustainable (or hardly sustainable) given the current economic 
system is the prescription of contextually unfeasible or lowly feasible actions.  
Let us suppose that we would like to implement a rule warranting basic liberties in a 
context currently characterised by severe scarcity of resources. Of course, if the 
current amount of resources is not sufficient to implement basic liberties in that 
context, then currently, basic liberties cannot be implemented in that context. 
Dealing with the strict practical feasibility requirement, if currently a certain 
prescription is not economically sustainable then it is impossible to perform the 
actions it prescribes and scholars should not devise it. Adopting the strict feasibility 
requirement we should conclude that any prescription that is not conforming with the 
current economic arrangement is not feasible. So, decision makers should not 
implement them. 
Individuals’ motivations to act and psychological facts – finally, practical feasibility 
can be sensitive to motivational constraints. The case of motivations is the most 
controversial for several reasons. The notion of individual motivations has been used 
in different disciplines from psychology to sociology and philosophy. Any discipline 
has different approaches to motivations and different definitions of motivations. So, 
it is not easy to understand how we should treat the notion.  
I suggest a vague definition in order to avoid controversial interpretation: 
motivations are any cause of human beings’ actions. Given this definition and 
assuming that motivations are conditions of feasibility, it might seem reasonable to 
conclude that first, any disposition to act is a practical constraint; and, second, 
applying a strict feasibility requirement, any prescription should conform with all 
motivational constraints. However, these conclusions are disputable. Gilabert, for 
example, seems to suggest that there are two kinds of motivations: motivations act 
given by what individuals want and motivations entailed by un-chosen22 factors 
                                                
22 Obviously there are middle range cases in which motivations given by individuals are influenced by 
un-chosen factors (sociology of situated individuals and bounded rationality assume exactly a kind of 
disposition to act in which individual choices are the outcome of individuals’ inner characters and 
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(traumas, psychological illness, imprinting, addictions, etc.)23. He suggests that only 
the second kind of motivations constrains the abilities of an agent performing an 
action. Let us check these two kinds of motivations. 
Motivations given by what individuals want – here, I am considering those 
motivations that are simply the expression of what individuals want to do. So, let us 
suppose that a prescription necessarily demands that everyone goes to a postal office 
one times per week in order to pay taxes (it is an old fashion prescription), but 
suppose that people are extremely lazy and do not want to leave the sofa. Then, 
nobody goes to the postal office and it is not possible to implement or maintain the 
prescription. In this case, the prescription is not successful here and now but the 
reason seems absurd and it seems unjustified to retain that this motivation affects 
ability degree of people to perform the prescribed action. The reason is that there is a 
difference between saying that an individual does not want to do something and 
saying that an individual is not able to do something. Therefore, it seems that what 
individuals want to do should not affect the feasibility of prescriptions.  
In the last chapter, I will accurately treat this distinction between what individuals 
want to do and what individuals are able to do. For now, I want to anticipate that 
motivations that are the outcome of what individuals want to do24 are not considered 
feasibility constraints in the literature. 
Motivations entailed by un-chosen factors – Here, I am considering those 
motivations that are necessary and un-chosen. Now, let us suppose the case in which 
a prescription demands that ‘people ought to preserve water’ and consequently 
‘people ought to wash their hands for a maximum of three times per day’. Let us 
suppose that there is a group of human beings that are compulsively motivated to 
wash their hands at least ten times per hour. In this case, people seem unable to 
perform the actions that the prescription demands, so it seems that human beings’ 
motivation to wash hands affects the feasibility of this prescription. In this case, the 
                                                                                                                                     
external factors such as education, culture, etc.). However, I will not discuss these sociological 
contributions in this paragraph and I will just touch on them in the rest of the thesis.  
23 Clearly, we are referring to a deterministic relation between external factors and dispositions to act 
in a certain way 
24 I will call them individuals’ own motivations 
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motivations springing from this pathology seems to be un-chosen. That is to say, it 
seems that they are not the expression of what agents want. Hence, it seems possible 
to concede that these motivations do constrain the feasibility of prescriptions.  
However, if motivations given by psychological and physiological addictions, 
traumatic events or compulsive motivations were the only motivations that can be 
considered feasibility constraints in Normative Political Theory, we should conclude 
that motivations do not affect feasibility in a substantial way. In fact, these 
motivations would affect the feasibility of prescriptions only in contexts in which the 
majority of people have these addictions or traumatic/compulsive motivations. These 
cases seem to be quite uninteresting for normative political theory, given that it is not 
probable that a politically autonomous contexts such those does exist. In other words, 
a context in which the majority of people are addictively, traumatically or 
compulsively motivated in a certain ways could be hospitals or a rehabilitation 
centres: cases that concern Ethics much more than Normative Political Theory and 
that are not politically autonomous. 
In the literature, other kinds of motivations or psychological features of human 
beings seem to affect the implementation and maintenance of a certain prescription 
in a certain context. These are others’ motivations and motivations characterising 
our moral model of agent.  
Others’ motivations are those motivations of people who do not belong to the context 
in which the prescription we are interested in should be implemented. For example, 
in case that Italians want to implement a certain prescription, Germans’ motivations 
about the Italian decision to implement that prescription could bring German 
government to act in a certain way that constrain the feasibility of that prescription in 
Italy. In this sense, Germans’ motivations could affect the feasibility of the 
prescription in Italy.  
Others’ motivations are usually considered feasibility constraints. Therefore, given 
the strict feasibility requirement, we should not implement prescription clashing with 
others’ motivations. 
Hahn seems to suggest that other motivational or psychological features of human 
beings could be considered feasibility constraints. Specifically, I will show that in 
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Hahn’s contribution, the motivations characterising the moral model of agent 
assumed by the normative theory are feasibility constraints. For example, if the 
theory supporting the prescription that we want to implement is based on a moral 
model of an agent that is solidarity driven, then motivations based on feelings of 
solidarity are feasibility constraints. I later discuss and reject this argument.  
In conclusion, un-chosen motivations, others’ motivations and motivational features 
characterising our moral model of an agent are considered feasibility constraints in 
the literature. Any prescription clashing with these facts is unfeasible and we should 
not implement it given the strict feasibility requirement. 
 
In sum, a prescription is said to be strictly feasible if and only if it conforms to every 
hard constraint and every fact characterising a certain context and belonging to the 
categories of soft constraints. So, supposing a context characterised by facts f, f1, f2, 
f3…fn25 and supposing that these facts belong to the categories of hard and soft 
constraints, normative political prescription should conform to all these facts in order 
to be feasible. Now, I am going to argue that strict practical feasibility is too strong a 
commitment for Normative Political Theory: dealing with such a requirement, 
normative political prescriptions risk being reduced to a status quo description. In 
other words, if scholars devised their prescriptions to conform to all of these facts, it 
would be difficult to devise normative political prescriptions different from the 
current state of affairs. Furthermore, if we would advise implementation only of 
those prescriptions that conform to all hard and soft constraints we would hardly 
modify the set of prescriptions characterising a context in a substantial way.  
 
Strict practical feasibility and status quo drift  
 
The list of soft constraints includes facts belonging to the kinds of fact such as state 
of technology, institutions, economy, culture, others’ motivations and motivational 
and psychological facts characterising the moral model of agent assumed by our 
                                                
25 To repeat, f, f1, f2, f3…fn are facts belonging to these kinds of facts: institutional setting, cultural 
habits, economic conditions and arrangements and in some unspecified cases motivational and 
psychological facts 
 
57 
 
theory. These kinds of facts have to be added to those kinds of facts that are 
considered hard constraints, such as logic rules, physical and biological laws.  
Strict practical feasibility requires that normative political prescriptions be devised 
and implemented in a context in accordance with any hard constraint and any soft 
constraint. In other words, dealing with strict practical feasibility, just those 
prescriptions that do not clash with all facts characterizing a context (and listed 
above as feasibility constraints) are feasible prescriptions. Despite dealing with such 
a feasibility requirement we could devise and implement highly (or perfectly) 
feasible prescriptions, I suggest that we avoid it because it could lead us to a re-
formulation of the status quo. Then, if I recommended dealing with strict feasibility, 
I would recommend that any prescription that does not conform to the status quo 
would be unfeasible; and I think this is not the case. That is to say, I think that 
prescriptions that do not conform to the status quo can be feasible. 
Strict feasibility assumes that human beings belonging to a certain context can act 
only in accordance with those facts (rules, procedures, habits, etc.) already 
characterising the context in which they live. However, I think that human beings 
can also act in accordance with prescriptions clashing with the status quo. Therefore, 
I reject the strict feasibility requirement. 
The reasoning to reject strict feasibility is the following. Let us suppose that the 
Context E (that is the space s at time t) is characterised by facts e1, e2, e3…en. Strict 
feasibility requires that all these facts characterising the context E should be 
considered practical constraints for normative prescriptions. Hence, a prescription is 
strictly feasible only if it demands actions that do not clash with any of those facts. 
For instance, a prescription is not feasible if it demands an action that clashes with 
the fact e1. Given that by definition, the context E is characterised by all and only the 
facts e1, e2, e3…en, then any feasible prescription would not modify the status quo 
existing in E. In other words, it would be impossible to obtain normative political 
prescriptions different from the status quo (or different from some undistinguished 
re-formulation of the status quo). However, it seems plausible to think that there are 
cases in which normative political prescriptions are feasible even if they modify the 
status quo. So, it is possible that human beings inhabiting a context can act in 
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accordance with prescriptions that clash with one or some facts characterising that 
context. Therefore, being strict practical feasibility too strong requirement of 
feasibility, it is inappropriate. 
I think an example could help to understand why a strict feasibility requirement is 
not appropriate. Let us assume that in God-land (the city-state introduced in the first 
chapter) the God’s Grand-vizier (that is still the main political authority of God-land) 
wants to implement a prescription recommending that ‘any female and male citizen 
of God-land ought serve the God’s Army two weeks per year until her/his physical 
abilities permit her/him to do it’. Let us suppose that this new rule clashes with the 
previous one: ‘only male citizens of God-land have the right and the duty to serve the 
God’s Army, two weeks per year until their physical abilities permit them to do it’. 
Of course, the new rule radically changes the status quo26. So, the implementation of 
the latter rule is obviously clashing with the previous one (with the status quo). 
However, if we accept that it would be possible to implement it, we concede that it is 
feasible and we should reject the strict feasibility requirement.  
If we think that normative political prescriptions different from the status quo can be 
devised and implemented in a certain context, then we should not deal with strict 
feasibility requirement27. Consequently, we should accept to devise prescriptions that 
are not in accordance with all existing facts characterising a certain context. 
Furthermore, we accept that we can implement prescriptions that are not in 
accordance with all facts characterising a certain context here and now.  
In conclusion, devising and implementing normative political prescriptions, we 
should care about both hard and soft constraints. However, we should not care about 
any fact (or kind of facts) characterising a context and belonging to the above 
                                                
26 A sociologist could find out also some social implications about the role of woman in the society 
and could argue that a rule such that would relevantly change the social environment. 
27 Someone could hold that we should deal just with strict practical feasibility and if strict practical 
feasibility entails that normative political prescriptions different from the status quo are impossible, 
then we should accept this conclusion. Nonetheless, I think that it is possible to obtain and employ 
normative political prescriptions different from the status quo. Therefore, we should not deal with 
strict practical feasibility. 
I think that the hypothesis about the existence of normative prescriptions different from the status quo 
and still feasible is historically grounded. History is full of events that show that it is possible to 
radically change the current state of affairs. For instance, revolutions are ways to employ a normative 
political prescription radically different from the status quo, that means: revolutions are the historical 
fact showing that normative prescriptions different from the status quo are feasible.  
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categories of soft constraints. This could mean that i) there are facts characterising a 
context and belonging to the categories of facts described above that have not the 
necessary requirements (properties) to be considered soft feasibility constraint; ii) 
there are kinds (categories) of facts that should not be considered soft feasibility 
constraints. 
Given that not all facts or kinds of facts should be considered soft feasibility 
constraints, the problem is to find out an appropriate criterion to select soft 
constraints and to distinguish them from simple facts. Contributions that I am going 
to review suggest some criteria to select relevant facts constraining the feasibility of 
prescriptions. In other words, these contributions try to establish a rule in order to 
distinguish between simple facts characterising one or more contexts and soft 
constraints that affect the feasibility of normative political prescriptions. That is the 
first step in order to formalise adequate feasibility requirements. 
 
Selecting soft constraints: normative and practical feasibility requirements 
 
Strict practical feasibility requirement is not a good feasibility requirements. Hence, 
after having listed all kinds of facts that could affect feasibility, it is necessary to 
understand which facts or kinds of facts of a given context do matter for the 
feasibility of normative political prescriptions. In other words, it is necessary to find 
out an appropriate criterion that enables scholars to understand which facts should be 
considered soft feasibility constraints. 
In order to avoid the drift of status quo, authors inquiring into feasibility suggest two 
main approaches to select soft practical constraints of normative political 
prescriptions: the first approach suggests selecting soft practical constraints through 
normative criteria. Roughly, this approach suggests that all and only normatively 
valuable facts (or kind of facts) should be considered soft feasibility constraints. So, 
normative political prescription should deal with normative feasibility requirements; 
the second approach suggests selecting soft practical constraints through practical 
criterion. Roughly, this approach suggests that all and only facts affecting the success 
of a certain prescription now and in a predictable future should be considered soft 
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constraints. So, normative political prescriptions should deal with a practical 
feasibility requirement. I am going review those former contributions in the next part 
of this chapter and the latter contributions in the last part.  
I anticipate that normative feasibility requirements seem problematic to me because 
their criteria for the selection of soft constraints lead to circular arguments. Whereas, 
I will hold that practical feasibility requirements approach the question in the right 
way: trying to evaluate practical constraints only by virtue of their impact on the 
ability of people to perform actions. So, I will hold that the interference of morality is 
correctly cleaned out in practical criteria. However, I will not share the emphasis on 
social fact as feasibility constraints because they are facts dependent on what human 
beings want. Hence, I think that these facts affect the success of prescriptions but 
they do not affect ability of groups of people to perform prescribed actions. So, I will 
conclude that purposed criteria are not adequate to select soft feasibility constraints. 
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Chapter 3 
Normative requirements of feasibility 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I listed feasibility constraints. I underlined that despite 
most pre-eminent scholars agreeing about the set of hard feasibility constraints, 
disagreement may occur about the set of soft feasibility constraints. In other words, 
the authors analysing the question of feasibility agree that normative political 
prescriptions should conform to logical rules and physical/biological laws. 
Differently, they could disagree about the set of soft constraints: those facts that 
affect the contextual feasibility or the feasibility degree of prescriptions. The reason 
is that not all those facts listed above should be considered soft feasibility 
constraints. Thus, we should appropriately distinguish soft constraints from simple 
facts; then we should exclude certain facts from the list of soft constraints. Since 
currently there is not an uncontroversial and adequate feasibility criterion to select 
soft constraints, there is disagreement about the appropriate set of soft constraints.  
For this reason, it seems necessary to find an appropriate criterion for the selection of 
soft constraints. Such a criterion should be based on the necessary properties of 
feasibility constraints and it would enable us to distinguish soft feasibility constraints 
from simple facts characterising a context.  
As I already wrote, authors’ contributions can be distinguished between those 
suggesting normative criteria and those suggesting a practical criterion for the 
selection of soft constraints. Now I am going to review those contributions from 
which I deduce the former criteria. 
In order to obtain an appropriate set of feasibility constraints, normative criteria are 
based on the hypothesis that ‘all and only normatively (or morally) valuable facts 
should be considered soft constraints’. From this hypothesis, I will deduce two 
different normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints. My aim is to 
structure a normative feasibility requirement and to show why we should avoid 
selecting soft constraints thorough a normative criterion. To be precise, no author 
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explicitly formalises a criterion to select soft constraints: I deduced these from 
certain more or less accurate advices. However, I think that Hahn28 and Räikkä29 (the 
authors I will consider in this part) provide arguments suggesting which facts are 
normatively valuable. Thanks to these suggestions, I will shape two formal 
normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints. I will dub these criteria 
Griffin/Hahn criteria and Räikkä criteria.  
Roughly, Hahn’s advice is that only those facts characterising the moral model of 
human being (or agent) embedded in the normative theory we trust should be 
considered soft constraints. For instance, if our moral model of human being is 
driven by pure and unilateral solidarity toward the human genre, we should not 
consider soft constraints some egoistic motivations. Differently, Räikkä advice is that 
only those facts whose lack30 would entail moral costs should be considered soft 
constraints. For instance, if implementing a prescription we frustrated the 
motivational fact of human self-preservation but the frustration of this fact does not 
imply any moral cost, then motivational fact of self-preservation should not be 
considered a soft feasibility constraint.  
Both Hahn and Räikkä seem to hold that a certain normative (moral) property of 
facts plays a role in defining the set of soft constraints31. Roughly, I am going to 
criticize normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints because two reasons. 
First, these criteria are sensitive to controversial implications that do not fit with the 
definition of feasibility that I used here and with the common sense definition of 
‘feasible as capable of being successfully used’. So, the feasibility requirements 
emerging from these criteria are incongruent with the common sense definition32 of 
feasibility and with my definition of feasibility. However, this criticism has an 
                                                
28 Hahn, H. (2011), “Justifying Feasibility Constraints on Human Rights”, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 15(2): 143-157. 
29 Räikkä, J. (1998), “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 
6(1): 27-40. 
30 Later on, I will use the formula undermining the existence meaning violating, frustrating, lacking, 
etc. 
31 Maybe my interpretation of Hahn’s and Raikka’s arguments is wrong, but I ask to consider it right 
in order to understand whether normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints are adequate. 
32 The common sense definition of feasibility can be: ‘something (here a prescription) is feasible if it 
is capable of being successfully used’. This definition of feasibility is the one provided by Raikka 
himself. 
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important limit, it can be accepted only if you agree with my definition of feasibility 
or with the common sense definition of feasibility. Differently, I think the second 
criticism should be accepted whatever definition of feasibility we use. In fact, I am 
going to argue that the normative criteria lead to vicious circular arguments for the 
selection of soft feasibility constraints and because of this we should not accept 
them. 
I will start introducing the relation between normative feasibility requirements and 
the Rawlsian contribution. The aim of this first paragraph is to underline the 
inspirational role of the analysis concerning the relation between the fact of 
reasonable pluralism and the stability of institution. I suggest that normative 
feasibility requirements are in some way inspired by this Rawlsian analysis, since it 
emphases the role of a normatively valuable fact affecting the stability of liberal 
democratic institutions. However, I will clarify that is not opportune to deduce any 
normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints by Rawlsian contribution. 
Secondly, I am going to describe the Hahn’s normative criterion for the selection of 
soft constraints. I will call it Griffin/Hahn criterion33. So, I try to show that it has 
some implications that do not fit with my definition of feasibility. Then, I will hold 
that it leads to circular arguments for the selection of soft constraints. In the third 
paragraph, I will describe Räikkä’s normative criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints. So, I try to show that it has some implications that do not fit with my 
definition of feasibility and with the definition of feasibility used by Räikkä himself. 
Then, I will try to show that also this requirement leads to a circular argument for the 
selection of soft constraints. In conclusion, I will sum up the circular argument of 
normative feasibility criteria and I will show why it is not just circular but also 
vicious. Thus, I will suggest that practical criteria for the selection of soft constraint 
could be preferable since they do not collapse in this kind of vicious circularity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Even if I do not know whether they would accept it or not 
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Stability for the right reasons and normative feasibility 
 
The degree of feasibility of prescriptions depends on their accordance with adequate 
feasibility requirements. Where feasibility requirements says us which conditions of 
feasibility normative political prescriptions should respect. In order to shape an 
adequate feasibility requirement, we have to find a good criterion for the selection of 
soft feasibility constraints. To find an adequate criterion for the selection of soft 
constraint is a preliminary aim of my research (the interrelated and consequent aim is 
to discover the feasibility constraints). In this part of the chapter, I will pay attention 
to the analysis of normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints. Such 
normative criteria roughly suggest that a certain fact is a soft feasibility constraint 
only if it bears a normative (or moral) value, namely, only if it is normatively 
valuable. As it usually happens in contemporary political philosophy, the disciplinary 
routine suggests me to move from Rawlsian contribution and in particular from its 
emphasis about the stability for the right reasons. 
I am recommended to move from this contribution because the analysis about the 
fact of reasonable pluralism and its relation with the notion of stability for the right 
reasons seem to be the inspirational source of normative criteria for the selection of 
soft constraints. That is to say, it seems that the Rawlsian contribution about 
‘stability for the right reasons’ introduces the idea that a feasible prescription should 
conform to normatively valuable facts such as the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
Thus, normatively valuable facts are natural facts or social facts that we think bear 
normative (or moral) values.  
Reasonable pluralism is a fact that potentially constrains the feasibility of Rawlsian 
prescriptions. Then, I maintain that such an emphasis on reasonable pluralism as 
normatively valuable fact plays an inspirational role for any attempt of normative 
feasibility requirement. Nonetheless, I will argue that is not appropriate to conclude 
that Rawls pays attention only to these kinds of facts. For this reason, I do not think 
that Rawls would agree with the hypothesis that ‘only normatively (or morally) 
valuable facts affect the feasibility of his prescriptions’. Therefore, I will conclude 
 
66 
 
that is not appropriate to deduce any normative feasibility criterion for the selection 
of soft constraints from Rawlsian contribution. 
In the whole Rawlsian contribution (including at least A Theory of Justice, Political 
Liberalism and The Law of People), the question of feasibility is explicitly and 
directly addressed when the author analyses the stability for the right reasons. In this 
part of Political Liberalism, the fact of reasonable pluralism plays a pivotal role for 
the stability of liberal democratic institutions. Hence, someone could think that 
reasonable pluralism is the only feasibility constraint identified by Rawls. 
Reasonable pluralism is a fact characterising any just society and can be considered a 
good example of normatively valuable feasibility constraint. It is the fact of the 
existence of diverse reasonable comprehensive doctrines: doctrines that ‘reasonable 
citizens affirm and that political liberalism must address’34. Certain reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines could avoid accepting liberal prescriptions concerning the 
basic structure of just societies and by implication this disagreement could 
undermine the existence of those institutions. As Rawls himself points out: 
‘reasonable pluralism limits what is practically possible here and now’35. Then, the 
existence of different reasonable comprehensive doctrines could undermine the 
stability of liberal democratic institutions and because of this it is considered a 
feasibility constraint.  
Rawls pays particular attention to the fact of reasonable pluralism in virtue of its 
normative value. Reasonable pluralism emerges as outcome of the use of individuals’ 
reasonableness under societies characterised by just institutions, consequently it is a 
necessary feature of just and fair societies. Being a necessary (or constitutive) feature 
of just and fair societies, it is not just a constraint that could undermine the stability 
of institutions, it is also a constraint that we should accept and which we should deal 
with (a fact that we should not neutralise). Hence, the features of reasonable 
pluralism are two: first, it constrains the feasibility since it could undermine the 
stability of certain just institutions; second, it is normatively valuable since it is the 
outcome of individuals’ use of reasonableness and it is a constitutive part of just 
                                                
34 Rawls, J. (2005), Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 36-37 
35 Rawls, J. (1997), The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., p.12 
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societies. Because of this, we can say that reasonable pluralism is a normatively 
valuable feasibility constraint.  
In sum, what makes reasonable pluralism problematic are its implications for the 
stability of liberal institutions. That is, reasonable pluralism is a feasibility constraint 
since it affects the stability of institutions. Furthermore, reasonable pluralism is 
particularly relevant for Rawls because it is normatively valuable.  
Rawls emphasises the fact of reasonable pluralism and the search for the overlapping 
consensus as a condition for the stability for the right reasons. Such an emphasis on 
reasonable pluralism as normatively valuable feasibility constraints could influence 
the analysis of feasibility constraints. That is to say, one could argue that in 
accordance with Rawls, only normatively valuable facts can be considered relevant 
feasibility constraints. Hence, one could argue that evaluating the feasibility of 
normative political prescriptions we should consider only normatively valuable 
constraints. That is why I maintain that Rawls’s analysis could inspire normative 
criteria for the selection of feasibility constraints.  
Nonetheless, I reject this interpretation of Rawls’s contribution; I reject the idea that 
Rawls would pay attention only to normatively valuable constraints as factors that 
could undermine the feasibility of his prescriptions. If that were the case, if really 
Rawls thought that only normatively valuable facts are feasibility constraints, then it 
would be correct to deduce a first primordial criterion for the selection of soft 
feasibility constraints from his contribution. However, it does not seems to me that 
reasonable pluralism is the only fact affecting feasibility that Rawls considers.  
Paying attention to the whole Rawlsian contribution, including A Theory of Justice, it 
seems that other facts affect the possibility to maintain Rawlsian prescriptions. For 
instance, circumstances of justice seem to affect the feasibility of principles of 
justice. Quoting Rawls: ‘the circumstances of justice’ are ‘conditions under which 
human cooperation is both possible and necessary’36., where the cooperation brings 
about a just society characterised by principles of justice and liberal democratic 
institutions. Hence, the circumstances of justice are conditions under which 
principles of justice and consequently liberal democratic institutions are feasible.  
                                                
36 Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.,p. 126 
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Circumstances of justice such as the physical facts about human beings and their 
similarity in mental features, the moderate scarcity of resources or the limited 
altruism are all facts which we have no reason to consider normatively valuable: they 
do not bear particular moral values. However, they play a fundamental role for the 
stability of Rawlsian prescriptions. That is why I think Rawls would consider them 
feasibility constraints.  
In conclusion, I concede that the emphasis on the reasonable pluralism could inspire 
normative criterion for the selection of soft constraints. Nonetheless, Rawls himself 
seems to pay attention to both normatively valuable facts and non-normatively 
valuable facts as factors affecting the feasibility of prescriptions. Hence, it does not 
seem to me that Rawls would agree with the idea that ‘only (or morally) normatively 
valuable facts (such as the fact of reasonable pluralism) are feasibility constraints’. 
Consequently, it does not seem to me appropriate to deduce any normative criterion 
for the selection of soft constraint from the Rawlsian contribution.  
In the next paragraphs of this part of second chapter I am going to suggest two 
different normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints. Here, my aim is to 
show that normative criteria are inadequate.  
 
Griffin/Hahn requirement of feasibility37 
 
The first contribution I am going to analyse is the Hahn’s contribution, which seems 
inspired by Griffin38. In Justifying Feasibility Constraints on Human Rights, Hahn 
seems to suggest that normative political prescriptions, in this particular case, human 
rights39, should conform to those features that human beings would have if they were 
‘the kind of persons we have reasons to want they be’. This kind of advice is not a 
formal criterion to select soft constraints per se. So, I am going provide an 
                                                
37 I call this requirement Griffin/Hahn requirement given that Hahn cites the work of Griffin and he 
recognises to Griffin the fatherhood of the indication from which it rises. However, I am not sure that 
Griffin would accept the interpretation that Hahn gives to Griffin’s analysis of practical constraints. 
38 Griffin, J. (2008), On Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
39 Hahn contribution is about the feasibility of human rights. However, I will assume that his 
indication and the feasibility criterion that I will deduce from it can be used to shape a feasibility 
requirement of normative political prescriptions in general 
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interpretation of this suggestion in way that it can work as a selective criterion. As 
any other feasibility requirement, what I call the ‘Griffin/Hahn requirement’ assumes 
that normative political prescriptions should not conform to all facts existing in a 
certain context. Normative political prescriptions should conform only to hard 
practical constraints and constitutive features of the moral model of agent assumed in 
our normative theory. Citing Hahn: 
 
Griffin restricts what we can demand of a person to the capabilities this 
person would have if she were the kind of person we have reason to want 
her to be…an ideal that appears to be morally desirable in itself and that is 
feasible in principle [conform to hard constraints] might nevertheless turn 
out to be practically infeasible from the point of reference set by other 
normative ideas concerning the circumstances of ideal’s realization40. 
 
Given my interpretation of this advice, I assume that the Griffin/Hahn criterion for 
selection of soft constraints is based on the notion of moral model of agent, where 
the moral model of agent is a theoretical model of a human being, which is 
characterised by certain morally valuable features chosen by theorists on the ground 
of certain moral arguments. In this sense, the features of the moral model of agent 
could non-correspond to the real nature of human beings. This means that if a theory 
is based on a certain moral model of an agent, the Griffin/Hahn criterion says us that 
we cannot prescribe principles or rules that do not conform to the features of that 
moral model of an agent. In this sense, Griffin/Hahn’s criterion for the selection of 
soft constraints could be formalised in the following way: all and only facts41 that 
are constitutive moral features of the model of agent assumed by our normative 
theory are soft constraints. 
Hence, let us suppose that our normative theory, M (from which will rise the 
prescription m), assumes the moral model of an agent, Im. Then let us suppose that 
Im’s actions are driven by the morally relevant motivations, a and b. Then, the 
                                                
40 Hahn, H. (2011), “Justifying Feasibility Constraints on Human Rights”, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 15(2): 143-157., pp. 150-151 
41 Mainly motivational facts 
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prescription m of M must respect: first, all hard practical constraints, and, second, the 
morally relevant motivations, a and b. That is to say, the prescription m cannot 
demand actions that Im is not motivated to perform (given its features a and b). 
For instance, let us suppose that in our normative theory, we assume that agents are 
solidarity driven42. Given this moral model of an agent, let us suppose that first, the 
agents have an interest in their own well being that is equal to her interest in the well 
being of other people; second, the agents believe that well-being is given by a certain 
amount of material goods and affections. To put it another way, let us suppose that 
the agents are mainly motivated by two states of mind: the desire to share well-being 
with anyone that needs it; the belief that well-being is provided by a certain level of 
material goods and affections. In this case, any prescription must respect: first, all 
hard practical constraints; second, the motivational states of mind driving the actions 
of this moral agent model. For example, the fact that this agent is motivated to share 
her material goods and affections with all other people who need them. 
The Griffin/Hahn criterion suggests that only hard constraints and motivational 
features of the moral model of the agent constrain the feasibility of the normative 
political prescriptions. So, in this case the set of soft constraints would include just 
motivations regarding solidarity. It means that any normative political prescription 
would be perfectly feasible if it conforms to hard constraints and motivations 
regarding solidarity. 
Intuitively, given a common sense definition of feasibility or given my own 
definition of feasibility, I think we would not necessarily obtain feasible 
prescriptions if we formalised them in accordance with the moral model of agent we 
assume. The common sense definition of feasibility suggests that something (a 
prescription) is feasible iff it is capable of being successfully used. Furthermore, I 
defined that prescriptions are feasible iff it is possible for human beings to act in 
accordance with those prescriptions ‘or’ human beings are able to act in accordance 
with those prescriptions. So, I think the Griffin/Hahn criterion is inappropriate 
because the moral model of agent that theorists assume in their theories could not 
correspond to reality. In other words, the moral model of agent could not correspond 
                                                
42 A solidarity driven individual is every time motivated to act in accordance with solidarity 
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to real human beings; so, we cannot suppose that human beings would behave as the 
moral model of agent behaves. 
Let us see the argument of the moral model of agent in the context of God-Land, the 
experimental city-state affected by a severe scarcity of resources. Let us suppose that 
God-Land citizens are in trouble because of a strong famine and that some of them 
do not have sufficient goods to stay alive in a decent way. Furthermore, let us 
suppose that in given the famine some people passed away, so some other people lost 
the person they loved. So, they suffer because of the physiological need of food and 
because they lost the people they love. Let us suppose that suddenly an enthusiastic 
and young Franciscan Monk starts to preach that ‘everyone ought share her material 
goods and love with people who need it’. Then let suppose that after one week of 
sermons, people start to share their food with the needy, but nothing changes in 
affective relations (except some brief expressions of compassion). In other words, 
people do not share love with others. The monk rounds up people in the central 
square of God-land, and he asks them why they do not share their feelings of love 
with others. Imagine that after a moment of silent and embarrassing sense of guilty, a 
shy woman answers that they are not able to share love with strangers, even if they 
need it. So, an older fellow brother of the monk suggests to the young that probably, 
it is not fully feasible to share affections with strangers. The young and disappointed 
monk then replies: ‘of course it is feasible. San Francesco, that is my moral model of 
human being, was able to share love with everyone. So, any human being is able to 
share love with everyone who need it’. Is this reasoning reasonable? Should we think 
that God-Land citizens (or the majority of them) are able to share their love with 
strangers just because San Francesco was able to do it? Should we think that 
everyone (or the majority of people) is able to act as the moral model of human 
beings we assumed, even if this model does not correspond to the reality of human 
beings?  
I think that assuming a common sense definition of feasibility ‘objects (in this case 
prescriptions) are feasible iff are capable of being used’, Griffin/Hahn criterion for 
the selection of soft constraints could have controversial implications. In fact, 
Griffin/Hahn criterion would admit cases in which certain prescriptions are feasible 
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even if they are not in accordance with the common sense definition of feasibility. In 
the case of the example above, the Franciscan prescription should be considered 
feasible if we adopt the Griffin/Hahn criterion for the selection of soft constraints; 
but it is difficult to consider it feasible adopting the common sense definition of 
feasibility. The same problem occurs if we adopt the definition of feasibility from 
which I move. In fact, it is difficult to think that human beings are able to share 
feelings of love with everyone else. So, the possibilities are two: either the 
Griffin/Hahn criterion for the selection of soft constraints is inadequate; or the 
common sense definition of feasibility and my definition of feasibility are wrong. In 
other words, the Griffin/Hahn criterion and the common sense definition of 
feasibility (or my definition) are incompatible; so, we should choose to maintain one 
or the other.  
For the moment, I suggest rejecting both the common sense and my definition of 
feasibility. So, I suggest analysing if the Griffin/Hahn criterion hold independently 
from the definitions of feasibility I provided. My opinion is that whatever definition 
of feasibility we have, the Griffin/Hahn criterion is inadequate because it leads to a 
vicious circular argument for the selection of soft constraints.  
 
I try to explain why this normative criterion leads to a circular argument for the 
selection of soft constraints. Feasibility requirements define the feasibility conditions 
of normative political prescriptions. So, theories of feasibility aim to determine the 
feasibility constraints that normative political prescriptions should conform with. 
Griffin/Hahn criterion to select soft feasibility constraints makes the feasibility 
requirement dependent on features of the moral model of agent assumed by the 
theories themselves. In other words, adopting this criterion, the feasibility conditions 
of normative political theories are dependent on the normative theories themselves.  
Griffin/Hahn criterion for the selection of soft constraints suggests that in order to be 
feasible, a normative theory should conform to features of the moral model of agent 
assumed by the theory itself. Precisely, the mechanism for the selection of soft 
constraints is the following: i) in order to be feasible, normative prescriptions must 
respect some facts; ii) however, in order to be assessed as feasibility constraint, a fact 
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should be assumed by normative theory itself as feature of the moral model of agent. 
In my opinion, this requirement warrants internal coherence between theoretical 
assumptions and prescriptions of the normative theories. However, it leads to 
circularity between internal parts of the normative theory and external constraints. 
Precisely, I hold that this normative feasibility criterion lead to arguments for the 
selection of soft constraints that are circular. Where a circular argument is an 
argument in which one of the premises is identical or equivalent to the conclusion43. 
 
I sum up the argumentation leading to Griffin/Hahn requirement of feasibility. The 
argument can be pointed out in this way: 
 
1. The theory M has to conform with facts that are soft feasibility constraints; 
2. A fact is a soft feasibility constraint iff it is a constitutive feature of the moral 
model of agent; 
3. The theory M assumes the moral model of agent (and its constitutive 
features); 
4. Therefore, a fact is a soft feasibility constraint iff the theory M assumes it is a 
soft feasibility constraints; 
5. Therefore, the theory M has to conform to facts that theory M assumes. 
 
Premise (1) is the feasibility requirement put in general form. Premise (2) is the 
Griffin/Hahn criterion for the selection of soft constraints. Premise (3) says us where 
we should find the moral model of agent. It seems opportune that the normative 
theory M assumes the features of its moral model of agent. Preliminary conclusion 
(4) is simply deduced by (3) and (2). The final conclusion (5) is deduced by (4) and 
(1): it is the Hahn’s feasibility requirement. Stressing (but not so much) this 
                                                
43 Sinnot-Armstrong writes, ‘an argument is weakly circular if and only if one of its premises is used 
to express the same proposition as its conclusion. An argument is strongly circular if and only if one 
of its premises expresses the same proposition in the same way as its conclusion.'  
Sinnot-Armstrong, W. (1999), “Begging the Question”, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 77(2), 
p.176 
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requirement, it says that normative theory M has to conform to soft constraints and 
soft constraints are fact that the theory M says are soft constraints44. 
 
Adopting the Griffin/Hahn criterion, we would select the soft constraints through an 
argument in which the set of soft constraints is assumed by the normative theory in 
itself. So, let us suppose that the theory M, which is based on the moral model of 
agent a-M adopts this criterion. The argument to select the set of soft constraints is 
the following:  
 
First premise, a fact is a soft feasibility constraint iff it is a constitutive 
feature of the moral model of agent a-M;  
Second premise, the fact-a is a feature of the moral model of agent a-M;  
Conclusion, the fact-a is a soft constraint.  
 
The first premise is the Griffin/Hahn criterion for the selection of soft constraints 
when it is adopted by a normative theory based on the model of agent a-M. The 
second premise is the line (3) of the previous reasoning: it states that the normative 
theory M assumes a certain moral model of agent a-M and consequently assumes the 
features of this model. So, the fact-a is assumed by the normative theory M. The 
conclusion states that the assumed fact-a is a soft constraint. I hold that this argument 
is circular because: given the first premise (so, adopting the Griffin/Hahn criterion 
for the selection of soft constraints), the second premise and the conclusion are 
equivalent (they express the same proposition).  
We understand it by substituting the second premise with the conclusion. So, that  
 
First premise, a fact is a soft feasibility constraint iff it is a constitutive 
feature of the moral model of agent a-M,  
                                                
44 In other words, the argument above can be synthesised in the following way:  
i) Normative theory M should conform with soft feasibility constraints;  
ii) Only those facts assumed by normative theory M are soft feasibility constraints;  
iii) Therefore, normative theory M should conform to those constraints assumed by 
normative theory M.  
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Second premise, the fact-a is a soft constraint,  
Conclusion, the fact-a is a constitutive feature of the moral model of agent a-
M.  
 
Therefore, adopting the Griffin/Hahn criterion the conclusion follows from the 
second premise, and the second premise follows from the conclusion. 
Through this criterion, soft feasibility constraints are assumed by the normative 
theory itself. So, any feasibility requirement shaped by this criterion is not 
independent from the normative theories themselves. I will show in the last 
paragraph that this circularity is vicious. In my opinion, this circularity makes the 
Griffin/Hahn criterion inadequate for the selection of soft constraints.  
 
Räikkä requirement of feasibility 
 
Räikkä's criterion for the selection of feasibility constraints is based on the notion of 
moral costs of changeover45. The moral costs of changeover are those costs in terms 
of values that could emerge when we try to implement a normative political 
prescription in the external world. 
Räikkä argues that when we try to implement a certain normative prescription, we 
could undermine the existence of certain facts. In other words, in order to implement 
a certain prescription in a certain context, it might happen that we need to modify, 
ignore, violate or destroy some facts. Some of these facts are just facts, some other 
facts could be morally/normatively46 valuable facts. For example, human life, 
personal goods, masterpieces could be normatively valuable facts. Thus, when we 
decide to implement a certain prescription we could undermine the existence of 
normatively valuable facts; when we undermine the existence of these facts we have 
                                                
45 Räikkä, J. (1998), “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 
6(1), pp. 33-38 
46 I do not provide a distinction between morally valuable facts and normatively valuable facts. So, I 
use these terms as synonymous. I just need that a fact is morally or normatively valuable iff it bears 
some value. 
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moral costs. So, given that we pay a moral cost, these facts should be considered 
feasibility constraints.  
From the Räikkä’s advice it could be possible to formalise a criterion such as ‘all 
and only facts that entails moral costs when their existence is undermined are soft 
constraints’.  
Anyway, someone could argue that this criterion stresses too much Räikkä’s 
suggestion. In fact, in his paper the authors admit that 
 
There are always some weak constraints, constraints that make it difficult 
(although not impossible) to implement social ideals, and some of the weak 
constraints involve moral costs, too.47 
 
Reading this sentence from Räikkä’s, it seems that the author is well conscious about 
the fact that just some soft constraints entail moral costs. He seems aware that there 
are other facts that play the role of soft constraints, even if they do not entail moral 
costs of changeover. This could be terminologically true. In the sense that Räikkä 
recognises that there are facts that make difficult to implement certain prescriptions 
even if they are not morally valuable. However, these non-morally valuable facts do 
not affect the feasibility degree of prescriptions. In other words, these facts are not 
relevant for the feasibility of prescriptions. Räikkä explicitly hold this: 
 
When evaluating the feasibility of a social institution, it is not enough to 
consider the strong [hard] constraints. Instead, a political theorist should 
consider some of the weak constraints too, namely, those that entail moral 
costs if the suggested [prescribed] institutional arrangements are 
implemented. There are feasibility degrees of feasibility only in the sense 
that arrangements are more or less feasible as far as they are more or less 
[morally] costly.48  
 
                                                
47 Ibidem, 34 
48 Ibidem, 38 
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Here, I avoid the terminologically redundant distinction between relevant and non-
relevant soft feasibility constraints, and it seems me plausible to hold that in Räikkä 
opinion just morally costly facts should be considered soft feasibility constraints. 
Now, I try to show how Räikkä’s criterion works. Let us assume the set of facts F: [i, 
m, e, c]. Such as; m and c entail moral costs of changeover; i and e do not entail 
moral costs of changeover. We can say that m and c are feasibility constraints, while 
i and e are not. Thus, let us assume the prescriptions x, y, z and let us suppose that i) 
any prescription respects hard constraints; ii) in order to implement prescription x it 
is necessary to undermine the existence of facts i and e; iii) in order to implement 
prescription y it is necessary to undermine the existence of facts m and c; iv) in order 
to implement prescription z it is necessary to undermine the existence of fact m. 
Given Räikkä's criterion for the selection of feasibility constraints we should 
conclude that i) prescription x is ‘completely’ feasible (because does not undermine 
the existence of normatively valuable facts); ii) prescription z is more feasible than 
prescription y. The reason to conclude ii) is that z undermines the existence of 
valuable facts less than y. 
We can see how this criterion works in God-Land context. Let us suppose that an 
engineer is interested to implement a prescription such as ‘we ought warrant water 
free access to everyone’. However, to do it, he has to solve the problem of scarcity of 
water that affects the city-state of God-Land. So, he projects a complicated water 
spring and he submits his project to the God-Land authority for public 
infrastructures. Let us suppose that in God-Land there is a cave and citizens of God-
Land believe (interpreting the Holy written) that God has been living in that cave. 
So, let us suppose that citizens call the cave ‘The Holy Cave’ and they assign a moral 
value to that cave. Let us suppose that the project recommends to build the water 
spring where the cave currently is. So, the project recommends to destroy the cave. 
Given that the cave is morally valuable, destroying it the citizens of God-Land would 
pay a moral cost. So, ‘The Holy Cave’ should be considered a feasibility constraint 
for the implementation of the ‘water-free’ prescription in the context of God-Land. 
Consequently, probably the God-Land authority for the infrastructure should 
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consider the project and the prescription unfeasible. And they should take other 
choices to provide water in God- Land. 
For example, let suppose that also a water seller coming from Waterworld (another 
city-state quite far from God-Land) is motivated to implement a prescription such as 
‘we ought warrant water free access to everyone’. So, she goes in front of the 
authority of God-Land and submits a business contract to buy water from the 
Waterworld Water Company. In this case the City of God-Land has not the material 
resources to buy the water, and the City of God-Land in no-way can buy the water 
from the Waterworld Water Company. However, given that the fact of severe 
scarcity of resources (or the lacked resources) is not morally valuable, then it should 
not be considered a soft constraint in Räikkä’s terms. 
Intuitively, this example also shows that Räikkä’s criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints has some trouble related to the common sense meaning of feasibility. 
Especially because Räikkä himself defines a feasible object as something 'capable of 
being successfully used'. In fact, given the Räikkä requirement of feasibility, the 
second way to implement the prescription should be considered more feasible then 
the first one, even if that way is not 'capable of being successfully used'.  
Of course, it is also plausible that Räikkä would prefer to revise his definition of 
feasibility instead of the criterion of moral costs of changeover. So, also in this case, 
I suggest rejecting both the common sense definition and my definition of feasibility. 
I suggest analysing whether the Räikkä’s criterion is a good criterion for the 
selection of soft constraints independently from any definition of feasibility. Also in 
this case, my opinion is that whatever the definition of feasibility we provide, 
Räikkä’s criterion is inadequate because it leads to circular arguments for the 
selection of soft constraints.  
 
I try to explain why this normative criterion leads to a circular argument. As the 
Hahn criterion, Räikkä criterion for the selection soft feasibility constraints makes 
the feasibility requirement dependent on normatively valuable facts: facts assumed 
by the normative theories themselves. In other words, also adopting this criterion, the 
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feasibility conditions of normative political theories are dependent on the normative 
theories themselves.  
Räikkä criterion for the selection of soft constraints suggests that ‘all and only those 
facts which entail moral costs of changeover are soft feasibility constraints’, where: 
‘only normatively valuable facts could entail moral costs’. The mechanism for the 
selection of soft constraints is the following: i) in order to be feasible, normative 
prescriptions should conform with some facts, namely, soft feasibility constraints; ii) 
however, in order to be assessed as feasibility constraint, a fact should be evaluated 
by the normative theory itself as ‘normatively valuable fact’. I think that this 
criterion leads to circularity between internal normative parts of the normative theory 
and (feasibility) constraints. In particular, this criterion suggests that the prescriptions 
of a normative theory should conform to external facts; but, the external facts should 
be assumed to be relevant in by the normative argument of the theory. 
 
I sum up the argumentation leading to the Griffin/Hahn requirement of feasibility in 
this way:  
 
1. The theory M has to conform with soft constraints;  
2. A fact is a soft constraint iff it implies moral costs;  
3. A fact implies a moral cost only if it is morally valuable;  
4. The theory M defines moral values. So, the theory M indirectly assumes 
morally valuable facts; 
5. Therefore, a fact is a soft constraint iff the normative theory M assumes that 
it is soft constraint; 
6. Therefore, the normative theory M has to conform to facts assumed by 
normative theory M. 
 
Premise (1) is the feasibility requirement in general. Premise (2) is Räikkä criterion 
for the selection of soft constraints. Premise (3) is implicit in the argument. Facts 
entailing moral costs are normatively valuable. Premise (4) says us how we can 
understand if a fact is morally valuable. It is the most sensitive step of the reasoning. 
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The idea is that given a fact m, I can say that it is morally valuable since I trust in a 
normative theory that assumes a certain value Vm that says which values to trust. 
Supposing that the theory assumes the value Vm and that m bears Vm, the theory 
assumes that fact m is morally valuable. Preliminary conclusion (5) is given by the 
inference of (4), (3) and (2). The theory M assumes morally valuable facts, morally 
valuable facts entail moral costs and facts entailing moral costs are soft constraints. 
So, the normative theory M assumes soft constraints. Last conclusion (6) is inferred 
by (1) and (5); and it is the Räikkä normative feasibility requirement.  
To rephrase the argument, it says that normative theory M has to conform to soft 
constraints and soft constraints are fact that the theory M says are soft constraints49. 
 
Adopting this criterion for the selection of feasibility constraints we would hold an 
argument in which the set of soft constraints is assumed by the normative theory 
itself. So, let us suppose that the normative theory M assumes that A is a value. Let 
us suppose that M proponents adopt the Räikkä’s criterion. In this case, the argument 
to select the set of soft constraints would be the following:  
 
First premise, a fact is a soft feasibility constraint iff it entails moral costs in 
terms of the value A (iff it is A-morally valuable);  
Second premise, the fact-a entails moral costs in terms of the value A (it is A-
morally valuable);  
Conclusion, the fact-a is a soft constraint.  
 
The first premise is the Räikkä’s criterion for the selection of soft constraints when it 
is adopted by theory M. The second premise is the line (4) of the previous reasoning: 
it states that the normative theory M assumes a certain moral value A, then it 
                                                
49 To see the requirement in another way: 
i) Normative theory M should be conform with feasibility constraints;  
ii) Feasibility constraints are those selected facts to which the theory M assign a normative 
value in accordance with its moral assumptions. Therefore;  
iii) Normative theory M should be conform with those facts selected by normative theory 
M.  
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implicitly assumes morally valuable facts (facts implying cost in terms of the value 
A). So, the fact-a (implying costs in term of A) is assumed entailing moral costs by 
the normative theory M. The conclusion states that the assumed fact-a is a soft 
constraint. I hold that this argument is circular because: given the first premise 
(adopting the Räikkä’s criterion for the selection of soft constraints), the second 
premise and the conclusion express the same proposition. So, the argument is 
circular. 
We understand it by substituting the second premise with the conclusion. So that  
 
First premise, a fact is a soft feasibility constraint iff it entails moral costs in 
terms of the value A (iff it is A-morally valuable);  
Second premise, the fact-a is a soft constraint;  
Conclusion, the fact-a entails moral costs in terms of the value A (it is A-
morally valuable). 
 
Adopting Räikkä’s criterion the conclusion follows from the second premise and the 
second premise follows from the conclusion.  
So, given Räikkä’s criterion, the selection of constraints of normative theory is not 
independent by the normative theory itself: in fact, facts are feasibility constraints if 
and only if they bear certain moral values assumed by normative theories. Again, a 
feasibility requirement should define the conditions to obtain feasible normative 
political theories. However, adopting the Räikkä criterion for the selection of 
constraints, the conditions of feasibility are assumed by the normative theories 
themselves (they depend on the normative theories). Now I am going to show why 
these circular arguments can lead to vicious implications. 
 
Normative criteria: incongruity and vicious circularity 
 
Though the review of Hahn’s and Räikkä’s contributions, I introduced two normative 
criteria for the selection of soft constraints. Briefly, I held that the feasibility 
requirements following these criteria are i) incongruent with my definition of 
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feasibility and with the common sense definition of feasibility; ii) inadequate 
whatever definition of feasibility we want to use, because they lead to circular 
arguments for the selection of soft constraints. 
I have shown that in accordance with the normative criteria for the selection of soft 
constraints some prescriptions should be considered feasible, even if they do not fit 
with the common sense meaning of ‘feasible’ as ‘something that is capable of being 
successfully used’. This implication was clear in the two cases occurred in the 
example of the city-state of God-Land.  
In the first example, the action ‘to share love with everyone who needs love’ was 
considered feasible because it was in accordance with the normative requirement: 
given that the assumed moral model of agent (San Francesco) would have been able 
to share love with everyone who needs love. I held that assuming the common sense 
definition of feasibility it is difficult to think that the action ‘to share love with 
everyone who needs love’ can be considered feasible. In fact, we think that human 
beings usually are able to feel love (and share it) just for a particular kind of people; 
so, people are usually unable to share love with strangers. Or at least, human beings 
are not able to share love with everyone who needs love: it is difficult to think that 
people would be able to share love with Hitler, a rapist or someone who stole their 
bicycle, even if these persons needed love. 
In the second example, the action ‘to buy water’ was considered more feasible than 
the action ‘to build a water spring’, even if, in order to be able to buy water, the 
internal product of God-Land should grow for the 50%. The action ‘to buy water’ 
was considered more feasible because it did not require to undermining the existence 
of valuable facts. I held that assuming the common sense definition of feasibility it is 
difficult to consider the action ‘to buy water (increasing the 50% the internal 
product)’ more feasible than the one ‘to build a water spring (simply destroying the 
Holy-Cave)’.  
Therefore, these examples show that the normative criteria of feasibility lead to 
feasibility requirements that are incongruent with the common sense definition of 
feasibility. Then, I suggested analysing the normative criteria of feasibility 
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independently of any definition of feasibility. So, I held that they lead to circular 
arguments for the selection of soft constraints. 
To sum up, the argument showing the circularity is this:  
 
1. The normative theory M should conform to feasibility constraints;  
2. Facts are feasibility constraints iff morally valuable (they bear certain 
values); 
3. Normative theory M assumes morally valuable facts;  
4. Therefore, a fact is a soft constraint iff the theory M assumes it is a soft 
constraints a soft constraint;  
5. Therefore, normative theory M should conform to facts assumed by the 
normative theory M.  
 
From which: 
 
First premise, a fact is a soft constraint iff it bears the value A (it is 
normatively valuable);  
Second premise, the fact-a bears the value A;  
Conclusion, fact-a is a soft feasibility constraint.  
 
The first premise is the normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints; and it 
takes this form when proponents of theory M adopt it in order to select soft 
constraints. The second premise states that a certain fact-a bears the value A. So, the 
theory M assumes that fact-a is normatively valuable. The conclusion states that the 
assumed fact-a is a soft constraint. I held that this argument is circular because: the 
second premise and the conclusion express the same proposition (they are equivalent 
and this is a form of weak circularity), since we adopt the normative criterion in the 
first premise. We understand it by substituting the second premise with the 
conclusion. So that first premise, a fact is a soft constraint iff it bears the value A (it 
is normatively valuable); second premise, the fact-a is a soft constraint; conclusion, 
the fact-a bears the value A. Hence, adopting a normative criterion the conclusion 
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follows from the second premise and the second premise follows from the 
conclusion.  
However, not any circular argument is a bad argument. Some mathematical 
arguments are circular but we are used to consider them good arguments. 
Specifically, circular arguments are valid arguments and they can also be sound 
arguments. So, a circular argument is bad argument when it its circularity is vicious. 
Thus, I try to show that this argument should be considered a poor one, because its 
circularity is vicious in most cases.  
Let us first consider the example used by Sinnot-Armstrong to show what vicious 
circularity is and when it occurs. Let us suppose that Nancy introduces this argument 
to Oliver: 
 
First premise, Ohio is the Buckeye State;  
Second premise, Mary lives in Ohio;  
Conclusion, Mary lives in Buckeye State.  
 
This argument is circular because the second premise and the conclusion are 
equivalent (they express the same content), since when Nancy assumes the first 
premise. Despite the argument is circular, it is logically valid and it could also be 
sound if the premises were true. However, let us suppose that Oliver rejects the first 
premise and he argues that Indiana is the Buckeye State and not Ohio. Let us suppose 
that Nancy does not have any external evidence to show that her first premise is true. 
So, she can simply say, 'Ohio is the Buckeye State because I know that Ohio is the 
Buckeye State'. Of course, this reason is also the reason to hold that Mary lives in the 
Buckeye state (Nancy would hold 'Mary lives in Buckeye State because I know she 
lives in the Buckeye State'). So, Nancy would just repeat the argument without any 
further reason to hold her first premise: without any further evidence to hold that 
Ohio is the Buckeye State. In this case, Oliver can still reject Nancy first premise 
(Oliver can still hold 'No, Mary does not live in the Buckeye State, because she lives 
in Ohio. And Ohio is not the Buckeye State').  
In other words, the first premise is questionable and because of this Sinnot-
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Armostrong says that Nancy’s argument is vicious. That is to say, when an argument 
lies on certain premises and the truth of these premises is questionable, it can happen 
that other people reject the premises and we have not (unquestionable) reasons to 
show them that they should not reject those premises. When this occurs, our 
argument should be considered vicious. 
I ask to consider this idea of ‘vicious circularity’ to evaluate the selection of soft 
constraints through normative criteria. So, let us consider the usual argument: 
 
First premise, a fact is a soft constraint iff it bears the value A (it is 
normatively valuable); 
Second premise, the fact-a bears the value A;  
Conclusion, fact-a is a soft feasibility constraint.  
 
In this case, the normative theory M assumes that the fact-a is normatively valuable 
(because it bears the value A) and it is a soft constraint. The fact-a is both 
normatively valuable and it is a soft constraint because it bears normative/moral 
values. In other words, ‘fact a bears moral value A’ is the reason to hold both the 
conclusion and the second premise.  
Now, let us suppose that Oliver (that is mostly sceptical) does not trust in the 
normative theory M. Let suppose Oliver trusts in the normative theory non-M and he 
argues that fact-a is not normatively valuable, because we should reject the first 
premise. So, let suppose that Oliver argues that the first premise should be ‘a fact is a 
soft constraint iff it bears the value B’. In other words, let us suppose that there is 
disagreement about the normative reason to hold that a certain fact is a soft 
constraint. In this case, the proponent of the normative theory M can just repeat her 
argument without appealing to any reason that is external from M. So, Oliver would 
disagree again. In this case, I can say that the argument is vicious given that the 
normative disagreement is unsolvable.50 The argument is insoluble if neither Oliver 
nor you change your normative theories. 
                                                
50 Maybe we could also say that the argument begs the question, given that the reason justifying the 
first premise is not independent from the reason justifying the conclusion.  
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So, cases of normative disagreement show that the circularity of this argument is 
vicious, given that there is not a reason external to the normative theories themselves 
to show that the premises are true. Normative criteria lead to arguments for the 
selection of soft constraints that are bad arguments. For this reason, normative 
criterion for the selection of soft constraints is sensitive to the following 
contradictory implication. Showing this implication I hope to discourage the reader 
to adopt normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints.  
Let us suppose the case in which two scholars trust in two different normative 
theories but both of them would like to evaluate the feasibility of the prescription x in 
a certain context C. That is to say, let us suppose that both the normative theory M 
and the normative theory non-M formalise the prescription x. Thus, M and non-M 
have different reasons to hold the desirability of x, anyway they both agree in the fact 
that x is desirable. Now, let us suppose that the fact-a is normatively valuable given 
the value A assumed by the theory M, but fact-a is not normatively valuable given 
the values assumed by the theory non-M. So, let us assume that both theories do not 
appeal to other reasons in order to show whether fact-a is normatively valuable or 
not. In other words, theory M assumes that fact-a is a normatively valuable because it 
bears the normative value A assumed by M. The normative theory non-M assumes 
that fact-a is not normatively valuable because it does not bear any value assumed by 
non-M. So, M and non-M disagree whether considering the fact-a normatively 
valuable or not, because they disagree about normative values (and they will never 
agree51). Given the unsolvable disagreement between M and non-M in considering 
the fact-a normatively valuable, we should conclude that the fact-a is and is not a soft 
constraint for the implementation of the prescription x in the context C. This 
conclusion is contradictory and, dealing with a normative feasibility requirement, we 
cannot appeal to any other argument to solve this contradiction. 
This last argument shows that when normativity (or morality) plays a role in the 
selection of soft constraints, normative feasibility requirements lead to vicious 
circular arguments for the selection of soft constraints. Finally, this vicious 
                                                
51 If they would agree in the future, this would mean that one of the two theories is changed in a 
relevant way and it cannot be considered anymore the same normative theory. 
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circularity compromises the evaluations about the feasibility of prescriptions. 
Therefore, we should reject normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this part of the second chapter, I have shown that given a common sense 
definition, a prescription is feasible if and only if it is capable of being successfully 
used. Dealing with this definition and emphasising the relevance of soft constraints 
affecting the feasibility of prescription, we have no reason to select soft constraints 
through a non-practical criterion. So, thanks to this review about the normative 
feasibility requirements, I think I have shown that the interference of normative (or 
moral) arguments during the selection of feasibility constraints is inappropriate 
when we accept a common sense definition of feasibility. If we want that a certain 
prescription be feasible, we should select facts affecting its implementation and 
maintenance through a practical criterion.  
It is obviously relevant that a normative prescription be implemented in a certain 
context through a way that is normatively acceptable, but I think that this problem 
does not matter for the feasibility in itself. Differently, I think that this problem 
regards the sphere of desirability of normative prescriptions. 
If a certain prescription can be successfully implemented, but implementing it we 
violate all moral values assumed by our normative theory, the limit of that 
prescription is not the feasibility but its desirability. In other words, we would not 
say that it is unfeasible to implement that prescription; we would say that it is not 
desirable to implement that prescription. In the same way, if a certain prescription 
can be successfully implemented only stimulating the immoral or non-moral 
motivations of human beings, the limit of that prescription is not the feasibility. 
Rather, to could be undesirable to implement that prescription. Therefore, despite the 
moral costs of changeover or the coherence with the moral model of agent could be 
factors that we should evaluate when we want to implement a prescription, such 
factors do not affect the feasibility of prescriptions. These factors affect the 
desirability of prescriptions. In other words, if a feasible prescription brings to unjust 
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consequences when it is implemented in a certain context, it still remains a feasible 
prescription, even if it is not desirable. 
Normative feasibility requirements ensure that prescriptions have not undesirable 
consequences during their implementation or maintenance. However, not any 
evaluation occurring during the phase of implementation and maintenance of 
prescriptions regards the feasibility. Some evaluations concern the desirability even 
if they occur when we pay attention to the consequences of implementation and 
maintenance in real contexts. The case of moral costs of changeover shows that 
evaluations concerning desirability can occur also during the phase of 
implementation of prescriptions and not only during the phase of theorization. 
Obviously, the consequences emerging during the phase of implementation could be 
undesirable, but this matters for the desirability of prescriptions. So, selecting 
constraints through normative criteria, we do not warrant the feasibility of 
prescriptions. Differently, we warrant that the consequences of the implementation of 
a certain prescription are desirable. 
Distinguishing between these two phases (implementation/maintenance and 
formalization of normative political prescriptions), it is clear that problems 
concerning feasibility and desirability occur in both phases.  
Otherwise, also Hahn and Räikkä deal with the set of hard feasibility constraints in 
virtue of a practical argument: ‘it is not practically possible to implement 
prescriptions that are not conform with this constraints’. So, it is not clear why they 
introduce normative arguments to for the selection of soft feasibility constraints. I 
think there are no reasons to change the definition of feasibility and the criterion for 
the selection of feasibility constraints. If I think that it is opportune to select hard 
constraints among those facts that affect the practical possibility, why should we 
select soft constraints among those facts that are normatively valuable (in my 
opinion)? I think there is not a reason to change the meaning of feasibility depending 
on the kinds of constraints that we take in consideration. Hence, I think we should 
select soft constraints paying attention to the practical property (or properties) that 
facts have. The analysis of the practical properties of soft constraints is the focus of 
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the rest of my thesis and it starts with the review of the Gilabert and Lawford-Sith 
practical feasibility requirement in the next part of this chapter. 
Of course, practical feasibility selective criterion avoids the normative circularity. 
Practical criteria to select feasible constraints evaluate the relevance of facts 
considering features that facts have by themselves; independently of the normative 
theory we trust. In particular, these criteria suggest that facts are soft feasibility 
constraints if they influence the probability of success of a certain prescription or if 
they make impossible to obtain a certain prescription in a certain context. By doing 
so, the prescription has a certain feasibility degree if it is to be capable of being 
successfully used for some degrees or if it is capable of being successfully used in a 
certain context. So, the requirement seem consistent with the common sense meaning 
of the term feasible. 
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Chapter 4 
Practical Feasibility Requirement 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will take into consideration a practical criterion for the selection of 
soft constraints. As in the case of normative criteria, here I suggest some guidelines 
to formalise a formal criterion inspired by previous contributions. However, 
differently from normative criteria, this practical criterion selects soft constraints 
independently of the moral or normative relevance of facts. This criterion selects soft 
constraints paying attention to the influence that certain facts have on the probability 
of success of a certain prescription in a certain context. 
In the next part of this chapter, I will try to accurately review and analyse Jensen’s, 
Gilabert’s and Lawford-Smith’s contributions about feasibility. However, it is 
necessary to preliminarily specify two differences between my account of feasibility 
and theirs. 
First of all, these authors provide some guidelines that are useful to formalise a 
criterion for the selection of soft constraints. However, these authors do not specify 
any formal criterion for the selection of soft constraints, while I will formalise this 
criterion deducing it from their guidelines. Thus, all of them could disagree on my 
interpretation of their contributions. Consequently, all of them could reject the 
practical criterion I will formalise because it could be incoherent with their 
guidelines.  
Second, I considered soft constraints those facts affecting the contextual feasibility as 
well as the general and contextual feasibility degree of prescriptions. Differently, 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith consider soft constraints just those facts affecting the 
contextual degree of feasibility of prescriptions. I do not think that this difference has 
an impact on the formalisation of the practical criterion. Anyway, in this chapter I 
will pay attention only to facts affecting the contextual feasibility degree of 
prescriptions. I will adapt this criterion for my goals in the next chapter: in that way, 
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it can be useful to select facts affecting the contextual feasibility the general degree 
of feasibility too. 
This part is divided in two sections.  
In the first section, I deduce the practical criterion from the guidelines that the 
authors provide. I will conclude this section showing that a fact is a soft constraint 
for the (set of) prescription(s) x in the context C iff: 
a) It affects the probability of success of x in C;  
b) It does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with other contexts; 
c) It does (a) now and in a predictable future; 
d) It exists in C independently of what people inhabiting C want 
In the second section I will show which kinds of fact are feasibility constraints in 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith account of feasibility. I will conclude that institutional 
facts, cultural facts and economic facts should not be considered feasibility 
constraints given the practical criterion for the selection of soft constraints. So, I will 
show that these social facts (which are usually considered uncontested soft 
constraints) do not matters for the feasibility of normative political prescription, 
because they do not satisfy the condition (d) of the practical criterion. 
 
Selecting soft constraints: facts and probability of success 
 
As I wrote in the introduction, in this part of the chapter I consider those 
contributions that try to provide a practical feasibility requirement. Authors as 
Jensen, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith purpose an important analysis about the 
selection of soft constraints. These authors call their conception of feasibility 
‘political feasibility’ or ‘practical feasibility’; here, I use the term ‘practical 
feasibility’. The aim of these authors is to determine the feasibility conditions to 
implement and maintain normative political prescriptions (or political outcomes) in 
peculiar contexts. Here, I will review these contributions trying to systematise their 
content and trying to formalise a practical criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints.  
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I already remarked that these authors consider soft constraints just those facts 
affecting the contextual probability of success of a certain prescription. This is 
particularly clear in some of their quotes. So, I suggest moving exactly from these 
quotes, and then reconstructing the practical criterion step by step.  
Lawford-Smith writes: 'an outcome [as normative political prescriptions] is binary 
feasible iff there exists an action such that the probability of the outcome given that 
action is greater than zero…the scalar feasibility of an outcome is equal to the 
probability of the outcome given the best action [to obtain that outcome]…The 
probability of the outcome is determined by the extent to which the best action 
clashes with soft constraints in producing the outcome'52.  
This quote underlines the already clarified distinction between binary feasibility and 
scalar feasibility. Also in this case, the distinction is between facts that make 
impossible to implement and maintain certain political prescriptions (outcomes) and 
facts that make improbable to implement prescriptions. The former kind of facts 
affects the binary feasibility of normative political prescriptions, while the latter 
affect the scalar feasibility (the degree of feasibility) of prescriptions. In this part, I 
am clearly interested in those constraints affecting the scalar feasibility of 
prescriptions: so, a first main clause to select soft constraints should pay attention to 
those facts affecting the probability of success of normative political prescriptions. 
Hence, it seems to me that soft constraints should those facts that affect the 
probability of success that a certain prescription (or set of prescriptions) be 
implemented and maintained in a certain context.  
 
That is to say, the first guideline to distinguish soft constraints from simple 
facts characterizing a context is only those facts characterizing a context C and 
affecting the probability of success of a certain (set of) prescription(s) x are 
soft constraints for that (set of) prescription(s) x in that context C.  
 
                                                
52 Lawford-Smith, H. (2013), “Understanding Political Feasibility”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 21(3): 9-14. 
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This guideline suggests us to pay attention on those facts affecting the probable 
success of normative political prescriptions in circumscribed contexts. In the first 
part of this chapter, I showed that cultural, institutions, economy, motivational53 and 
psychological features of human beings and state of technology are all good 
candidates to be soft constraints. However, not any fact belonging to these kinds of 
facts and characterising a certain context should be considered a soft constraint for 
any prescription in that context. At this first stage, just those facts influencing the 
probability of success could be soft constraints.  
That is to say: given a certain (set of) prescriptions(s) x that can be implemented or 
maintained in a context C through the best action A, the degree of feasibility of x 
depends on the probability that agents inhabiting C successfully implement or 
maintain x when they perform A. The probability of success to implement or 
maintain x depends on the extent to which A clashes with soft constraints.  
For example, let suppose we want that female people have the same rights of male 
people in an extremely culturally sexist society. Let us suppose that we want to 
implement a certain prescription such as ‘both women and men have the right to 
marry whoever they want’. This prescription implies that all women and men are 
allowed to choose their partners. Let us suppose that in our context men are used to 
choose their wives, but women are not allowed to choose their husbands, because the 
cultural practices are strongly sexist. In this case, we would say that the prescription 
clashes with the culture of the context, so it has not a full probability to be satisfied 
in that context. Hence, the sexist culture should be considered a soft constraint. 
 
I translate the first guideline for the selection of soft constraints in a criterion 
such that  
A fact is a soft constraint for the (set of) prescription(s) x in the context C iff: 
a) it affects the probability of success of x in C 
                                                
53 As I will write, these authors consider individuals’ own motivations as soft constraints only if they 
are independent from what individuals want. Therefore, individuals’ own motivations affect the 
feasibility of normative political prescriptions only if they are determined by un-chosen causes (i.e. 
traumatic event, psychological illnesses, etc.) 
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Given this first rule, soft constraints are selected according to their relevance in a 
certain context, and their relevance in a certain context depends on their influence on 
the success of prescriptions. In this sense, the context in which a prescription should 
be implemented or maintained plays a central role in the definition of the set of soft 
constraints. However, a context can be characterised in different ways, since when it 
is a set of facts that are placed in a certain space at certain time. So, a context is a 
certain space at certain time and it is characterised by certain facts; these facts can 
influence the success of a prescription in that space and at that time but they can even 
lose their relevance: they can change or they can disappear. In a word, soft 
constraints are malleable and they can be neutralised54.  
In the next two paragraphs I will show that some facts currently affecting the 
probability of success of a prescription in a politically circumscribed space could be 
neutralized thanks to: i) the network of political relations of that context; ii) some 
future changing of the characteristics of the context. Hence, my aim is to show that 
appropriately considering the network of relations of a certain circumscribed spaces 
or future improvements some facts are not soft constraints, even if they can appear to 
be so at first glance.  
 
Isolated vs. interacting contexts 
 
In their contributions, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith emphasise the risk to 
overestimate the relevance of certain facts: the risk is to overestimate the impact of 
certain fact on the probability of success of prescriptions in a certain context. The 
risk of overestimating the relevance of certain facts occurs in the moment in which 
we analyse a certain context isolating it from its network of relations. The idea is that 
spatially circumscribed contexts are usually in relation with each other: they are 
mostly geographically in contact with other contexts, and they have relations with 
other contexts. In other words, spatially circumscribed contexts are politically, 
                                                
54 A soft constraint is neutralised when it does not affect the probability of a certain prescription 
anymore 
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economically and culturally related: so, they belong to a network of political, 
economic and cultural relations55. 
Given this network of relations, some facts characterising a specific context and 
affecting the success of certain prescriptions lose their relevance. In other words, the 
network of relations permits that ‘intervention’ of external agencies (representing 
other contexts) neutralises certain soft constraints that without this ‘intervention’ 
would affect the success of a prescription in a certain context. In this sense, in the 
moment we want to evaluate which facts are soft constraints, we should not isolate 
the context we are interested in from its network of relations.  
 
About the influence of network of relations Gilabert writes: 'many poor nations 
do not have enough economic resources to secure the putative socioeconomic 
rights of their people. This would not show that there are no socioeconomic 
human rights. What it would show is that certain domestic duties to fulfill 
socio-economic rights cannot be fully met. But this still leaves open the 
possibility that there may be international duties to assist poor people in other 
countries…[about healthcare rights] if other countries have the medical 
technology that could help prevent diseases in the first country, then they 
should in principle make them available…International assistance regarding 
basic medical care has a level of moral urgency and feasibility that 
international assistance regarding advanced medical care does not have'.56 
 
I do not want to consider the normative content of this quote. What I am interested to 
show is that Gilabert explicitly claims that some facts that would constrain the 
feasibility of certain prescriptions in certain context lose their relevance thanks to 
international co-operation and international interventions. The quote shows two cases 
                                                
55 Poetically speaking, I could say that the network of relations expands the spatial dimension of 
contexts beyond its formally circumscribed boundaries. Even considering just physical facts, a context 
that is related with other contexts usually has some official headquarters in these other contexts. They 
have embassies offices, sometimes they military bases or just working offices in foreign countries. 
These are physical spaces that are parts of a circumscribed context but they are placed outside the 
boundaries of that context 
56 Gilabert, P. (2009), “The feasibility of basic socioeconomic human rights: a conceptual 
exploration”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(237), p. 671. 
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in which soft constraints are neutralised thanks to an external intervention. In the first 
case a prescription warranting a minimal level of nourishment could not be 
implemented in a certain context because of the scarcity of resources. In the second 
case a prescription warranting a basic level of medical care could not be 
implemented in a certain context because people inhabiting that context have not the 
necessary medical technology. In this sense, scarcity of resources and the lack of 
technology were soft constraints for those prescriptions. However, the author 
suggests that these constraints could be neutralised through the intervention of 
external agencies.  
In the previous paragraph I formalised a practical criterion such that a fact is a soft 
constraint for the (set of) prescription(s) x in the context C iff: a) it affects the 
probability of success of x in C and. Taking in consideration the advice about the 
network of relations of a context I add the specification such as 
 
‘Given C as interacting spatially defined context’. Where an interacting 
spatially defined context is a context that is formally defined by certain spatial 
coordinates and political boundaries, but it is also a context having relations 
beyond its boundaries with one or more other contexts. 
 
So far, I argued that we should select soft constraints taking in consideration the 
relations of a certain context; the reason is that isolating a context from its network of 
relations we could overestimate the relevance of certain facts. This means that 
isolating a context, we can think that certain facts affect the probability of success of 
a prescription; but if we considered its relations with other contexts, we could easily 
understand that these facts do not affect the probability of success of that 
prescription. So, it is inadequate to select soft constraints isolating contexts because 
any analysis of soft constraints that isolate contexts risks the overestimation of 
certain facts. Furthermore, isolating a context, we risk ignoring other facts that affect 
the probability of success of a prescription. Overestimation and ignorance about soft 
constraints are errors that can have dramatic consequences during the 
implementation or the maintenance of normative political prescriptions.  
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The previous analysis about overestimation seems to suggest that a context 
interacting with other contexts is affected by less soft constraints than a context 
which does not interact with others. In other words, the amount of soft constraints 
affecting an interactive context seems to be smaller than the amount of soft 
constraints affecting the same circumscribed space when it is isolated from other 
contexts. Let us suppose that insolating the context C from its network of relations, 
we find out that a certain number n of soft constraints affects the success of a certain 
prescription x in C. Differently, evaluating the network of relations of C, the number 
of soft constraints influencing the success of x in C seems to be smaller than n. In 
other words, the relations among contexts seem to reduce the number of soft 
constraints affecting the success of a prescription in a certain context. However, this 
is a wrong conclusion.  
In fact, the interactions of a context not necessarily reduce the number of soft 
constraints. There is not a reason to infer a reduction of soft constraints from the fact 
that a context interacts with other contexts. Thus, a unilaterally optimistic evaluation 
of interactions among contexts is inadequate. It is true that the relations among 
contexts could reduce the relevance of certain facts and neutralise them. However, 
the same relations could not reduce soft constraints or they could even generate other 
soft constraints. So, an analysis that takes in consideration the interactions among 
contexts is appropriate also because gives us the opportunity to evaluate those 
constraints emerging from the interactions among contexts: constraints that otherwise 
we would ignore. 
Briefly, even if I agree on the idea that contexts interact with each other, the 
consequence of such interactions is not necessarily a reduction of soft constraints. On 
contrary, the number of soft constraints can also increase because of conflicting 
interactions.  
For instance, let us suppose that the Franciscan monk living in God-Land would like 
to implement the prescription ‘everyone has the right to basic medical care’ in the 
city-state of God-Land. We already know that God-Land is affected by severe 
scarcity of resources. Consequently, citizens of God-Land have not the medical 
resources to satisfy that prescription, so it is lowly feasible (or maybe unfeasible). 
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However, let us suppose that the water seller of Waterworld is also a traveling 
salesman for a transnational Medical Corporation. Let suppose that whatever the 
reason is (I guess it is not an ethical one), the Medical Corporation offers basic 
medical care to citizens of God-Land for free. In this case, the prescription ‘everyone 
has the right to basic medical care’ becomes highly feasible. Thus, analysing God-
Land and its relations with other contexts, it seems that the soft constraint ‘scarcity of 
medicines’ disappears. 
However, let us assume now, that the God-Grand-Vizier (that is still the main 
political authority in God-Land) finds out that people inhabiting the context No-God-
Land do not trust in God (or they do not trust in the same God that people of God-
Land trust). So, let us suppose that inhabitants of God-Land and inhabitants of No-
God-Land start to have a conflicting relation. They start an escalation of tension and 
finally they start a war. Let us suppose that the transnational Medical Corporation 
does not want to work in a war-zone. So, it stops to medically assist God-Land 
citizens. In this case a sum of facts as the existence of a war and the will of the 
Medical Corporation board makes improbable to implement the health care 
prescription. Hence, soft constraints emerge because of the interaction among 
contexts. The conflict between contexts produces soft constraints, and the 
prescription ‘everyone has the right to basic medical care’ is lowly feasible in God-
Land. Then I conclude that conflicting relation produces soft constraints57.  
In conclusion, it is false that soft constraints of an interacting context are less than 
the soft constraints of that same but isolated context. If we think that we should 
consider an interacting context, we should accept that facts characterising an 
interacting context could be different and more than facts characterising the same but 
isolated context. Changing and growing the number of facts characterising that 
context, the number of facts influencing the probability of success of a certain 
prescription could change and grow too. Therefore, the number of soft constraints 
                                                
57 Let us consider a real case. Palestinians have relations with people inhabiting other contexts (at least 
with Israelis): so, we can agree that Palestine has a network of relations. However, it seems difficult to 
suppose that Palestine would have more constraints if she would not have relations with others. In this 
case, a wide number of constraints emerges properly because of (conflicting) relations with other 
contexts. 
 
100 
 
could change and grow as well as decrease or stabilise. In other words, the fact that a 
context belongs to a network of relations does not say anything about the number of 
soft constraints that influence the success of a certain prescription in that context. 
In this paragraph, I introduced a specification of the practical criterion for the 
selection of soft constraints. Precisely, I specified that we should select soft 
constraints taking into consideration the relations that a context maintains with other 
contexts.  
 
Given the specification, the practical criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints becomes: 
A fact is a soft constraint for the prescription x in the context C iff: 
a) It affects the probability of success of x in C and;  
b) It does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with other 
contexts  
 
Such a specification makes us aware about two kinds of soft constraints: first, those 
constraints that are proper features of a context independently of the network of 
relations of this context. So, those constraints that cannot be neutralised through the 
interaction with other contexts; second, those constraints that emerge in a context 
because of its relations with other contexts. Such a specification about the relational 
features of contexts allows us to avoid to overestimate and to ignore the relevance of 
certain facts.  
 
Lapses of time and soft constraint: synchronic abilities, diachronic abilities 
 
The third guideline to define a proper practical criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints is introduced by Jensen58 and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith follow it in 
their contributions. For these authors soft constraints are those facts affecting the 
probability of success of a certain prescription in a certain context. In the previous 
                                                
58 Jensen, M. (2009), “The Limits of Practical Possibility”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 17(2): 
168-184. 
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paragraph, I show that these authors pay attention to the network of relations of 
contexts in order to understand which facts are soft constraints. So, the formal spatial 
boundaries of a context are not sufficient to define the spatial limits of a context, 
because a context spatial dimension should include also the network of relations of 
contexts. Third guideline introduces the idea that we should not select soft 
constraints among those facts that only currently affect the probability of success of a 
certain prescription. So, a fact is a soft constraint only if it influences the probability 
of success now and in a certain future. The attention about facts influencing the 
success of a prescription in the future is justified by problems occurring in a situation 
such as the following one.  
Let us suppose that in the interacting context C at time t1, the probability of success 
of (a set of) prescription(s) x is determined by the set of soft constraints vCx=[a, b, d, 
e]. In other words, let us suppose that currently x clashes with these soft constraints. 
Then, let us assume that in the same context at same time, the (set of) prescription(s) 
y clashes the set of soft constraints vCy=[a, b, c]. So, let us assume that the 
probability of success of x is 5% and the probability of success of y is 25%. Let 
suppose that y is only a little more desirable than x. In this case, it seems obvious to 
conclude that y has a higher probability of success than x in C: that is to say, y is 
more feasible that x in C. So, it seems plausible to suggest that we should implement 
y in C. However, Jensen and Gilabert suggest that at time-lapse t2, some changing 
could occur in C, and given these changing the facts characterizing C at t2 are 
different than at t1. So, let us suppose that x clashes with facts a and b in C-t2; while, 
y clashes with facts a, b, c in C-t2. Let us suppose that x has the 50% of probability 
of success at t2, and y has still the 25% of probability of success at t2. When the facts 
characterising C change, the probabilities of success of x and y change59. Hence, it is 
not so obvious to maintain that x is more feasible than y. Therefore; it is not so 
obvious to implement y instead of x. 
This situation shows that some facts currently influencing the success of a 
prescription could lose their relevance in the future, so they would not be soft 
constraints in the future:  
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The third guideline for the selection of soft constraints says us that when we 
select soft constraints we should consider those facts that affect the probability 
of success of a prescription now and in predictable future. 
 
So, it is not sufficient that a fact currently influences the success of a prescription. To 
be a soft constraint it should affect it also in a predictable future. Jensen introduces 
the distinction between synchronic abilities and diachronic abilities in order to 
provide a more articulated theoretical background to this idea.  
Synchronic ability is a person’s (or group’s) ability to perform a certain action now. 
In the case in which I have a ball with me now, I can perform the action ‘to kick the 
ball’ now. In this case, Jensen calls my ability ‘to kick the ball’ synchronic ability. 
Diachronic ability is a person’s (or group’s) ability to perform a certain action in the 
future. In the case in which, I have not a ball with me now, but I will have in two 
hours, I cannot perform the action ‘to kick the ball’ now, but I can perform it in two 
hours. In this case, Jensen calls my ability ‘to kick the ball’ diachronic ability60.  
Given that I analyse the feasibility of normative political prescriptions, these two 
notions should be adapted to Normative Political Theory. So: first, a certain person 
or group has the synchronic ability to act in accordance with a certain (set of) 
prescription(s) iff this person or group has the ability to act in accordance with that 
(set of) prescription(s) now; second, a certain person or group has the diachronic 
ability to act in accordance with a certain (set of) prescription(s) iff this person (or 
group) will have the ability to act in accordance with that (set of) prescription(s) in 
the future. These notions are relevant to show why we should consider time lapses 
different from the current one during the selection of soft constraints. 
Such a distinction between synchronic and diachronic abilities is meaningful for 
practical (political) feasibility. In fact, what authors suggest is that we could be able 
to act in accordance with a certain prescription in the future, even if we are not able 
to do it now. So, facts that currently influence our ability to act in accordance with 
                                                
60 This distinction is well known in the theories of ability. I will treat it by introducing Alfred Mele 
contribution in the third chapter 
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prescriptions are not soft constraints if they do not influence our ability in the future. 
However, the question is if the prescription(s) x is (are) not feasible now, why and 
how can it (they) be feasible in the future?  
To answer this question, Jensen distinguishes between two kinds of diachronic 
abilities: direct diachronic abilities and indirect diachronic abilities. I try to simplify 
this distinction through two definitions.  
I say that a person (or a group) have a direct diachronic ability to perform the action 
x iff that person (or group) cannot perform x now, but she (it) can perform x in the 
future without performing any particular target-oriented-action that enables them to 
perform x. Differently, a person (or a group) has an indirect diachronic ability to 
perform the action x iff that person (or group) cannot perform x now, but they can 
perform x in the future by performing a target-oriented-action that enable she (it) to 
perform x in the future. Where I define a target-oriented-action as an action that the 
agent performs just because she wants to be able to perform another action in the 
future.  
So, let us suppose that the action x is ‘to sunbathe’. Let us suppose I am to the beach 
and the only necessary condition that I lack to perform the action ‘to sunbathe’ is ‘a 
sunny day’. Supposing that it will be sunny in two hours, I have not (and I cannot) to 
perform any target-oriented-action to be able to sunbathe. Now, I have a direct 
diachronic ability ‘to sunbathe’61. Differently, let suppose the action x is ‘to speak 
elementary German’ and let us suppose that to perform x it is necessary that I 
perform y ‘to study German’. Supposing that I am perfectly able to perform y, it is 
necessary (and perhaps sufficient) that I do it in order to be able to perform x (to 
speak elementary German). So, I have an indirect diachronic ability to ‘speak 
German’ 
This distinction is meaningful for normative political prescriptions too. I say that a 
certain (set of) prescription(s) x will be feasible in the context C thanks to a direct 
                                                
61 Someone could argue that even if I have just to stay to the beach to sunbath, ‘staying to the beach’ 
should be considered a target-oriented-action to sunbath. This is true if I stay to the beach just because 
I want ‘to sunbath’ in two hours. However, let us suppose that I would stay to the beach for the next 
four hours even if there will not be the sun because of other reasons (for example the presence of 
certain women to the beach); then, my ‘staying to the beach’ is not target-oriented ‘to sunbathe’. 
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diachronic ability of a certain group of people iff it is not necessary that these people 
perform any target-oriented-action in order to be able to act in accordance with x in 
the future. For example, let us suppose that people inhabiting the context C want to 
perform the action ‘to provide sufficient food to people living in poor contexts’. Let 
us suppose that they currently have not this food, but they will have in few months 
because the climate will be better in the next season. In this case, inhabitants of C 
have a direct diachronic ability to provide food for other people.  
Differently, I say that a certain (set of) prescription(s) x will be feasible in the context 
C thanks to an indirect diachronic ability of a certain group of people iff it is 
necessary that these people perform a target-oriented-action in order to be able to act 
in accordance with x in the future. Let us suppose that in order to provide food for 
foreign people, inhabitants of C should start to cultivate much more lands. In this 
case, they can provide food for foreign people only if they perform the action ‘to 
cultivate lands’ before. So, they have an indirect diachronic ability to provide food 
for foreign people.  
Selecting soft constraints we should consider both direct and indirect diachronic 
abilities. Having a direct or indirect diachronic ability to act in accordance with a 
certain prescription x, means that x is feasible. Therefore, those facts that do not 
influence the success of a prescription now and in a predictable future are not soft 
constraints, because they do not undermine the synchronic ability or diachronic 
ability of people to act in accordance with a certain prescription. Consequently, only 
those facts that affect the probability of success of a prescription now and in a 
predictable future are soft constraints.  
 
Considering this guideline in the practical criterion: a fact is a soft constraint for the 
prescription x in the context C iff: 
a) it affects the probability of success of x in C and;  
b) it does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with other contexts; 
c) it does (a) now and in a predictable future 
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The independence of what people want 
 
The last guideline to define the features of soft constraints can be deduced from 
Gilabert’s and Lawford-Smith’s analysis of motivations and psychological facts. In 
this paragraph, I show that according to these authors, only some motivations and 
psychological facts should be considered feasibility constraints. Precisely I claim that 
according to Gilabert and Lawford-Smith: given the implementation of a prescription 
in a certain context, only motivations and psychological facts that reduce the ‘option 
set’ of people inhabiting that context are feasibility constraints. Analysing such a 
guideline, I claim that it leads to a more accurate rule such as ‘only those facts that 
are independent of what people want are feasibility constraints’. 
Before I introduce the Gilabert and Lawford-Smith’s argument about the relevance 
of motivations and psychological facts on feasibility, I think it is necessary to 
identify these two terms. These terms are undefined in the contributions I am 
reviewing, so I do not know if the authors would agree with my definitions. Anyway, 
let us define human psychological facts as any event occurring in the mind of human 
beings. Let us define human motivations as any non-pathological psychological fact 
causing human’s actions.  
Given these two wide meanings of psychological facts and motivations, I think 
everyone can agree on the idea that human beings’ actions are determined by 
motivations and influenced by pre-motivational psychological facts (such as 
psychological pathologies). Consequently, the probability of success of a certain 
prescription could obviously be affected by motivations and psychological facts.  
That is to say, if a certain (set of) prescription(s) x demands to a certain agent to 
perform the action a-x and the agent is not motivated to do it, the probability that this 
agent will act in accordance with x is equal to zero. So, we would conclude that the 
probability of success of x is equal to zero in this situation. Furthermore, given a 
certain group of people, if some of the group members are not motivated to act in 
accordance with x, then the probability that these people would act in accordance 
with x is equal to zero. Consequently, not any member of the group will act in 
accordance with x. Hence, we would say that x is not fully feasible, because the 
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actions of some group members could affect the probability of success of x. So, the 
agents’ motivations and psychological states of mind seem to constrain the degree of 
feasibility of prescription x, then agents’ motivations seem to be soft constraints. 
However, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith hold that motivations and psychological facts 
are not feasibility constraints. Or better, not all motivations or psychological facts are 
feasibility constraints. This is clear in the following quote by Gilabert and Lawford-
Smith:  
 
We think that economic, institutional and cultural (including religious) 
constraints are clear cases of soft constraints…It is less clear how we should 
categorize motivational and psychological constraints. On the one hand, we 
might include psychological constraints only when they are pathological, and 
leave aside other kinds in addition to motivational constraints, because to 
include these would be to risk a cynical realism we should avoid. The fact that 
people do not want to do something does not mean that we should getting it 
done is infeasible, it just means we should think about how to change incentive 
structures and thereby change people desires62.  
 
Lawford-Smith (2013) states that  
 
Motivation seems like something we should exclude as a soft constraint. The 
fact that a person won’t do what he ought is no reason to think he cannot do 
it…We surely do not want to say that the recommendations of one theory are 
less feasible than another just because people are less likely to try to realize the 
one than the other. Feasibility is a concept that treads a fine line between 
possibility, on the one end, and likelihood, on the other. The feasible does not 
extend to do everything and anything that could be possibly done, because that 
would leave in too many unrealistic recommendations. But neither does it 
extend only to what probably will be done, because that would leave out too 
                                                
62 Gilabert, P. & Lawford-Smith, H. (2012), “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration”, 
Political Studies, 60(4), p.813 
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many aspirational recommendations. At the extreme end of a continuum of 
pathologies, things like addiction, compulsion, phobia and illness can make a 
person unable to act in certain ways. But at the less extreme end of the 
continuum, these pathologies may be little more than a person failing to try…I 
think the right way to deal with the motivation question, which also helps in 
dealing with the problem of diachronic possibilities and option sets raised 
earlier, is to say that the motivation of other people is part of the context in 
which an agent acts, and therefore properly a soft constraint on whether her 
action will succeed. But her own motivation is not something to factor in; when 
we think about what is feasible for her we think about what she can do, and this 
depends only on what her options are 63. 
 
These quotes are a good samples of the way in which motivations and psychological 
facts are approached in practical accounts of feasibility. A first intuition that seems 
me deducible from these quotes is that feasibility is different from the mere 
probability of success. So, if a prescription has a low probability to be successfully 
implemented or maintained in a certain context it does not necessarily mean that the 
prescription has a low degree of feasibility. This is clear when Lawford-Smith 
argues: 'Feasibility is a concept that treads a fine line between possibility, on the one 
end, and likelihood, on the other'. The idea is that feasibility is something more than 
mere probability of success. For this reason, not any fact influencing the probability 
of success is a feasibility constraint. Surely motivations and psychological facts 
affect the probability of success of a certain prescription in a certain context, but not 
all motivations and psychological facts affect the feasibility of that same prescription 
in that same context.  
Consequently, only particular kinds of psychological facts and motivations affect the 
feasibility of normative political prescriptions: first, psychological pathologies; 
second, others’ motivations. In Gilabert and Lawford-Smith account, any other kind 
                                                
63 Lawford-Smith, H. (2013), “Understanding Political Feasibility”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 21(3), pp. 14-15. Emphasis is mine. 
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of psychological and motivational fact should not be considered a feasibility 
constraint, because it does not constrain what people can (is able to do) do.  
Let us have look on these soft constraints. Psychological pathologies are feasibility 
constraints since a person that is affected by a psychological pathology (such as 
compulsive behaviours) cannot (or is not fully able) to perform some kinds of action. 
For example, let us suppose that a certain prescription demands to wash hands no 
more than three times per day (in order to preserve scarce resources of water). Let us 
suppose that it should be implemented in a context that is populated by people 
having the compulsive need to wash their hands. In this case, the prescription is not 
fully feasible, because people inhabiting that context have low ability degree to act in 
accordance with it.  
Others’ motivations are motivations of people (or groups of people) that that do not 
inhabit the context in which the prescriptions we are interested in should be 
implemented or maintained. Let us suppose that the group of people I=(i1, i2, i3) 
inhabiting the context C has to implement and maintain the prescriptions x. Let us 
suppose that another group of people Y=(y1, y2, y3) that do not inhabit C has certain 
preferences regarding x and generating certain motivations. Y’s motivations 
concerning x are said others’ motivations. Others’ motivations (e.g. motivations of 
the group Y) are feasibility constraints for the actions certain person (or group) I, 
since the success of the action of a person (or a group) I can be influenced by 
motivated actions of other people (or groups) Y. 
The question is to understand if these constraints matter for the feasibility of 
normative political theories. In other words, it is necessary to understand in which 
sense psychological pathologies and others’ motivations matter in normative political 
analysis.  
In the first paragraph of this part of chapter, I stated that a fact is a soft constraint for 
a certain normative political prescription only if it influences the probability of 
success of a prescription. In common political contexts, a fact affects the success of a 
prescription (or set of prescriptions) when it regards a large number of people64 
inhabiting that context, or when it regards a particular minority of people that plays a 
                                                
64 It can be a fact that regards the majority or a numerous minority of people inhabiting the context 
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substantial role in political choices. For example, if the majority of people inhabiting 
a context compulsively needs to wash hands hundred times per day, a prescription 
demanding to wash hands three times per day would be lowly feasible. In the same 
way, if the King of a context compulsively needs to wash his hands hundred times 
per day, it is difficult to think that the King would implement a prescription 
demanding to wash hands three times per day. So, the prescription would be lowly 
feasible. 
Fortunately, psychological pathologies (as the compulsion of washing hands) are 
spread characters just in contexts that usually cannot be defined ‘politically 
autonomous contexts’. Of course, I can imagine a political context in which the 
majority of people or a large minority has a particular psychological pathology. It 
seems possible that an autonomous political context such that could exist. However, I 
think that a political context such that never existed and I would bet that it would 
never exist. Contexts in which the majority of people (or a large minority) share the 
same psychological pathology are hospitals or rehab centres, but they are quite 
uninteresting cases in my thesis and it seems to me that those cases are interesting for 
ethical analysis. Differently, it seems much more realistic to imagine a context in 
which a politically dominant minority is affected by a psychological pathology. Of 
course, there are cases of ‘crazy’ emperors as Caligula or Nero in the ancient Rome. 
In these cases a psychological pathology could affect political choices and so it could 
constrain the feasibility of certain political prescriptions.  
Therefore, it seems plausible to think that psychological pathologies are feasibility 
constraints in two cases: first, in the unrealistic case in which a large number of 
people inhabiting a political context are affected by the same pathology; second, in 
the rare case in which a politically dominant minority is affected by a certain 
pathology. In cases in which a small number of politically non-dominant people are 
affected by a psychological pathology, the actions of these people do not affect the 
success of a prescription.  
Others’ motivations matter for the feasibility of a certain normative political 
prescription in the case in which: (some) people inhabiting a context want to act in 
accordance with a certain prescription but (some) people inhabiting another political 
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context are motivated in way that interfere with the actions of the former group of 
people. Let us suppose that people inhabiting the context C1 want to act in way a-x 
that satisfy the prescriptions x. Let us suppose that a-x can be successful only if 
people inhabiting the context C2 perform another action a-y. Let us suppose that 
people of C2 are not motivated to perform a-y, so they interfere in the success of a-x 
and because of this the prescription x will not be successfully implemented or 
maintained. In this case, the motivations of people inhabiting C2 influence the 
success of x in C1 and for this reason they are feasibility constraints. 
I use an example similar to the one used by Lawford-Smith to explain how others’ 
motivations could play a role in a political situation.  
Let us suppose that (some) people inhabiting certain country (namely, Sweden) want 
to satisfy the human rights of refugee for people escaping from a certain war context 
(namely, Syria). Let us suppose that Swedish can effectively implement these rights 
only if people escaping from Syria arrive in Sweden, and to arrive in Sweden it is 
necessary that escaping Syrians can travel through Europe. Let us suppose that to 
travel through Europe these people have to cross some boundaries of other political 
contexts. In this case, Sweden can effectively implement rights of refugee only if 
(some) people inhabiting other European contexts do not prevent Syrians to cross 
their boundaries. Let us suppose that (some) Hungarians are not motivated to leave 
that Syrians cross the Hungarian boundaries, so (some) Hungarians build a wall to 
prevent it. In this sense, the motivation of (some) Hungarians makes lowly feasible 
the effective implementation of the right of refugee in Sweden. 
In the same way, let us suppose that certain people living in a certain context 
(namely, Switzerland) wants to preserve the existence of red squirrels in their 
environment and to do it they have to prevent grey squirrels from living in the Swiss 
forest65. Let us suppose that people inhabiting a context close to Switzerland 
(namely, Italy) are totally indifferent about the colour of squirrels. So, a large 
number of grey squirrels populate Italian forests, and red squirrels are close to be 
extinct in Italy. Furthermore, let us suppose that Italians are also indifferent about the 
colour of squirrels inhabiting Switzerland, so Italians are not motivated to spend 
                                                
65 Because grey squirrels' virus kills red squirrels 
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resources to prevent grey squirrels from crossing the Italian/Swiss boundary. In this 
case, the actions of Swiss people ‘to preserve red squirrels’ are influenced by the 
Italians' motivation to not spend money on migratory politics for the tutelage of red 
squirrels. So, Italian motivations influence the feasibility of ‘preserving red squirrels’ 
in Switzerland. 
These examples show that there are situations in which psychological pathologies 
and others’ motivations can indirectly66 influence the success of normative political 
prescriptions in political contexts. Although it is clear that psychological pathologies 
and others’ motivations are kinds of feasibility constraints, I think I should clarify 
why other psychological facts and motivations are not feasibility constraints. In other 
words, I just pointed out that psychological pathologies and others’ motivations can 
be feasibility constraints because they influence the success of prescriptions in 
certain contexts. However, also other psychological fact and ours’ own motivations 
affect the success of prescriptions. Why should we not consider them feasibility 
constraints?  
 
Lawford-Smith specifies that psychological pathologies and others’ motivations are 
feasibility constraints because they constrain the option-set of ‘agents’: the set of all 
actions that are available for a certain agent. When a fact reduces the availability of a 
certain action a, that fact is feasibility constraint for that action a. Lawford-Smith’s 
argument is that others’ motivations and psychological pathologies affect the option 
set, while other kinds of psychological facts (as the agents own motivations) do not 
affect the option-set. That is to say, if a prescription demands me to perform the 
actions a-x but I have a psychological pathology that prevent me to perform the 
action a-x, then the action a-x does not belong to my option set. In the same way, if a 
prescription demands me to perform the action a-x but your motivated actions a-y 
prevents that I perform a-x, then the action a-x does not belong to my option set. 
Differently, if a prescription demands me to perform the action a-x but I am not 
                                                
66 They indirectly influence the feasibility because they are relevant only if an action (negative or 
positive) follows from these psychological facts. In other words, they are feasibility constraint on only 
in virtue of their actions causation. 
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motivated to do it, that action a-x still belongs to my option-set. As I will show in a 
moment, I disagree with this last claim. 
Given Lawford-Smith’s analysis of feasibility, we should conclude that ‘a fact is a 
soft constraint only if it constrains the agents’ option-set in way that the agents have 
not the demanded action in their option-set’67. However, I think that any motivational 
fact reduce the set of available actions. So, any motivational facts could be 
considered a soft constraint given the rule just formalised. Unfortunately, both 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith would not accept it68. 
I try to show that any motivation is a soft constraint if we select soft constraints in 
virtue of their impact on agents’ option-set without any other specification. My 
argument is that first, any non-pathological and non-coerced human action is driven 
by its proper motivation, since I defined a motivation as the non-pathological/non-
coerced cause of any human action; second, to have a certain action in my option set, 
I should have a proper motivation to perform that action. By consequence, any 
motivation to do the contrary of what is required excludes the related action from the 
agent option set. So, any lack of motivation constrains the option-set and then should 
be considered a feasibility constraint so far. 
For instance, let us suppose the prescription x demands me to perform the action a-x. 
Let suppose that I am not motivated to perform the action a-x because I simply do 
not want perform a-x. So, let us say that I have the motivation non-m-x. Since I have 
the motivation non-m-x, I cannot perform the action a-x. So, a-x is not currently in 
my option set (it is currently out of my option set). So, in this case the lack of 
motivation leaves out a-x from my option set: it means that since the motivation m-x 
does not exist in my mind, the action a-x is not in my option set. So, the action a-x 
can belong to my option set only if I shape the motivation m-x in my mind. Applying 
                                                
67 When an action does not belong to the option set of an agent, the agent cannot perform it. In 
collective contexts (such as the political contexts), psychological pathologies and others’ motivations 
are soft constraints since when they can exclude some actions from the option set of a certain number 
of people. This means, that some people cannot perform those actions. So, if a prescription demands 
to people belonging to C to perform the action a-x but the half of the population is affected by 
psychological pathology that prevent them to perform a-x, then half of population has not a-x in its 
option set. In this sense, the feasibility degree of a-x is equal to the 50%. Therefore, that prescription 
has not a full degree of feasibility.  
68 I do not accept this consequence too 
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the rule above, the motivation non-m-x is a feasibility constraint for the action a-x 
even if it simply the expression of something I do not want to do. In fact, non-m-x 
leaves the action a-x out of my option-set. So, it should be considered a feasibility 
constraint in accordance with the ‘option-set rule’ stated by Lawford-Smith. 
However, we cannot accept this conclusion. 
If I am not motivated to pay taxes, I cannot not perform the action ‘to pay taxes’. 
That is to say, if there my motivation is ‘to do not pay taxes’, the action ‘to pay 
taxes’ is not in my option set. It could belong to my option set before I shape my 
motivation or in case I modify my motivation, but it cannot be in my option set when 
I am not motivated to perform it. Hence, in this case my simple motivation ‘I do not 
want to pay taxes’ excludes the action ‘to pay taxes’ from my option set and for this 
reason it should be considered a feasibility constraint in accordance to ‘the option-set 
rule’. Of course, both Gilabert and Lawford-Smith do not accept this implication. So, 
I think we should distinguish motivations that are feasibility constraints from 
motivations that are not feasibility constraints by considering an intrinsic feature of 
these facts: their independence of what agent want.  
I think that what distinguishes ‘agents’ own motivations’ from ‘psychological 
pathologies/ others’ motivations’ is the independence of what agents want of the 
latter facts.  
Psychological pathologies characterize a certain agents even if those agents do not 
want them; and even if those agents do not want to perform actions producing and 
maintaining those pathologies. For instance, let us suppose that the agent a is 
affected by schizophrenia, we can hardly suppose that a wants to be schizophrenic 
and we can hardly suppose that the agent wanted to perform certain actions knowing 
that those actions would have generate or maintain her/his pathology. Therefore, that 
what s/he wants does not contribute to generate or maintain that pathology. In the 
same way, others’ motivations are independent of what we want. That is to say: other 
people are motivated to do something even if we want that they are motivated to do 
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something else; other people are mostly motivated to do something even if we 
performed some actions that could have affected their motivations69.  
Differently, our own motivations preserve what we want. They exist because we 
want them exist. 
Here, I define a fact as independent of what agents want when: i) it exists even if 
agents do not want that it exist and they did not perform any non-coerced/non-
manipulated action in order to produce or maintain it70; ii) or, it is the unexpected 
(unintended or accidental) outcome of non-coerced/non-manipulated agents’ actions. 
Differently, it is not the case to consider a fact ‘independent of what agents want’ 
when i) it exist only if agents want that it exists and they produced or maintained it 
through some non-coerced/non-manipulated actions; ii) or, agents’ do not want it but 
it is the expected (non-accidental) outcome of some non-coerced and non-
manipulated agents’ actions71.  
For instance, let us suppose that I am the agent and I want to be drunk tonight, then I 
drink four gin-tonics and after while I am drunk. The fact that I am drunk depends of 
what I want: I wanted to be drunk, I performed certain actions and I am drunk. 
Furthermore, let us suppose that I am the agent and I do not want to be drunk tonight; 
however, let us suppose that I drink four gin-tonics knowing that I will be drunk after 
while. The fact that I am drunk is still dependent of what I want, since it is the 
expected outcome of actions I wanted to perform. That is to say, if I did not want to 
drink four gin-tonics, I would not be drunk. Therefore, the outcome ‘to be drunk’ 
depends on what I wanted to do72.  
                                                
69 It can happen that sometimes we influence or shape others’ motivations by performing certain 
actions. In those cases, others’ motivations cannot be considered feasibility constraints. However, 
accepting that some others’ motivations does not depend on our actions we accept that there are cases 
in which others’ motivations are feasibility constraints. 
70 In those cases in which a fact is the outcome of coerced or manipulated agents’ actions, it is 
independent on what agents want since the agents did not perform the actions they have had 
performed. In those cases in which a fact is an unexpected outcome of agents’ actions, it is an 
independent fact because I assume that agents’ lost their control over the outcomes of actions. 
71 A fact depends on what agents’ want when it is the wanted outcome of non-coerced and non-
manipulated agents’ actions. Furthermore, a fact depends on what agents want when agents knew that 
they would have produced that outcome (or when they knew it was highly probable they would have 
produced) by performing those actions (even if they did not want to produce or maintain that fact). 
72 In this second case, the agent (me) does not want the outcome in itself but he wants to perform 
actions which give rise to that outcome despite he knows he will get drunk. In other words, agent’s 
actions preserve what the agent wants to do; the sum of agent’s actions gives rise to the outcome (and 
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Psychological pathologies and others’ motivations are feasibility constraints because 
that the they exist even if the agent do not want they exist. Furthermore, it is not 
necessary that agents perform certain actions in order to generate or maintain their 
own psychological pathologies or others’ motivations73. Thus, psychological 
pathologies and others’ motivations can be independent of what agents want. For this 
reason others’ motivations and psychological pathologies are feasibility constraints. 
Let suppose that agents a, b and c should perform certain actions a-x in accordance 
with prescriptions x. Let suppose a is affected by a certain psychological pathology 
that prevent her to perform a-x. Let us suppose that b is not motivated to perform a-x 
because she does not want. Let us suppose that c would perform a-x but she could do 
it only if b performs a-x, and b does not perform a-x. In this case: the agent a cannot 
perform a-x because of her psychological pathology, and a’s psychological pathology 
exists independently from what a wants; the agent b does not to perform a-x because 
she is not motivated, and her motivation is dependent (is the expression) of what she 
wants. That is to say, it is necessary that she does not want to perform a-x in order 
that the motivation to do not perform a-x does exist. So, b’s motivation to do not 
perform a-x exists only if she does not want to perform a-x; the agent c cannot 
perform a-x because of b does not perform a-x, and b actions and motivations exist 
independently from what c wants. So, b’s motivation exists even if c does not want 
that they exist. Nobody wants her psychological pathologies and (realistically) 
nobody perform action knowing that they will produce or maintain a psychological 
pathology. Moreover, other people have their motivations even if we do not want 
they have them, and even if we performed certain actions knowing them they could 
have modified their motivations. So, these facts exist independently from what 
agents want.  
I will show how the independence of what people want is an important 
discriminating factor of soft constraints later on. Now, I point out that our own 
motivations are just the expression of what we want, so they are dependent on what 
                                                                                                                                     
the agent know it). Therefore, the outcome cannot be independent of what the agent want to do. That 
is to say: what the agent wants (to perform the actions) is necessary to produce the expected outcome.    
73 That is to say, psychological pathologies and others’ motivations are not necessarily the outcome of 
agents’ actions 
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we want. This is the reason why I do not consider them feasibility constraint. I think 
that Gilabert and Lawford-Smith could agree on the idea that feasibility constraints 
are independent of what people want. Gilabert himself writes: ‘the fact that people do 
not want to do something does not mean that we should getting it done is infeasible’. 
So, I think the idea of the independence of what people want should be taken in 
consideration in a proper practical criterion for the selection of soft constraints. Then, 
I say that  
 
A fact is a soft constraint for the prescription x in the context C iff: 
a) it affects the probability of success of x in C and;  
b) it does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with other contexts; 
c) it does (a) now and in a predictable future 
d) it exists in C independently of what people living in C want  
 
 
The set of soft constraints: which kinds of facts? 
 
So far, I have introduced the practical criterion to select soft constraint. Although a 
selective criterion is necessary, I have not shown which kinds of facts the literature 
considers soft constraints. In this paragraph, my aim is to show which kinds of facts 
are usually considered soft constraints and then I criticise this choice. So the set of 
soft constraints usually identified includes kinds of facts such as institutions, 
economy, culture, others’ motivations and psychological pathologies. Others’ 
motivations and psychological pathologies have been widely analysed before. 
Technological and medical limits have a particular status that I am going to consider 
immediately. Institutional settings, economic arrangements and cultural habits will 
be analysed after technologies (and medicine). My main aim is to show that 
institutional settings, economic arrangements and cultural habits are not independent 
from what people want. So, I hold that the set of soft constraints should not include 
them. 
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Global lack of technologies and medicines 
 
As I already wrote, facts influencing the contextual possibility are considered hard 
constraints in Gilabert/Lawford-Smith account of feasibility. This is a first difference 
between my account of feasibility and theirs. In this sense, a certain lack of 
technology and medicine makes impossible to perform certain actions in certain 
contexts, so it affects the possibility to act in accordance with certain prescriptions in 
a certain context. Since when it affects the possibility (and not the probability of 
success) to act in accordance with a prescription, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 
consider the lack of technology and medicine as hard constraints. Although the 
current analysis is about the selection of soft constraints, I think that the 
disagreement between my account and Gilabert/Lawford-Smith’s account is not so 
relevant. I can call ‘hard constraints’ those facts that affect the contextual possibility 
to perform an action instead of calling them ‘soft constraints’: the name does not 
matter. What matters is the kind of technological and medical constraint that Gilabert 
and Lawford-Smith seems to take in consideration.  
Precisely, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith seems to pay attention to the global 
excellence of technology and medicine as condition to perform certain actions; so just 
the global lack of technology and medicine is a feasibility constraint. I try to show 
what the global lack of technology and medicine is. I define global excellence of 
technology and medicine as the highest state of technology and medicine that exists 
in the world. For example, if a pill to cure Ebola has been developed in a Swiss lab, 
then the global excellence of medicine includes that pill to cure Ebola. In this sense, 
Gilabert would argue that we do not lack the medicine to cure Ebola. Then ‘a pill to 
cure Ebola’ is not a feasibility constraint in Switzerland and in any other context of 
the world. Consequently, if someone dies because of Ebola in Sierra Leone, nobody 
(no Sierra Leone’s doctors too) can argue that this person died because of a lack of 
the medicine to cure Ebola, since Swiss lab has a pill to cure Ebola. Therefore, 
nobody lacks the pill to cure Ebola.  
This interpretation of technological and medical constraints seems me to correspond 
with what Lawford-Smith and Gilabert argue in their contributions:  
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The lack of an existing technology now makes it impossible to implement a 
proposal that requires it, but once the technology has been developed, that will 
be no constraint at all74. 
 
Lawford-Smith argues that 
Sometimes we do fly experts across the world to undertake actions that no one 
else can perform (think of medical specialists, neurosurgeons, forensic 
scientists and so on). An outcome can be feasible and yet not worth trying to 
bring about, because of the cost involved. Feasibility assessments are empirical 
assessments. We want to know whether an outcome can be brought about. If 
there's an agent somewhere in the world who has an action in her (its) option 
set with a positive probability of bringing the relevant outcome about, that 
outcome is feasible75.  
 
Gilabert:  
The human right to basic medical care provides an example. Perhaps a country 
may presently not be able to secure freedom from all curable diseases. But if it 
can eradicate some, then it has the duty partially to fulfill this right. If other 
countries have medical technology that could help prevent diseases in the first 
country, then they should, in principle, make them available in fair ways. Here 
the difference between basic and advanced medical care is relevant, as even the 
wealthiest countries have to set limits on the extent to which they can supply 
medical care to their own residents. International assistance regarding basic 
medical care has a level of moral urgency and feasibility that international 
assistance regarding advanced medical care does not have76. 
 
                                                
74 Lawford-Smith, H. (2010), Feasibility Constraints for Political Theories, PhD thesis, p. 107 
75 Lawford-Smith, H. (2013), “Understanding Political Feasibility”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 21(3), p. 7 
76 Gilabert, P. (2009), “The feasibility of basic socioeconomic human rights: a conceptual 
exploration”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(237): p. 671 
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Once more it seems me that these authors assume that relations among contexts 
reduce feasibility constraints in particular places. In this quotes, it seems to emerge 
the idea that since a technology or a medicine has been developed, the country or the 
corporation that developed that technology or medicine would give it to contexts that 
need it. Alternatively, it seems that since a technology or a medicine has been 
developed, a context that needs that technology or medicine can (is able) to acquire it 
from the corporation or the country that develop it. As I pointed out before, the fact 
that contexts are related with each other does not imply that soft constraints affecting 
a specific context are less. In this case, the fact that a context C1 has a relation with a 
context C2 that developed a certain technology (or medicine) does not necessarily 
imply that C2 would give its technology to C1 or that C1 would be able to acquire 
that technology from C2. So, in principle, it is possible that people living in C1 lack a 
certain technology (or medicine) even if that technology exists in C2 and C1 has 
relations with C2. Therefore, in principle, the state of technology and medicine in a 
certain context is not necessarily equal to the global excellence of technology and 
medicine. Consequently, a certain context could lack a certain technology or 
medicine now and in a predictable future, even if this technology or medicine has 
been developed elsewhere. 
However, practically, it seems plausible to accept that a context can obtain or acquire 
a technology (or medicine) that it needs if it interacts with another contexts having 
this technology (or medicine). So, if C1 is related with C2 and C1 needs the 
technology developed by C2, it seems plausible to think that people living in C1 will 
find a way to obtain that technology. In conclusion, I accept Gilabert’s and Lawford-
Smith’s argument about technological and medical constraints because it is a good 
practical approximation of how technologies and medicines affect the feasibility of 
certain prescriptions in certain contexts in the real world. Therefore, a certain lack of 
technology or medicine is a feasibility constraint only if we lack that technology or 
medicine in each part of the world.  
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Social Facts 
 
In this paragraph, I consider whether or not institutions, economic facts and culture 
are really soft constraints. In order to avoid listing all these kinds of facts, I call them 
social facts. My first aim is to point out the banal observation about social reality: 
social facts can exist in a context only if human beings do exist in that context. I will 
use this observation to reinforce the assumption that social facts are all implemented 
and maintained by human beings through human activity. So, social facts 
characterizing a certain context are implemented and maintained by members 
belonging to the group that inhabit that context. For this reason, social facts cannot 
be considered independent of what inhabitant of a context want. Therefore, social 
facts do not respect the condition (d) of the practical criterion for the selection of soft 
constraints. Therefore, social facts are not feasibility constraints.  
First of all, let me start this analysis with a rough definition of institutions, culture 
and economy. I do not provide strict definitions of these terms. Consequently, the 
definitions of institutions, culture and economy overlap for some regards. This means 
that a fact that can be consider ‘institutional’ in a certain context (for example a 
certain procedure) could be also a cultural or economic fact in that same context. 
Also for this reason, I absorb institutional, cultural and economic facts under the 
label social facts. 
The following definitions of the term ‘institution’ are useful to provide a rough, 
broad, but plausible definition of institutions. 
Hodgson argues that 'Institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules 
that structure social interactions. Language, money, law, systems of weights and 
measures, table manners and firms (and other organizations) are thus all 
institutions'77. Knight says that '[institutions are] set of rules that structure social 
interactions in particular ways'78. Jonathan Turner states that 'a complex of positions, 
roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising 
                                                
77 Hodgson, M.G. (2006),” What are institutions?”, Journal of economical issues, 10(1), p. 2 
78 Knight, J. (1992), Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 2 
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relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in 
producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals and in sustaining 
viable societal structures within a given environment'79. 
 
According to Ostrom: 
 
Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all 
forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, 
neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations and 
governments at all scales. Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations 
face choices regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences 
for themselves and for others80. 
 
Given these definitions, I think it is possible to underline some recurring elements 
ascribable to institutional facts: first, institutions are sets of prescriptions that are 
embedded in rules or procedures (they have the form of rules and procedures) and 
that explicitly or implicitly take the form ‘agents A ought to do X in situations S’; 
consequently, their function is to organise the human activity and the interactions 
among people and to create a patterns of behaviours. In other words, institutions 
organize certain human actions. Furthermore, institutions are related to a certain 
context in which they exist: so, they contextually exist.  
Given these features, I define (for the rest of the thesis) institutions as sets of rules 
and procedures that organise specific actions of human beings under a certain 
context.  
Let me define the term ‘culture’. If an ‘umbrella’ term does exist, this is the term 
‘culture’. Trying to provide the first definition of culture, E.B. Tylor wrote that it is 
                                                
79 Turner, J. (1997), The Institutional Order: Economy, Kinship, Religion, Polity, Law, and Education 
in Evolutionary and Comparative Perspective, London: Longman., p. 6 
 
80 Ostrom, E. (2005), Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton: Princeton University Press., 
p.3 
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'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'81. 
I deny the determinism that such a all in definition implies82, but I think that it is 
useful to recognise the ‘cultural facts’ and their relation with groups. The ‘cultural 
facts’ are knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals (beliefs about values), customs (including 
languages and hared symbols) and widely accepted in a certain context. All of these 
facts include prescriptive or descriptive contents such as ‘agents A ought to do X in 
context C’ or ‘subject S is A in context C’. Cultural facts are related to groups: so, 
any cultural fact exists only if groups of people exist and accept them (recognise 
them as true and right). Different groups of people (inhabiting different contexts) are 
subjected to different ‘cultural facts’. So, we say that there exist the culture of group 
A, the culture of group B, the culture of group C and so on. Combining the cultural 
facts and their relations with groups we can say for example that the value A is part 
of the culture of the group A, the habit A is part of the culture of the group A, the 
value B is part of the culture of group B, the habit B is part of the culture of the 
group B and so on.  
Given these two features of culture, I suggest to use the definition of culture provided 
by the Cambridge English Dictionary. Hence, culture is 'the way of life, the general 
customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time'. 
Last, I try to define the term ‘economy’. The dictionary defines ‘economy’ as the 
‘system or range of economic activity in a country, region or community’. Where, 
‘economic activity’ is ‘the complex of human activities concerned with the 
production, distribution and consumption of goods and services’. Combining these 
two definitions, I define ‘economy’ as the ‘system or range of human activities 
concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services 
in a country, region or community’. 
                                                
81 Tylor, E. (1920), Primitive Culture, New York: J. P. Putnam’s Sons., p. 1. 
82 I do not think that a certain human being is capable of performing only actions that she learned how 
to perform from her cultural environment. Anyway, I do not explain why I reject determinism. Let us 
just consider that if we were able to perform only those actions that we learned from our cultural 
environment there would not be any human development: probably we would still eat roots and we 
would not stand upright 
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For the purposes of this chapter and the following one, it is important to underline 
that adopting this definition of economy, the amount of resources characterizing a 
context is not part of the economy of that context. I mean that a resource is a brute 
fact that could ‘naturally’ exist in a context or that could be the outcome of human 
activities, but it is not a human activity83. It is important for me to underline that 
economic arrangements (the economic activities) are strictly related with groups of 
people inhabiting a context. That is to say, different groups of people have different 
economic arrangements. Furthermore, similar groups of people inhabiting contexts 
characterised by similar amount of resources could have different economies84. 
Through this shallow terminological analysis, I want to underline a banal property of 
social facts: institutions, culture and economy characterising a certain context are 
facts that depend on the existence of human beings. That is to say: if no human being 
existed in a certain circumscribed space at certain time, then no (human) institutions, 
no (human) culture and no (human) economy (as I defined them) would exist in that 
space at that time. So, I claim that social facts can exist in a context only if human 
beings do exist in that context. This claim reinforces the assumption that social facts 
are implemented and maintained by human beings through human activities. So, 
there is a causal relation between human activities and social facts existence, where 
human activities cause social facts. As Searle pointed out: ‘social order is not part of 
the “nature of things,” and it cannot be derived from the “laws of nature.” Social 
order exists only as a product of human activity’85.  
I assume that a context is characterised by certain social facts only if human groups 
inhabiting that context implement or maintain those social facts through some kinds 
of activities. Given this, it is possible to have two alternatives: first, it is possible to 
                                                
83 Also what we call ‘economic resources’ (raw materials and human capital) are not the economy of a 
context. They are brute facts, they are not human activities 
84 A context can have an n barrels of oil because its economic activities are based on the import of oil; 
a context can have the same n barrels of oil because its economic activity is based on the search of oil 
around the world; a third context can have the n barrels of oil simply because they have it 
underground. In these cases the economies are different but the final amount of oil is the same 
85 Someone could argue that the contrary is also true: human beings can exist in a context only if 
social facts do exist in that context. Despite I think this statement is not true (if I currently stay in my 
flat and all my material needs are satisfied I can currently exist in my flat even if social facts do not 
currently exist in my flat. Maybe I can just exist for a short period of time, but I can). I am not 
interested to argue about this. For my argument it is just important that the claim: social facts can 
exist in a context only if human beings do exist in that context is true 
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hold that social facts are implemented and maintained by human beings but they 
exist independently of what human beings want; second, it is possible to hold that 
social facts are implemented and maintained by human beings, so they do not exist 
independently of what human beings want. Hence, it is not the case that they are 
independent of what human beings want. I think that the second conclusion is much 
more plausible than the first one. If I am right, social facts do not respect the rule (d) 
of the criterion to select feasibility constraints: they are not independent of what 
people inhabiting a context characterised by those social facts want. 
Let us consider an extreme case. Let us assume that only three human beings a, b and 
c live in the isolated context C (space s at time t). So, nobody interact with this group 
of people living in the space s at time t and because of this, I surely hold that the 
group is autonomous. Let us suppose that a, b and c follow the rule x, they speak the 
language y and they have the economic activity z. Let us suppose that to do it they 
perform the actions a-x, a-y and a-z. So, let us suppose that there is a causal relation 
between the activity of C inhabitants and social facts characterizing C such as the 
actions a-x, a-y and a-z of C inhabitants produce C social facts x, y and z. Now, the 
question is. Is it plausible to think that nobody of these three individuals wants that 
the rule x, the language y and the economic activity z? Is it possible to think that 
nobody of them wants that the actions a-x, a-y and a-z be performed?  
In my opinion, social facts x, y and z depend on what C-inhabitants (at least one C-
inhabitant) want. Let us consider the two following abstract situations. 
Let us suppose the situation in which a performs the action a-d determining that b 
and c perform a-x, a-y and a-z (for example she drugs them). Let us suppose that a 
does know that performing a-d, b and c will perform a-x, a-y and a-z and she knows 
that this will produce x, y and z. Of course, I cannot say that b and c wants to perform 
a-x, a-y and a-z. Differently, I should say that a wants to perform a-d and wants to 
obtain x, y and z (because a knows that performing a-d she produces x, y and z). So, 
this is not sufficient to hold that all inhabitants of C want x, y and z, but it is 
sufficient to say that some (a) inhabitant of C wants to obtain x, y and z. In other 
words, x, y and z would not exist in C if nobody inhabiting C wanted that x, y and z 
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do exist in C. So, it is sufficient to hold that it is not the case that x, y and z are 
independent of what people living in C want.  
Unfortunately, this case does not prove that some non-coerced/non-manipulated 
inhabitants’ actions are necessary in order that social fact does exist. It does not 
prove it because I assumed that a wanted to obtain x, y and z.  
To prove that social facts can exist in a certain context only if at least one inhabitant 
of that context wants that they exist, I should assume that no inhabitant of C wants 
that x, y and z do exist. Let us consider two cases in which it seems that the existence 
of x, y and z in C is independent of what inhabitants of C want. The first realistic case 
is the one in which social facts x, y and z emerged before a, b and c birth. The second 
less realistic case is the one in which a, b and c do not know that their actions 
implement (produces) x, y and z. In both cases, it seems plausible to argue that it is 
not necessary that a, b and c want x, y and z in order that x, y and z exist in C. 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that a, b and c perform certain actions which 
expected outcomes are social facts x, y and z in order that a, y and z do exist in C. 
Therefore, the implementation of social facts in a certain context could be 
independent of what people currently inhabiting that context want.  
Case one. Let us suppose the situation in which a, b and c were born in the context C 
which was already characterised by social facts x, y and z in the moment of their 
birth. In this case, a, b and c did not perform any action to implement (cause) x, y and 
z; so, they did not want to implement (cause) x, y and z.  
Case two. Let us suppose the situation in which a, b and c perform the actions a-x, a-
y and a-z without knowing that through these actions they would implement facts x, y 
and z (maybe they wanted to produce other social facts w, k and q; or maybe they did 
not want to produce any social fact, they just wanted to have fun). In this case, a, b 
and c do not know the consequences of their actions a-x, a-y and a-z; so it seems 
hard to say that a, b and c want to implement x, y, z or to say that x, y, z are expected 
outcome of what a, b, c want. 
In these cases, it is true that a, b and c do not want to implement x, y and z and they 
could not know that x, y, z would emerge. So, it seems that x, y and z do exist in C 
independently of what a, b and c want. However, social facts are continuous facts: 
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they are facts that do exist over time. Furthermore, to exist over time, social facts 
needs to be maintained and the first step to maintain a social fact is to accept it and 
perform actions that maintain them. As Searle notes, 'institutional [social] facts only 
exist in virtue of collective acceptance of something having a certain status, where 
that status carries functions that cannot be performed without the collective 
acceptance of the status'86 and ‘Social order exists only as a product of human 
activity’87. 
Thus, x, y and z do exist in C over time, only if someone living in C accepts that x, y 
and z do exist in C over time or someone perform certain actions that maintain them 
over time. In other words, the emergence of a social fact can be independent of what 
people living in a certain space want: the social fact can emerge before the birth of 
the people currently inhabiting the context or it can accidentally emerge. However, it 
seems me not plausible that a social fact continuously characterise a context if 
nobody wants it or if nobody performs some actions maintaining it. Hence, if 
inhabitant of C maintain social facts x, y and z, it means that some (at least one) 
inhabitant of C accept x, y and z: they wants to maintain x, y and z; or (at least) they 
perform some actions which expected outcome is the maintenance of x, y and z. 
Therefore, it seems me not the case that x, y and z are independent of what people 
living in C want.  
In general: it seems me not the case that social facts existing in a certain context are 
independent of what people living in that context want. Hence, social facts do not 
respect the clause (d) of the practical criterion for the selection of soft constraints: a 
fact is a soft constraint for the prescription x in the context C iff it affects the 
probability of success of x in C and; d) it exists in C independently from what people 
belonging to C want. Therefore, social facts are not feasibility constraints. 
 
If I am right to exclude social facts from those kinds of facts that should be 
considered feasibility constraints, the set of constraints would just include logic rules, 
physical and biological laws, the global lack of technologies and medicine, others’ 
                                                
86 Searle, J. (2005), “What is an institution?”, Journal of Institutional Economy, 1(1), p. 9. 
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motivations and (in particular rare cases) psychological pathologies. It seems that all 
these facts affect the (universal or contextual) possibility to implement a prescription. 
Given these kinds of facts, only others’ motivations can influence the probability of 
success of normative political prescriptions. So, only others’ motivations are soft 
constraints in Gilabert/Lawford-Smith terms.  
In the next and last chapter, I will provide an alternative set of soft constraints. My 
aim is to show that there are other facts influencing the contextual possibility to 
implement a prescription and the degree of feasibility of a prescription. In particular, 
I will adopt a certain refinement of the criterion for the selection of soft constraints 
introduced above. So, I will suggest that contextual feasibility, the general degree of 
feasibility and contextual degree of feasibility are influenced by frustrated human 
needs and lacking material conditions. 
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Chapter 5 
Material resources and human needs as soft constraints 
 
Introduction 
 
In this last chapter, I analyse which facts are soft constraints given an extended 
version of the criterion for the selection of soft.  
The chapter is structured in four parts. In the first part, I extend the a-clause of the 
criterion for the selection of soft constraints. By extending that clause, I include into 
set of soft constraints those facts undermining the feasibility of prescriptions in 
certain contexts and those facts influencing the general feasibility degree. Thus, also 
those facts affecting the contextual possibility and the general degree of ability to act 
in accordance with a certain (set of) prescription(s) are soft constraints.  
In the second part, I analyse the notion of feasibility in relation with the notion of 
ability. This step is necessary to understand which facts could indeed affect 
feasibility. I hold that those facts excluding some actions from the agents’ option set 
and those facts affecting the agents’ ability to be motivated to perform certain actions 
could be feasibility constraint.  
In the third part, I suggest that lacking material resources could exclude some 
actions from agents’ option set. Therefore, those lacking material resources that do it 
and respect all the other clauses of the criterion are feasibility constraints. I will 
emphasise that material resources undermining the general feasibility (making 
worldwide impossible to act in accordance with prescriptions now and in a 
predictable future) are feasibility constraints, but it is not possible to know if they are 
hard or soft constraints.  
In the fourth part, I suggest that frustrated human needs could influence the agents’ 
ability to be motivated to perform certain actions. Therefore, all those frustrated 
human needs that do it and respect all the other clauses of the criterion are feasibility 
constraints. I will hold that absolute and entrenched human needs can affect the 
ability to be motivated of human beings and they can respect the other clauses of the 
criterion: in particular, they are independent of what agents want and they exist now 
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and in predictable future. Therefore, the frustration of these needs constrains the 
feasibility of prescriptions. 
 
Extended a-clause 
 
Here, I extend the first rule of the criterion for the selection of soft constraints in a 
way that it can include also those facts affecting the contextual possibility and the 
general degree of feasibility to act in accordance with a certain (set of) 
prescription(s)88. Hence:  
 
A fact is a soft constraint for the (set of) prescription(s) x iff: 
a) it influences the probability of success of x in general; or it influences the 
probability of success of x in the context C; or it undermines the possibility to 
act in accordance with x in the context C;  
b) it does (a) despite or because the interactions among contexts; 
c) it does (a) now and in a predictable future 
d) it generally exist (or exists in C) independently of what people (or C 
inhabitants) want 
 
I do extend the category of soft constraints to those facts undermining the contextual 
feasibility. That is to say, all those facts undermining the possibility to implement or 
maintain a (set of) prescription(s) in a certain contexts are soft feasibility constraints. 
I do so because a prescription that is not conform to one of these facts could be 
unfeasible just in those contexts in which that fact does exist. In any other context in 
which that fact does not exist the prescription is feasible89, then that prescription is a 
                                                
88 This is an obvious remark to make the criterion as clear as possible. I remember that the original 
criterion considers soft constraints only those facts that affect the contextual degree of feasibility. This 
extended version does not exclude those facts influencing the contextual degree of feasibility, but it 
includes also other facts undermining the contextual feasibility or influencing the general feasibility 
degree. 
89 Assuming that no other fact undermines the feasibility in those contexts. 
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normative political prescription even if it clashes with that fact90. Since I defined 
hard constraints as ‘all and only those facts undermining the possibility to act in 
accordance with a certain prescriptions at any place and time of the world’ (so in any 
context in which human beings can live), facts affecting the contextual possibility 
cannot be hard constraints. They cannot be hard constraints because they do not exist 
in any place of the world or at any time.  
I do extend the category of soft constraints to those facts influencing the general 
degree of feasibility. That is to say, all those facts influencing the probability to 
implement or maintain a (set of) prescription(s) in generally spread circumstances 
are soft feasibility constraints. I do so, because I recognise that there are facts that 
affect the degree of feasibility of normative political prescriptions independently 
from the context in which we want to implement and maintain those prescriptions. 
These facts are generally spread: they are characteristics of any Earth context or 
characteristic of any human being now and in a predictable future. Since they are 
generally spread, there is no reason to think that they cannot generally influence the 
success of prescriptions. 
 
Feasibility/Ability 
 
In this paragraph I want to analyse the relation between feasibility and ability. I think 
that the criteria to select feasibility constraints should be formalised in a way that 
warrants that human beings and groups of human beings be able to perform the 
actions that prescriptions demand. This means that first of all, it is necessary to 
define what being able means. Although a critical analysis of the concept of ability 
would be extremely interesting, I do not provide it. Differently, I just sketch the 
notion of ability that I think is functional for the analysis of feasibility of normative 
political prescriptions, since I think that feasibility and ability are strongly related. 
My aim here is to clarify what contextual feasibility, general feasibility degree and 
                                                
90 In the second chapter I maintained that hard constraints are those facts making impossible to act in 
accordance with a certain prescription in any place at any time. Being impossible in any place at any 
time to act in accordance with a prescription, the prescription should not be considered a normative 
political prescription (since no punishable law should be deduced from it. 
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contextual feasibility degree of normative political prescriptions mean in term of 
abilities. This is useful in order to address and justify the choice of feasibility 
constraints that characterise my further analysis in the rest of this thesis. 
At the end of the first chapter, I held that a prescriptive normative political theory is 
feasible iff it is possible for human beings to perform the action that the prescriptions 
demand ‘or’ human beings are able to perform the actions that the prescriptions 
demand. Where, I meant that a prescriptive normative political theory is a theory that 
provides a set of normative political prescriptions. This definition seems a plausible 
one, however it is different from the commonly accepted notion of feasibility such as 
something (in this case a (set of) prescription(s)) is said to be feasible iff it is capable 
of being successfully used.  
I think that the plausibility of my definition of feasibility is due to the fact that it is a 
‘active’ definition of feasibility that coexist with the common sense ‘passive’ 
definition of feasibility. In other words, the capability of being used of a certain (set 
of) prescription(s) necessarily implies the ability of some agents to ‘use’ that (set of) 
prescription(s). Precisely, the capability of normative political prescriptions of being 
implemented and maintained necessarily implies the ability of human beings to 
implement and maintain prescriptions. Let us see why. 
Preliminarily, it is important to point out that both abilities and capabilities (as 
feasibility) are properties of certain subjects that could be expressed through the 
auxiliary ‘can’. So, the sentences ‘John can ride horses’ and ‘my mobile can surf on 
Internet’ are both characterised by the use of the auxiliary ‘can’. Anyway, they differ 
in the nature of their subjects. Obviously, the ‘can’ of the first sentence is related to 
an alive subject (the human being John); differently, the ‘can’ of the second sentence 
is related to an inanimate object (my mobile). So we say that the first sentence 
identifies a certain John’s property (his ability to ride horses); while, the second 
sentence identifies a certain property of my mobile (his capability to surf on 
internet). So far, I suggest using the term ability exclusively to properties of living 
beings, while the term capability can also be referred to inanimate objects. 
Given that normative political prescriptions are inanimate objects, their property of 
being feasible can just be defined as a capability, so it seems terminologically 
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inappropriate to connect the feasibility of prescriptions with abilities. However, 
feasibility as ‘the capability of an inanimate object of being successfully used’, 
presupposes a second subject, namely, a user. Specifically, here feasibility is the 
capability of normative political prescriptions to be successfully implemented and 
maintained. ‘To be implemented’ and ‘to be maintained’ are passive verbs, so they 
implicitly need some user that actively implement and maintain normative political 
prescriptions. Implicitly and obviously, the exclusive ‘users’ of normative political 
prescriptions are human beings, and human beings can implement and maintain 
normative political prescriptions only if they are able. So, that is why the property 
‘feasibility’ predicated of prescription is related to the abilities of human beings. 
Now, I sketch the notion of ability that I think concerns the feasibility of normative 
political prescriptions. So, I try to define the boundaries of the ‘abilities’ that play a 
role in the evaluation of feasibility. 
 
The main distinction in the debate about the concept of abilities is the one between 
‘general’ and ‘specific’ abilities. In this paragraph I consider two different ways to 
approach this question. The first way (purposed by Mele91) is useful to draw the 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic abilities. The second way (purposed 
by Maier and close to Lawford-Smith’s idea of option set) provides a robust 
understanding of the notion of abilities that can coexist and can be combined with the 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic abilities.  
Let me first introduce the notion of general abilities provided by Mele and inspiring 
Jensen. Following Jensen, I maintained that a (set of) normative political 
prescription(s) is feasible when a group of human beings has the ‘synchronic’ or the 
‘diachronic’ ability to perform the actions that the (set of) prescription(s) demands 
(clause c of the criterion for the selection of soft constraints). The distinction 
between ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ abilities is largely inspired by the distinction 
between ‘specific’ and ‘general’ abilities’ provided by Mele. Mele defines general 
abilities as 'the kind of ability to A that we attribute to agents even though we know 
                                                
91 Mele, A. (2002), “Agents' Abilities,” Noûs, 37: 447-470. 
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they have no opportunity to A at the time of attribution and we have no specific 
occasion for their A-ing in mind'92. General abilities are those abilities we attribute to 
an agent when we suppose that she could show them in certain circumstances (if she 
has the opportunity to do it). They are abilities that the agent does not show in the 
moment of the attribution because she currently has not the opportunity and maybe 
she will never have; however, in the moment of the attribution we think that the 
agent would be able to perform the act we attribute if she has the opportunity. For 
example, let us suppose the ability ‘to score a penalty goal’. I can say to have the 
general ability to ‘to score a penalty goal’ iff I suppose I would score a penalty goal 
if I have the opportunity, but I have not the opportunity to show it now (maybe 
because I am in my bed or because I broke my feet) and I do not know if would ever 
have it. Differently, specific abilities are traditionally defined through the conditional 
analysis. So we say that ‘the agent S has the [specific] ability to A iff S would A if S 
tried to A’93. This means that specific abilities are those abilities that the agent has in 
the current circumstance and she would show them if she tried. So, I can say that I 
have the specific ability ‘to score a penalty goal’ iff I would score a penalty goal if 
kick a penalty goal now.  
The existence of both general and specific abilities is important to draw the 
difference between synchronic abilities and diachronic abilities. In fact, it 
presupposes that we can attribute certain ability to an agent in both cases: either 
when she would perform a certain act if she would try to do it now, or in the case we 
suppose she would perform that act if she has the opportunity now or in the future. 
That is what Jensen suggests when he supposes that an agent (or a group) has certain 
ability either if she/it has it now or if she/it will have in a predictable future. 
Although the distinction between general and specific abilities directly inspired the 
analysis about feasibility of normative theories, it is still not clear what ‘to be able’ 
means. Maier theory of abilities seems to be more accurate in this.  
Maier introduces a meaning of ‘abilities’ as ‘restricted possibility’. I suggest that 
combining the distinction between synchronic and diachronic abilities with the 
                                                
92 Ivi, p. 447 
93 The conditional analysis of abilities has been purposed by Austin, J.L. (1956), “Ifs and Cans,” 
Proceedings of The British Academy, 42: 107-132 
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notion of abilities as restricted possibilities, I could give a definition of feasibility in 
terms of abilities.  
In Maier’s theory, the agents’ abilities are defined as the available options that agents 
have in certain circumstances. Where, I define circumstances as sets of facts (events) 
occurring in certain contexts (in certain spaces at certain times). He writes: 'we might 
say, that someone has the general ability to A [in the circumstance C] just when94 she 
has the option of A-ing under some circumstances [similar to C]'95. The idea behind 
this definition of ability is that an agent I is generally able to perform an action A in a 
certain circumstance C only if that action A is an option for her in a relevant number 
of circumstances similar to C96. For instance, let us consider the circumstance in 
which I am going to kick a penalty. Let us suppose that in a relevant number of 
circumstances similar to this one, I score the penalty. In this case, I can say that ‘I am 
able to score a penalty’. Let us consider how this account of ability works. Let us 
suppose that the agent I is in the circumstance C. Let us suppose that the 
circumstance C is similar (for some unspecified regards) to the circumstances C1, 
C2, C3, C4, C5. Let us suppose that is metaphysically possible for me to perform the 
actions (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) in C. However, let us suppose that other non-metaphysical 
facts97 constrain the I’s option-set in C in a way that we can say: ‘I is just able to 
perform the actions a, b, c in C’. In this case, it seems we should conclude that I is 
only able to perform a, b and c in C. However, let us suppose that in all the other 
circumstances similar to C (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5), I have also the ability to perform 
the action d. In this case we would say that the agent I has the general ability to 
perform the actions (a, b, c, d) in C. The implication of such an account of general 
                                                
94 I interpret the formula ‘just when’ as ‘only if’. I do not know if it is right or by using ‘just when’ 
Maier means only ‘if’. 
95 C. Maier, J., 2015, “The Agentive Modalities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
96 Probably, this account should specify how many circumstances are necessary to say that an agent is 
able to perform an action in her circumstance. Furthermore, it should need to specify how similar 
should be these circumstances to be compared to the current one. So, for instance it could purpose: 
‘someone has the general ability to A in the circumstance C, just when she has the option of A-ing 
under the 50% of the circumstances that are equal to C in regards to facts a, b, and c’. This problem is 
well underlined by Maier but I do not think he offers a clear answer. I think that he argues that there is 
not a fixed percentage of circumstances and there is not a fixed definition of similar circumstances. 
So, I think that the relevant number of circumstances and their similarity should evaluated case by 
case 
97 These facts should obviously be independent of what the agent want 
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ability is that an agent could be said to be generally able to perform an action in the 
current circumstance even if she fails to perform that action in the current 
circumstance.  
Let us suppose the action ‘to score a penalty kick’. I am in a football field in Milan 
and I am going to kick a penalty (circumstance C). In 70% of the cases in which I am 
in a football field (in any part of the world) and I am going to kick a penalty 
(circumstances similar to C), I score it. So, in 70% of the circumstances similar to the 
current one, the action ‘to score a penalty goal’ is an available option. Let us suppose 
that I kick the penalty but I fail it. Given the account of general abilities as restricted 
possibilities, I still have the general ability to score the penalty, even if I failed the 
penalty in that precise circumstance. I have the general ability to score the penalty 
goal, because it is an available option in a relevant number of circumstances similar 
to my current one.  
From these examples emerge that some facts (not necessarily metaphysical facts) 
constrain the set of all available options. Hence, not all the metaphysically possible 
actions are available options in the agent option-set: that is why abilities are 
considered restricted possibilities. This idea reminds Lawford-Smith’s contribution 
about feasibility, however here I specified that those facts restricting the possibilities 
must be independent of what the agent want. That is to say, not only metaphysical 
facts restrict the available options of the agent, but also not even facts that depend on 
what the agent wants do it. What I need to know is which other facts do restrict the 
possibility to perform an action in certain circumstances.  
In the next paragraphs I will show that according to the definition of ability as 
restricted possibility, lacking material resources do undermine the contextual 
feasibility of prescriptions as well as they influence general and contextual degree of 
feasibility. In terms of restricted possibilities this means that i) lacking material 
resources could exclude certain actions from the context-C inhabitants’ option set in 
any circumstance occurring in C; ii) lacking material resources could exclude certain 
actions from human beings option set in a certain number of generally spread 
circumstances; iii) lacking material resources could exclude certain actions from the 
context-C inhabitants’ option set in a certain number of circumstances (not all) 
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occurring in C.  
The first case is the one in which the inhabitants of C always (in any circumstance) 
lack the material resource to perform the action a-x in C and that resource is 
necessary to perform a-x in C. In this case, C inhabitants never have the action a-x in 
their option set (now and in a predictable future). Hence, a (set of) prescription(s) x 
demanding to perform a-x is not feasible in C (now and in a predictable future).  
The second case is the one in which human beings generally lack a certain material 
resource in number of circumstances. Thus the resource is lacked in a certain number 
of generally spread circumstances and it is always necessary to perform the action a-
x. Alternatively, human beings always lack a resource and it is necessary to perform 
a-x in a certain number of generally spread circumstances. Finally, human beings 
lack a resource in a certain number of generally spread circumstances and that 
resource is necessary to perform a-x in a certain number of generally spread 
circumstances. In these three situations, there is a number of generally spread 
circumstances in which human beings (or groups of human beings) have not the 
action a-x in their option set. Therefore the (set of) prescription(s) x demanding a-x 
is not feasible in certain percentage given by the number of generally circumstances 
in which agents have a-x in their option set.  
The last case is the one in which context-C inhabitants contextually lack a resource 
and this fact restrict the possibility to perform an action in certain circumstances. 
This can happen when C inhabitants always lack a material resource and that 
resource is necessary to perform a-x in certain number of C circumstances. 
Alternatively, C inhabitants lack a material resource in a certain number of C 
circumstances (now and in a predictable future) and that resource is always necessary 
to perform a-x in C. Finally, it happen when C inhabitants lack a material resource in 
a certain number of circumstances (now and in a predictable future) and that resource 
is necessary to perform a-x in a certain number of C circumstances (now and in a 
predictable future). In these three situations, there is a number of C circumstances in 
which C inhabitants have not the action a-x in their option set. Therefore the (set of) 
prescription(s) x demanding a-x is not feasible in certain percentage given by the 
number of C circumstances in which agents have a-x in their option set. 
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Through the concept of ‘ability as restricted possibility’, I can consider the analysis 
of degrees of feasibility evaluating the percentage in which an action is possible 
given by the number of circumstances in which certain actions have success. Given a 
(set of) prescription(s) x demanding the actions a-x, the feasibility degree of x is 
given by the percentage of circumstances in which the agents have a-x in their option 
set. However, given a precise circumstance, not any action in our option set has the 
same probability to be obtained; consequently, not any prescription has the same 
degree of feasibility in a given circumstance. The degree of success of an action in a 
precise circumstance also depends on what Gilabert calls ‘the agent’s deciding to 
act’98. For example, ‘going to run’ and ‘writing my thesis’ are both actions that I 
have in my option set today but they have not the same degree of success because I 
have different degree of motivations toward these two actions. So, their degree of 
success obviously depends on my own motivations. In the previous chapter I 
concluded that agents’ own motivations do not affect the feasibility of actions and 
prescriptions since they are the expression of what the agent want. I maintain this 
conclusion here; however, certain facts could affect the agents' ability to be 
motivated in a certain way and these facts could be independent of what the agent 
want. Hence, these facts influence the ability to be motivated to act in a certain way 
and the consequent performance of the action. Therefore, they could influence the 
feasibility of prescriptions.  
 
Although the approach of abilities as restricted set of options is very clear, it does not 
grasp a certain sense in which the notion of ability is gradable. This approach does 
not show that the ability to perform some actions (then the ability to close the 
available options) depends on the ability to be motivated99 to perform those actions. 
That is to say, let us suppose that in the current situation and in situations similar to 
it, I have the options ‘to eat’, ‘to write’ and ‘to watch a movie’. Let us suppose that 
                                                
98 Gilabert, P. (Forthcoming), “Justice and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach”, in K. Vallier & M. 
Weber (eds.), Political Utopias, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
99 I will specify that the degree of ability to act in accordance with certain prescription is not given by 
agents’ motivations. I hold that it is given by agents’ ability to be motivated 
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they are exclusive actions100, and let us suppose that they are all available actions 
(means they all exist in my option set). Let us consider I am so hungry that I am 
difficultly able to be motivated ‘to write’ or ‘to watch a movie’. In this sense, ‘to 
write’ and ‘to watch a movie’ are options in my option-set, but my inner condition is 
such as I am difficultly able to be motivated to choose them. So, I think I have a 
degree of ability to perform those actions that is smaller than the degree of ability 
that I have to perform the action ‘to eat’. In this case, my degrees of ability to 
perform the actions ‘to eat’, ‘to write’ and ‘to watch a movie’ does not seems given 
by the number of circumstances similar to the current one in which I have the option 
to perform those actions. 
The idea that the ability to perform certain actions depends on the ability of being 
motivated to perform those actions is not new. First Duggan and Gert101 and then 
Don Locke102 suggest that the ability to perform an action is influenced by the ability 
to be motivated (or to will) to perform that action. Don Locke writes: ‘for A to be 
able to do x it must also be possible for A to be appropriately motivated, as 
apparently nothing could motivate this miser to give this beggar money. So being 
able has to be understood not in terms of what an agent will do given the motivation, 
but in terms of what he can successfully be motivated to do’103.  
I will hold that the ability of being motivated is a condition affecting the degree of 
feasibility: it affects the general feasibility degrees and contextual feasibility 
degrees. The general feasibility degree of a certain (set of) prescription(s) x is 
affected by human beings ability to be motivated to perform the action that x 
demands. That is to say, a certain (set of) prescription(s) x has a certain general 
degree of feasibility p if, in general circumstances, human beings are able or will be 
(in a predictable future) able to be motivated for a certain degree m to perform the 
actions that x demands. The contextual feasibility degree of a certain (set of) 
prescription(s) x is given by the ability of inhabitant of a certain context C to be 
                                                
100 Meaning that if I perform one of these actions I cannot perform the others 
101 Duggan, T. & Gert, B. (1967), “Voluntary Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 4(2): 127-
135. 
102 Locke, D. (1976), “The ‘Can’ of being able”, Philosophia, 6(1): 1-20. 
103 Ivi, p. 11 
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motivated to perform the action that x demands. That is to say, a certain (set of) 
prescription(s) x has a certain contextual degree of feasibility p only if C inhabitants 
have or will have (in a predictable future) a certain degree m of ability to be 
motivated to perform the actions that x demands in C. 
Later on, I will hold that degree of ability of being motivated to act in a certain way 
is influenced by human needs frustration. Human needs (whose existence is 
independent of what agents want) influence the agents’ ability to be motivated to act 
in accordance with a certain set of prescriptions. Consequently, human needs 
influence the success of prescriptions to the extent that they affect agents’ ability to 
be motivated to perform the actions that prescriptions demand. Of course, I do not 
think that we can measure the precise degree in which human needs affect the ability 
of being motivated. However, we can suppose that prescriptions demanding actions 
that frustrate human needs are lowly feasible, because the agents would not be fully 
able to be motivated to perform those actions. 
 
In sum, the feasibility of normative political prescriptions is related with the ability 
of agents to perform the actions that normative political prescriptions demand. 
Precisely, the abilities intended as restricted possibilities could undermine both the 
general and the contextual feasibility. Furthermore, they could influence the general 
degree of feasibility and the contextual degree of feasibility of (sets of) normative 
political prescriptions. The general feasibility of a (set of) prescription(s) x 
demanding the actions a-x depends on the fact that human beings have or will have 
the option a-x in some generally spread circumstances. The contextual feasibility of a 
(set of) prescription(s) x demanding the actions a-x in context C depends on the fact 
that inhabitants of C have or will have the option a-x in some circumstances of C. 
The general degree of feasibility of a (set of) prescription(s) x demanding the actions 
a-x depends on the number (percentage) of circumstances in which human beings in 
general have or will have the option a-x in their option set. The contextual degree of 
feasibility of a (set of) prescriptions x demanding the actions a-x in the context C 
depends on the number of circumstances occurring in C in which C inhabitants have 
or will have the option a-x in their option set. General feasibility, contextual 
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feasibility, general degree of feasibility and contextual degree of feasibility so 
defined are sensitive to some facts, which restrict the set of options that agents have 
in general or particular contexts. I will show that these facts are lacking material 
resources. 
Furthermore, the ability to be motivated affects the general degree of feasibility and 
the contextual degree of feasibility of (sets of) normative political prescriptions. The 
general degree of feasibility of (a set of) prescription(s) x demanding the action a-x 
depends on the degree of ability to be motivated to a-x of human beings. The 
contextual degree of feasibility of (a set of) prescriptions x demanding the action(s) 
a-x in C depends on the degree of ability to be motivated to a-x of people inhabiting 
C or contexts similar to C. General degree of feasibility and the contextual degree of 
feasibility so defined are sensitive to some facts, which restrict the ability to be 
motivated in certain ways. I will show that these facts are human needs. 
 
Soft Constraints: lacking material resources and human Needs 
 
In the previous paragraph I pointed out that facts are soft constraints in two cases: 
first, they influence or undermine the success of (a set of) prescription(s) by 
excluding certain actions from the agents’ option set in some generally spread 
circumstance or by excluding certain actions from the agents’ option set in any or 
some contextually circumscribed circumstances; second, they influence the success 
of (a set of) prescription(s) by influencing the agents’ ability of being motivated to 
perform the actions that the prescriptions demand. In the next paragraphs, I hold that 
in the first case lacking material resources are feasibility constraints; while, in the 
second case, human needs are feasibility constraints. That is to say, the lack of 
material resources excludes certain actions from the agents’ option set; while, human 
needs influence the agents’ ability of being motivated to perform certain actions.  
By doing so, lacking material resources can undermine the contextual and general 
possibility to act in accordance with a certain (set of) prescription(s) now and in a 
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predictable future104. Furthermore, they influence the general degree of feasibility 
and the contextual degree of feasibility of (a set of) prescriptions. While, human 
needs influence the general and the contextual degree of feasibility. Therefore, 
lacking material resources and human needs can be considered soft feasibility 
constrains.  
 
Lacking material resources 
 
In these paragraphs, my aim is to introduce the feasibility constraint ‘lacking 
material resources’. I hold that it is a feasibility constraint since lacking material 
resources could undermine the general and contextual feasibility of prescriptions. 
Furthermore, they could influence the general and contextual degree of feasibility of 
prescriptions. Hence, here I try to provide a definition of lacking material resources 
and I try to explain which lacking material resources matter for the sake of 
feasibility. By doing so, I will specify in which cases it is opportune to consider the 
lack of material resources independent of what agents’ want.  
The first step to show how lacking material resources could exclude certain actions 
from the agents’ option set is to define what material resources are. I widely define 
material resources as all those physically existing objects that an individual or a 
group have got (now or in a predictable future) and can use to achieve certain goals. 
This definition of material resources is explicitly based on the notion of physically 
existing objects, a notion that I compare with the one of social facts. Physically 
existing objects are those facts that exist independently of what human beings accept 
and because of this they differ from social facts, which exist only in virtue of what 
human beings accept105. For example, given a ‘piece of paper’ which value is ‘ten-
euro’, the ‘piece of paper’ is a physically existing object (it exist independently of 
our acceptance), while the value ‘ten-euro’ is the social fact related to that object and 
it needs our acceptance in order to exist. In other words, the value ‘ten-euro’ exists 
only because human beings accept that ‘the piece of paper is a ten euro’, while the 
                                                
 
105 Searle has a similar idea about social facts. Searle, J. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, 
London: Penguin. 
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piece of paper does exist even if human beings do not accept the idea that it exists106. 
‘Material resources as physically existing facts’ belong to the category of external 
facts: facts that do not need to be believed as ‘real’ by human beings in order to 
exist107. ‘Consequently, lacking material resources are all those physically existing 
objects that could be useful to achieve certain goals, but individuals or a groups have 
not and will not have in a predictable future.  
To see that lacking material resources exclude some actions from an individual’s 
option set is quite easy. Let us suppose the action ‘to score a penalty kick’ and let us 
suppose that the agent of this action has not and will never have a ‘ball’ to kick a 
penalty. In this case, we can say that the agent lacks the ‘ball’108; then the ball is a 
lacking material resource for this agent. It is quite easy to understand, that the agent 
cannot perform the action ‘to kick a penalty goal’ in the current circumstance and in 
any circumstance similar to it. So, the lacking resource ‘ball’ undermines the 
individual’s ability to perform the action ‘to score a penalty goal’. Therefore, the 
lacked ball excludes the action ‘to kick a penalty goal’ from the individual’s option 
set.  
In the next paragraph, I will try to show how lacking material resources exclude 
some actions from human beings’ or groups’ option set. So, I will show how lacking 
material resources undermine or influence the feasibility of normative political 
prescriptions. Now, let me just clarify when the lack of material resources matters for 
the feasibility analysis and for which extent we could lack material resources. 
                                                
106 Of course, a piece of paper does exist only if someone produced it and nobody destroyed it, so it 
existence is not independent from human actions. However, once it has been produced, it exists even 
if nobody believes that it exists. That is to say, given its existence, it does exist independently of what 
human beings believe. Differently, supposing that an one associates a nominal value of ten euro to 
that piece of paper, that value does not exist in the case that nobody believe that it exists. 
107 Let us suppose that there exist a bottom, which would power up a system that deletes the memory 
of any human being if someone pressed it. Let us suppose that a guy presses that bottom. In that case, 
it would not exist any social fact in the moment immediately after the guy’s action. Consequently, in 
that moment, the world would be characterized only by non-social facts. 
108 ‘The ball’ (or however you want to call a sphere having certain dimensions, weight and atomic 
structure) is a physically existing fact that is necessary to achieve a socially created action such as ‘to 
kick a penalty’. 
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The causes of lacking a material resource can be different: we can lack a resource 
because of the state of technology109; we can lack a resource because of certain 
features of the environment; we can lack a material resource because someone steal 
it or destroy it; or we can lack a resource simply because of some unfortunately 
events that randomly happen. We could lack ‘drinkable water’ because we actually 
have not a technology to create artificial clouds; in this sense we first lack the 
‘technology to create artificial clouds’ and consequently we lack ‘drinkable water’. 
We could lack ‘drinkable water’ because it does not rain so much in the context in 
which we live; in this case, we first lack a ‘rainy climate’ and consequently we lack 
‘drinkable water’. We could lack ‘drinkable water’ because of both causes: we live in 
a dry environment and we do not have the technology to create artificial clouds. We 
could lack our bottle of drinkable water because someone steals it and drinks it. 
Finally, in certain circumstances, we could lack drinkable water because of unlucky 
events that sometimes happen: for example, we lose our bottle of water during an 
excursion in the middle of Sahara. Whatever the reason is, a lacking material 
resource can be considered a feasibility constraint only if the agents lack that 
resource independently of what they want. In other words, lacking material resources 
matter as feasibility constraints only if they respect the last clause of the criterion for 
the selection of soft constraint110.  
Unfortunately, it is not that banal to understand in which cases agents lack material 
resources independently of what they want. Let us consider the following case. Let 
us suppose that in the context C, the group of individuals GC lacks the resource 
‘water’. In order to consider the lacked water a feasibility constraint, it should be 
lacked independently of what members of GC want. So, let us consider that GC 
members lack ‘water’ because they lack both a ‘rainy climate’ and ‘the technology to 
generate artificial clouds’. Then, consider that they lack ‘a technology to generate 
artificial clouds’ because they lack ‘research programmes (labs, researchers, etc.) 
                                                
109 It is opportune to remember that the lack of technology has been recognised as a particular soft 
constraint in the previous chapter. Differently, here the lack of technology is comprised as a kind of 
the wider set ‘lacking material resources’. 
110 More generally, only those lacking material resources respecting the criterion for the selection of 
soft constraint affect the feasibility 
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specialized in artificial clouds technological development’. Then, they lack ‘research 
programmes specialised in artificial clouds technological development’ because they 
lack the ‘resources to invest in research programmes specialized in artificial clouds 
technological development’. Finally, they lack the ‘resources to invest in research 
programmes specialized in artificial clouds technological development’ because they 
lack ‘the political “will” to invest on research about artificial clouds technological 
development’.  
Given this causal chain, it is not so obvious to understand whether or not the lack of 
‘water’ is independent of what group members want. So, it is not so obvious to know 
whether or not the lack of ‘water’ is a feasibility constraint. If someone asked GC 
members ‘do you want to lack water?’ they would probably answer, ‘no, we do not!’ 
So, it seems that the lack of ‘water’ is independent of what GC members want; then 
it seems the lack of water is a feasibility constraint. On the other hand, the prime 
cause of the lack of ‘water’ seems to be a lack of ‘political will’ to invest in certain 
research programmes. Since the lack of ‘political will’ is the expression of what GC 
members want, the last consequence of ‘GC political will’ (namely, ‘lack of water’) 
indirectly depends on what GC members (at least one) want. So, it seems that the 
lack of ‘water’ is not independent of what GC members want and because of this it 
seems that it is not a feasibility constraint. Therefore, if we consider the ‘lack of 
water’ isolating it from its causal chain, it is a physical fact independent of what GC 
members want. Differently, if we consider the lack of ‘water’ as final outcome of a 
certain causal chain, it could be a physical fact which lack depends on what GC 
members want.  
I think that in order to evaluate the independence of lacking material resources from 
what agents want, we should consider the causal chain generating the lack of 
material resources (supposing that the causal chain is clear to us). Hence, when the 
causes generating the lack of resource depends on what agents want, then the lacking 
resource is not independent of agents want. In the case of the example, it seems 
correct to conclude that the lack of ‘water’ is not independent of what GC members 
want since one of its cause is a lack of political will. However, I think that this could 
be a hurried conclusion.  
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In accordance with the previous refinement of d-clause111, I suggest maintaining that 
a certain lacking material resource is not ‘independent of what agents want’ if some 
voluntary actions (causes112) is/are necessary to generate or to maintain the lacking 
resource in those circumstances (and the agents know that performing those actions 
they will lack those resources). That is to say, in the case that an outcome (a lack of 
resource) would not exist if voluntary actions did not generate or maintain it, then the 
outcome is dependent of what agents’ want. Therefore, the outcome is not a 
feasibility constraint.  
On contrary, a certain lacking material resource is ‘independent of what agents want’ 
only if it would exist in those circumstances independently of any voluntary action. 
In case that an outcome (a lack of resources) would exist even if the no voluntary 
actions generate or maintain it, then the outcome is independent of what agents want. 
Consequently, in the latter case, the outcome (the lacking resource) is a feasibility 
constraint. 
In the example above, the prime cause of the causal chain is a lack of ‘political 
“will”’ and it is obviously the expression of what GC members want. Let us assume 
that in C circumstances (circumstances of context C), the lack of ‘political will’ is 
necessary to produce the lack of ‘resources for research about artificial clouds 
technological development’ and the consequent lack of ‘research programmes 
specialized in artificial clouds technological development’. Thus, the lack of 
‘resources for research about artificial clouds technological development’ and the 
lack of ‘research programmes specialised in artificial clouds technological 
development’ depend on what GC members want. So, they cannot be feasibility 
constraints. Alternatively, let us assume that in C circumstances, the lack ‘political 
will’ and the consequent lack of ‘research programmes about artificial clouds 
                                                
111 Here, I define a fact as independent of what agents want when: Here, I define a fact as independent 
of what agents want when: i) it exists even if agents do not want that it exist and they did not perform 
any non-coerced/non-manipulated action in order to produce or maintain it; ii) or, it is the unexpected 
(unintended or accidental) outcome of non-coerced/non-manipulated agents’ actions. Differently, it is 
not the case to consider a fact ‘independent of what agents want’ when i) it exist only if agents want 
that it exists and they produced or maintained it through some non-coerced/non-manipulated actions; 
ii) or, agents’ do not want it but it is the expected (non-accidental) outcome of some non-coerced and 
non-manipulated agents’ actions. 
112 Causes dependent on what agents want. 
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technological development’ are not necessary to lack the ‘technology to generate 
artificial clouds’. Furthermore, GC members would lack the ‘technology to generate 
artificial clouds’ even if they invested on research about that technology and 
whatever path of action they could perform. In this case, the lack of ‘technology to 
generate artificial clouds’ and the consequent lack of ‘water’ are independent of what 
GC members want. So, they are good candidates to be feasibility constraints. 
 
Some other banal distinctions can say something more about material resources. For 
instance, material resources are lacked for different extents: a material resource can 
be generally lacked or it can be lacked just in some context(s) of the world; 
furthermore, a material resource can be lacked in any circumstance or just in some 
circumstance(s). Therefore, when I say that a resource is lacked I could mean that it 
is generally lacked in any circumstance; generally lacked in some circumstances; 
contextually lacked in any circumstance; contextually lacked in some circumstances. 
So far as I know about these facts: a ‘technology to create artificial clouds’ is a 
generally lacking resource in any circumstance. Simply, it does not exist in this 
world and probably will not exist in a predictable future; ‘rain’ is a generally lacking 
resource just in some circumstances (namely, during non-rainy days). That is to say, 
in any place of the world at any time there are occasions in which it does not rain and 
occasions in which it does rain; ‘the sea’ could be a contextually lacking resource in 
any circumstance in which a context does exist and it will exist in a predictable 
future. Supposing a context such as Switzerland, it has not the sea and will not have 
in a predictable future. So, in that context the sea is a lacking resource in any 
circumstance; drinkable water could be a lacking resource in some contexts, but it is 
lacked just in some circumstances. Supposing that the context is the Sahara, there are 
circumstances in which ‘drinkable water’ does exist even if it is lacked in the most 
circumstances. So, in that context the water is a lacking resource in some (the most) 
circumstances.  
A further example introduces a case in which lacking material resources constrain 
the feasibility of a certain prescription and it introduces the analysis of the next 
paragraphs. So, let us suppose the context of God-Land and let us suppose that 
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inhabitants would like to implement the prescription ‘everyone ought to have free 
access to water’. This means that they necessarily need the resource ‘sufficient 
drinkable water’ in order to perform the action ‘to provide free water for everyone’; 
so, they need ‘sufficient drinkable water’ in order to act in accordance with that 
prescription. As we already know, some God-Land inhabitants think that they could 
obtain the resource ‘sufficient drinkable water’ simply by building a water-spring. 
Now, let us suppose that after some further geologic analysis, The ‘God-Land Water-
Spring Research Team’ discovers that there is not enough water underground. So, 
even building a water spring, God-Land inhabitants would not have ‘sufficient 
drinkable water’ to provide free access to water for everyone. In this case, the 
available technology (the water spring) does not work in God-Land, since there is not 
water underground. So, the environmental features of God-Land do exclude the 
necessary material resource to implement the prescription. That is to say, God-Land 
environmental features determine that there is not ‘sufficient water’ in that context. 
Therefore, the lack of water does exclude the actions to implement the prescription 
from God-Land inhabitants’ option set.  
Now, let us suppose that the chief engineer of ‘The God-Land Water-Spring 
Research Team’ has the idea to use a technology generating artificial clouds that 
would provide rainy water. Let us suppose that he searches on Google for this kind 
of technology, but unfortunately he discovers that there are just some experimental 
attempts to generate artificial clouds. Thus, artificial clouds would not work in non-
lab contexts. In this case, the current state of technology (that is a worldwide lacking 
resource) excludes the possibility to have ‘sufficient water’ in God-Land. So, God-
Land inhabitants still lack the necessary material resource to perform the actions that 
the prescription demands. They lack ‘sufficient water’ also because they lack the 
adequate technology, then they cannot act in accordance with the prescription. 
In conclusion, the balance between the natural features of God-Land and the current 
state of technology excludes the actions to implement and maintain the prescription 
‘everyone ought to have free access to water’ from God-Land inhabitants’ option set. 
Assuming that both the ‘lacking technological resources’ and ‘lacking environmental 
features’ do not depend on what God-Land inhabitants want, the lacked ‘sufficient 
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water’ is also independent of what they want. So it is a feasibility constraint for that 
prescription in that context. 
This example shows ‘how’ lacking material resources could be relevant for the 
feasibility of normative political prescriptions.  
 
In the next paragraph, my aim is to show that lacking material resources undermine 
the general and contextual feasibility of prescriptions as well as the general and 
contextual degree of feasibility.  
I first show that those resources that we generally lack in any circumstance (now and 
in a predictable future) can undermine the general feasibility of prescriptions: I will 
show that they are surely feasibility constraints, but we should suspend our judgment 
whether or not they are soft or hard constraints. Then I will argue that those 
resources that we generally lack can also undermine the contextual feasibility of 
prescriptions: they can be the contributory causes (of a set of causes) undermining 
the feasibility of certain prescriptions in certain contests (now and in a predictable 
future). Furthermore, generally lacking material resources can influence the general 
and the contextual degree of feasibility. That is to say, they could affect the general 
or contextual possibility to act in accordance with a prescription but just in some 
(and not all) circumstances. Differently, those resources that we generally lack just in 
some circumstances can only influence the general or the contextual degree of 
feasibility. Those resources that we contextually lack in any circumstance can 
undermine the contextual feasibility of prescriptions as well as they can influence the 
contextual degree of feasibility. Finally, those resources that we contextually lack 
just in some circumstances can influence the contextual feasibility degree of 
prescriptions. 
To show that lacking material resources are feasibility constraints, I will maintain 
first that no-clause of the criterion for the selection of soft constraints necessarily 
excludes lacking material resources from the set of facts affecting feasibility. 
Second, I will provide some definitions aiming to identify the abstract cases in which 
material resources affect feasibility. Finally, I will provide examples showing 
concrete cases in which lacking material resources affect feasibility. 
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Lacking material resources and feasibility 
 
Generally, lacking material resources are those physical facts that are lacked in any 
place of the world (and in any or some circumstances), now and in a predictable 
future. Generally, lacking material resource can undermine the general feasibility of 
normative political prescriptions. That is to say, generally lacking material resources 
can make impossible to act in accordance with certain prescriptions in any place of 
the world, now and in a predictable future. In the second paragraph, I related 
feasibility with abilities so that a (set of) prescription(s) x is feasible in the context C 
(space s; time t) only if the inhabitants of the contexts C(s; t) have the option to 
perform the actions that x demands in a relevant number of circumstances. Assuming 
that the context C is the space ‘world’, at time ‘now and in a predictable future’, I 
think that generally lacking material resources could exclude some actions from the 
option-set of C inhabitants113. So, generally lacking resources could make impossible 
for all human beings to perform certain actions now and in a predictable future. 
Consequently, they could make impossible to satisfy what prescriptions demand, 
now and in a predictable future. Because of this, generally lacking material resources 
could be feasibility constraints. 
Let us consider an example that intuitively shows how generally lacking material 
resources exclude some actions from all human beings’ option set in any 
circumstance, now and in a predictable future. Let us suppose a prescription such as 
‘it is forbidden to waste trash on Earth’114. Let us suppose that in order to act in 
accordance with this prescription, there are two set of actions: first, human beings 
should recycle all their thrash; second, human beings should waste trash somewhere 
in the universe. Let us suppose that despite human beings are able to recycle a lot of 
trash, there are some waste (as toxic waste) they cannot recycle. So, they ought to 
perform the action ‘to waste unrecyclable trash somewhere in the Universe’. In order 
                                                
113 All those human beings inhabiting the world now and in a predictable future 
114 Suppose that it is justified by some normative reasons concerning the preservation of the 
environment 
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to perform this action, human beings need a spatial technology that enables them to 
perform it. In particular, they need to develop a kind of spatial technology that is 
capable to bring all the unrecyclable trash from the Earth to a place somewhere in the 
Universe. For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that this action is possible for 
human beings only having some space cargo-shuttles (huge space shuttles) everyday 
departing from the Earth to the interstellar-dump. Unfortunately, such a space cargo-
shuttle does not exist in the real world and it will not exist in a predictable future. 
Consequently, the lacked cargo-shuttle excludes the action ‘to waste the unrecyclable 
trash somewhere in the Universe’ from human beings option set, in any circumstance 
now and in a predictable future. Therefore, the lacked space cargo-shuttle makes the 
prescription ‘it is forbidden to waste trash on Earth’ unfeasible in the world, now and 
in a predictable future. So, the lacked space cargo-shuttle is a feasibility constraint.  
The example shows a case in which a generally lacking resource could be feasibility 
constraints since it could make impossible for human beings to act in accordance 
with prescriptions. However, it is not clear whether these lacking material resources 
undermining the general feasibility of a prescription are soft or hard constraints. At 
the beginning of the second chapter, I defined hard constraints as ‘those facts that 
make impossible for human beings to perform certain actions at any place and any 
time’115. Given this definition, logic rules, physical laws and biological laws were the 
only hard constraints I identified. Generally lacking material resources differ from 
these facts because we can only know that they do undermine the general feasibility 
of prescriptions now and in a predictable future. So, we cannot know whether they 
will undermine feasibility at any time (‘any time’ includes also ‘non-predictable 
future’). In other words, we only know that these lacking resources make impossible 
for human beings to perform certain actions in any place of the world, now and in a 
predictable future. By definition, we do not know if these lacking resources make 
impossible for human beings to perform certain actions at any time (in a non-
predictable future). Without knowing whether they make impossible to perform the 
actions at any time or not, we do not know if they are hard constraints or not.  
                                                
115 This definition implies that a prescription clashing with hard constraints is not a normative political 
prescription at all, because it is impossible for human beings to act in accordance with it. 
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For example, we can imagine a future in which space cargo-shuttles do exist. It shall 
not happen in a predictable future, but it could happen sooner or later. This idea 
could bring me to think that the lack of space cargo-shuttles is just a temporary 
lacked fact and maybe I should consider it as soft constraints. However, I cannot 
know if we will be able to develop space cargo-shuttles in a non-predictable future 
(by definition it is not predictable); maybe, human beings will be never able to 
develop and produce space cargo-shuttles. In that case, the lack of space cargo-
shuttles would be a hard constraint. The point is that by definition we have never 
good arguments to believe (predict) that we will obtain those resources that we lack 
now and in a predictable future in any place of the world. So, we cannot know 
whether or not those lacking material resources will undermine the feasibility of 
prescriptions also in a non-predictable future. Hence, there are not good arguments to 
hold that material resources that human beings lack now and in a predictable future 
will be or will not be obtained in a non-predictable future. Therefore, there are not 
good reasons to hold that generally lacking resources116 are soft constraints or hard 
constraints. Consequently, I can only conclude that generally lacking resources could 
be feasibility constraints (since they could undermine the general feasibility of 
prescriptions), and I have to suspend my judgement about whether they are hard or 
soft constraints.  
 
Let me show that lacking material resources can undermine the contextual feasibility 
of normative political prescriptions since they can be conform with the criterion for 
the selection of soft constraints. That is to say, no-clause of the criterion for the 
selection of soft constraints excludes lacking material resources from the set of facts 
that could undermine the contextual feasibility of normative political prescriptions. 
Hence, they could be soft constraints. 
 
A lacking material resource is a soft constraint for the prescription x 
if: 
                                                
116 Resources that worldwide lacked, now and in a predictable future 
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a) it undermines the possibility to act in accordance with x in 
C;  
b) it does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with 
other contexts; 
c) it does (a) now and in a predictable future 
d) it exists in C independently of what people living in C want 
 
The first clause of the criterion does not exclude any lacking material resources from 
the set of soft constraints, since it is opportune to think that lacking material 
resources can undermine the possibility to act in a certain way in a certain context. 
As I wrote, lacking material resources can exclude some actions from the option-set 
of inhabitants of a given context. When a lacking material resource excludes the 
actions that a prescription demands from the inhabitants’ option set in any 
contextually circumscribed circumstance, then that lacking material resource could 
be a soft constraint.  
The clauses b and c do not exclude lacking material resources from the set of soft 
constraints and the reason is quite banal. It is opportune to think that certain contexts 
do not have certain resources even if they interact with other contexts; and it is 
opportune to think that certain contexts will not have certain resources even in a 
predictable future. For example, it is opportune to think that Zimbabwe does not 
have a boreal climate even if Zimbabwe citizens or Mugabe himself collaborates and 
interacts with all the Scandinavian nations. Furthermore, it is opportune to think that 
Zimbabwe will not have a boreal climate in a predictable future. Consequently, 
supposing that a prescription demands actions that can be performed only having a 
boreal climate, this prescription is unfeasible and it will not be feasible in Zimbabwe.  
Clause d does not exclude any lacking material resource from the set of soft 
constraints, since it is opportune to think that some material resources are lacking in 
a certain context even if all the inhabitants of that context do not want to lack them. 
For example, even if all the current and future inhabitants of Zimbabwe wanted a 
boreal climate, they cannot have it. So, ‘boreal climate’ is a lacking resource in 
Zimbabwe independently of what Zimbabwe inhabitants want. 
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In conclusion, none of these clauses exclude all lacking material resources from the 
set of soft constraints. Therefore, lacking material resources respecting all these 
clauses constitutes a soft constraint. 
I related feasibility with abilities so that a (set of) prescription(s) x is feasible in the 
context C(s; t) only if the inhabitants of the contexts C(s; t) have the option to 
perform the actions that x demands in some117 C circumstances. In order to hold that 
lacking material resources undermine the contextual feasibility of prescriptions, I 
show the banal fact that lacking material resources could exclude some actions from 
the option-set of inhabitants of a given contexts. So, they make the inhabitants of 
those contexts unable to perform certain actions (except in extraordinary 
circumstances), consequently they could make inhabitants unable to satisfy what 
prescriptions demand.  
Let me synthesise the case in which lacking resource undermine the contextual 
feasibility of a normative political prescription. So, let us suppose that a (set of) 
prescription x demands to perform the actions a-x. Let suppose that to perform the 
actions a-x, it is necessary to have the material resource mr-x. Finally let us suppose 
that independently of what all inhabitants of context C want, there is not (and there 
will not be in a predictable future) the material resource mr-x in C (except during 
some extraordinary circumstances). Given these premises, it is easy to conclude that 
the (set of) prescription(s) x is unfeasible in C because C inhabitants lack the material 
condition mr-x that is necessary to perform a-x: this means that a-x is not an option in 
C inhabitants’ option set because they lack mr-x. Therefore, the fact ‘lacked mr-x’ is 
a feasibility constraint. 
The point is that some material resources are necessary to perform certain actions: I 
cannot ‘score a penalty’ if I do not have ‘a ball’. Consequently, lacking certain 
material resources the inhabitants of a given contexts cannot perform those actions 
that a prescription demands: they have not the option to act in accordance with a 
certain prescription. 
Furthermore, even if they could perform those actions in extraordinary 
circumstances, we cannot consider that they are able to perform them. Even if they 
                                                
117 Non-extraordinary 
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had the option to act in accordance with a certain prescription in extraordinary 
circumstances, this is not enough to say that they are able to perform those actions; in 
fact, the success of those actions would be unstable. Such of instability of demanded 
actions would make the prescription itself unstable, for this reason, the 
prescription(s) should be considered unfeasible. Hence, even if the inhabitants of a 
given context are able to act (have the option to act) in accordance with a certain (set 
of) prescription(s) in some extraordinary circumstances; this is not enough to hold 
that the prescription(s) is/are feasible, since it/they would not be stable. 
Consequently, a lacking material resource can undermine the possibility to act in 
accordance with a certain prescription in a certain context, even if inhabitants of that 
context do not lack that resource in extraordinary circumstances; or even if, in 
extraordinary circumstances, inhabitants of that context are able to act in accordance 
with that prescription despite they lack the resource to do it. 
The previous example of God-Land shows that there is no way to perform the action 
‘to provide sufficient water for everyone’ in that context. It seems to be clear that the 
action ‘to provide sufficient water for everyone’ is not feasible in God-Land given 
the lacking material resource ‘sufficient water’. That lacking material resource 
characterises God-land in any circumstance (except in some anomalous 
circumstances. For example except during some rare rainy days); consequently, the 
prescription ‘everyone ought to have free access to water’ seems to be unfeasible in 
that context. Precisely, ‘lacked water’ undermines the contextual feasibility of 
‘everyone ought to have free access to water’ because: i) it characterize God-Land 
and excludes the action to ‘provide water for everyone’ from inhabitants’ option set 
in any circumstance (except extraordinary cases); ii) God-Land inhabitants lack the 
water at present time and they will lack it in a predictable future; iii) the fact that 
they lack the water is independent of what they want. In this case and only in this 
case, the ‘lack of water’ undermines the feasibility of ‘everyone ought to have free 
access to water’ in God-Land. So, in this case, ‘the lack of water’ is a soft constraint. 
 
So far, I showed that lacking material resources undermines the contextual feasibility 
of normative political prescriptions. However, feasibility is also a matter of degree. 
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Here, my aim is to show that lacking material resources influence the general degree 
of feasibility of normative political prescriptions.  
I related the general degree of feasibility to the notion of ‘abilities as restricted set of 
options’, namely, ‘abilities as restricted possibilities’. In this way, a certain (set of) 
prescription(s) x has a certain general degree p of feasibility if human beings have or 
will have (in a predictable future) the option to perform the actions that x demands in 
a number p of circumstances. The idea is that generally lacking resources118 could 
influence the abilities of human beings to perform certain actions by reducing the 
number of circumstances in which human beings have the option to perform those 
actions. So, I need to show that generally lacking material resources could exclude 
some actions from human beings’ option-set only in a certain number of 
circumstances. Where, a generally lacking resource is a resource that any human 
being lacks in some or all circumstances.  
By doing this, it is important to be careful in avoiding considering physical or 
biological laws as facts influencing the general degree of feasibility. It is clear that 
physical and biological laws are at least generally spread conditions, but they do not 
influence the general feasibility degree of prescriptions. Differently, they undermine 
the general feasibility of prescriptions. That is why they are hard constraints. The 
point now is that we actually lack some material resources all over the world in any 
or in a great number of circumstances, and these lacking resources exclude some 
actions from human beings option-set just in certain circumstances. Then, those 
actions requiring those lacking resources have not a full degree of feasibility. 
Consequently, a prescription that demands to perform those actions has not a full 
degree of feasibility in general. These lacking resources are not hard constraints 
since they do not make ‘impossible’ for human beings to perform certain actions in 
any circumstance. 
First of all, let me synthesise the cases in which generally-lacking resources 
influence the general degree of feasibility of normative political prescriptions. So, let 
us suppose that a (set of) prescription(s) x demands to perform the actions a-x. The 
general feasibility degree of x is given by the degree of ability of human beings to 
                                                
118 Worldwide lacked physical facts at any time 
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perform a-x. So, supposing that the action a-x can be performed by having the 
resource mr-x, the prescription x will have a 1-p degree of feasibility if one of the 
following cases happens: i) human beings never have mr-x (now and in a predictable 
future) and mr-x is necessary to perform a-x in a number p of circumstances; ii) 
human beings have not mr-x in a number p of circumstances (now and in a 
predictable future) and mr-x is always necessary to perform a-x; iii) human beings 
have not mr-x in a number m of circumstances (now and in a predictable future), mr-
x is necessary to perform a-x in number q of circumstances (now and in a predictable 
future) and there is a number p of circumstances in which it is necessary to have mr-x 
to perform a-x and human beings have not mr-x. 
In all those p circumstances the lacking resource mr-x excludes the action a-x from 
the option set of human beings, then the prescription x has a general degree of 
feasibility 1-p. Since, I assume that human beings lack mr-x independently from 
what they want, the lacking material resource mr-x is a soft constraint for the general 
feasibility of x. 
Let us see how lacking resources influence the feasibility degree of normative 
political prescriptions through an example. So, let assume we want to check the 
feasibility degree of the prescription ‘first aid personnel ought help people who need 
help during emergency circumstances’. Let us suppose that this prescription 
necessarily demands the action ‘to find people who need help’: so, it demands that 
first aid personnel find people that need help. I resume three cases in which lacking 
resources are soft constraint for this prescription in generally spread circumstances. 
In the first case, human beings never have the resource mr-x (now and in a 
predictable future) and mr-x is necessary to perform a-x in a number p of 
circumstances. Let us suppose the case in which an expert mountaineer decides to 
climb a mountain and he start his walk having the GPS and a radio to call the 
emergency in case of troubles. Let us suppose that everything is going well, but 
suddenly he slides in a crevice and he faints, he also hurts his head and loses a lot of 
blood. So, he will die if the emergency personnel do not help him. Unfortunately, he 
cannot call the emergency because he is unconscious. Furthermore, we actually lack 
a technology that automatically calls the emergency and gives them the coordinates 
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to find the person who needs help when that person cannot call by herself (let us call 
it guardian angel radio). The guardian angel radio119 is a technology that 
understands that someone needs medical help: so, it automatically contacts the 
emergency and gives the coordinates to find the person who needs help. In this case, 
the first aid personnel cannot know that the mountaineer needs help, then they cannot 
find him. In this circumstance, the action ‘to find people who need help’ is not in the 
option-set of the first-aid personnel because human beings in general (the humanity) 
lack the technology guardian angel radio. So, the lacking the guardian angel radio is 
necessary to exclude the action ‘to find people who needs help’ from the first aid 
personnel option-set in a certain number p of circumstances. Then, the prescription 
‘first aid personnel ought help people who needs help during emergency 
circumstances’ has a 1-p general feasibility degree. Therefore, the lacked ‘guardian 
angel radio’ is a soft constraint. 
In the second case, human beings have not the resource mr-x in a number p of 
circumstances (now and in a predictable future) and mr-x is necessary to perform a-x 
in any circumstance. Let us suppose the case in which, the mountaineer is able to call 
the emergency after he faints. Furthermore, the GPS reveals the coordinates where he 
is. The helicopter flies over the mountain; however, it is too dark to see the 
mountaineer and the crevice is much darker than the surrounding environment. So, 
the emergency personnel lack the resource ‘sufficient light’ in this circumstance: a 
resource that is always necessary to find people (except in extreme statistically 
anomalous cases). So, the lack of ‘sufficient light’ (occurring in a number p of 
circumstances) excludes the action ‘to find people who need help’ from the first aid 
personnel’s option-set (except in anomalous circumstances). Consequently, it 
influences the feasibility of the prescription ‘first aid personnel ought help people 
who need help during emergency’. Therefore, the lack of ‘sufficient light’ is a soft 
constraint. 
In the third and last case, human beings have not mr-x in a number m of 
circumstances (now and in a predictable future), mr-x is necessary to perform a-x in 
                                                
119 We can imagine it as a skin adherent sensor monitoring some values of people like level of sugars, 
pulsation, blood pressure, etc. When the sensor reveals something wrong, it automatically contacts the 
emergency. 
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number q of circumstances (now and in a predictable future) and there is a number p 
of circumstances in which it is necessary to have mr-x to perform a-x and human 
beings have not mr-x. Let us suppose the case in which the mountaineer falls in the 
crevice and he breaks the radio during the tumble. Consequently, he cannot call the 
emergency because he does not have a functioning radio in this circumstance, and he 
would need a functioning radio to call the emergency in this circumstance (in other 
circumstances, he could use a mobile, a call box, etc.). So, the circumstantial lack of 
a ‘working radio’ excludes the action ‘to find people who need help’ from the first 
aid personnel’s option set in this circumstance. Consequently, it influences the 
feasibility of the prescription ‘first aid personnel ought help people who needs help 
during emergency’. Therefore, the lack of the ‘working radio’ is a soft constraint. 
 
Let me show that lacking material resources can influence the general degree of 
feasibility of normative political prescriptions since they can be conform to the 
criterion for the selection of soft constraints. That is to say, no-clause of the criterion 
for the selection of soft constraints excludes lacking material resources from the set 
of facts that could influence the general degree of feasibility of normative political 
prescriptions. 
 
A lacking material resource is a soft constraint for prescriptions x if: 
a) it influence the ability degree of human beings to act in 
accordance with x;  
b) it does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with 
other contexts; 
c) it does (a) now and in a predictable future 
d) it exists in C independently of what people living in C want 
 
The first clause of this criterion does not exclude all lacking material resources from 
the set of soft constraints; since it is opportune to think some lacking material 
resources influence human beings’ degree of ability to act in a certain way, in certain 
generally spread circumstances. As I extensively wrote above, generally lacking 
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material resources can exclude some actions from human beings’ option-set in 
certain circumstances. When a lacking material resource excludes the actions that a 
prescription demands from the human beings options in number p of circumstances, 
then that lacking material resource could be a soft constraint.  
The clauses b and c do not exclude generally lacking material resources from the set 
of soft constraints and the reason is quite banal. It is opportune to think that human 
beings lack some resources in a wide range of circumstances even if they interact; 
and it is opportune to think that human beings will not have certain resources, even 
in a predictable future. For example, it is opportune to think that human beings lack a 
certain degree of light in a worldwide spread number of circumstances, even if the 
context in which they are interacts with other contexts. Furthermore, human beings 
will lack a certain degree of light in a wide range of circumstances, also in a 
predictable future. Consequently, supposing that a prescription demands actions that 
can be performed only having a certain degree of light, it is and will not be feasible 
in those circumstances in which there is not that degree of light.  
Clause d does not exclude any lacking material resource from the set of soft 
constraints, since it is opportune to think that some general material resources are 
lacked in a wide range of circumstances in certain contexts, even if all the inhabitants 
of that context do not want to lack them: for example, even if all human beings do 
not want to lack them. So, a certain degree of light is lacked in certain circumstances, 
even if all human beings in that circumstance do want to lose it. 
In conclusion, no one of these clauses excludes generally lacking material resources 
from the set of soft constraints. Therefore, a generally lacking material resource that 
respects all these clauses is a soft constraint. 
 
Now, I aim to show that lacking material resources can influence the contextual 
degree of feasibility of normative political prescriptions. So, I need to show that 
lacking material resources excludes some actions from context-inhabitants’ option-
set in a certain number of circumstances (but not in any circumstance). That is to say, 
a certain (set of) prescription(s) x has a certain contextual degree of feasibility p in 
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the context C when C inhabitants have or will have (in a predictable future) the 
option to perform the actions that x demands in a number p of circumstances.  
Before I start to show how contextually lacking resources affects the contextual 
feasibility of prescriptions, I think it necessary to clarify that it is not necessary that a 
resource be contextually lacked in order to influence the contextual degree of 
feasibility. Generally-lacking resources can influence contextual feasibility too. 
Obviously, a generally lacking resource is a physical object that is lacked worldwide, 
now and in a predictable future; while a contextually-lacking resource is a physical 
object that is lacked just in certain contexts. That is, we know that a contextually-
lacking resource is lacked only in some places in the world or at some times. A 
generally-lacking resource can influence the contextual feasibility (and not the 
general feasibility) of a prescription since a generally-lacked physical object could 
have implications on feasibility only in some contexts and not in any context. In 
other words, a generally lacking resource could exclude some actions from agents’ 
option set only in certain contextual circumstances; while in some other it could have 
no relevance. The examples I will introduce later may help to understand this point.  
Let me synthesise first the case in which lacking resources influence the contextual 
degree of feasibility of normative political prescriptions. So, let us suppose that a (set 
of) prescription(s) x demands to perform the actions a-x in the context C. The 
feasibility degree of x is given by the degree of ability of C inhabitants to perform a-
x. So, supposing that the action a-x can be performed by having the resource mr-x, x 
have a 1-p degree of feasibility if one of the following happens: i) C inhabitants 
never have mr-x (now and in a predictable future) and mr-x is necessary to perform 
a-x in a wide number p of circumstances; ii) C inhabitants have not mr-x in a number 
p of circumstances (now and in a predictable future) and mr-x is necessary to 
perform a-x; iii) C inhabitants have not mr-x in a number m of circumstances (now 
and in a predictable future), mr-x is necessary to perform a-x in number q of 
circumstances (now and in a predictable future), and there is a number p of 
circumstances in which it is necessary to have mr-x to perform a-x and C inhabitants 
have not mr-x. 
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In all those p circumstances the lacking resource mr-x excludes the action a-x from 
the option set of C inhabitants, then the prescription x has a degree of feasibility 1-p. 
Since, I assume that C inhabitants lack mr-x independently from what they want, the 
lacking material resource mr-x is a soft constraint for the feasibility of x in C. 
Let me introduce some examples to show that lacking material resources influence 
the contextual degree of feasibility of prescriptions. 
I wrote that the (set of) prescription(s) x demanding the action(s) a-x has a 1-p degree 
of feasibility if: C inhabitants never have mr-x (now and in a predictable future) and 
mr-x is necessary to perform a-x in a number p of circumstances. This means that the 
lacking resource is lacked just in certain contexts (e.g. certain contexts lack certain 
environmental features). Alternatively, that resource is lacked in any context (it is 
generally-lacked) but this fact has consequences just in certain contexts (for example, 
anyone lacks a technology to create artificial clouds, but this does have relevant 
consequences in England). My example shows this second case. 
I already pointed out that anyone lacks a technology to create artificial clouds in a 
lab nowadays. God-Land inhabitants lack this technology: so, in a number p of 
circumstances, they cannot have not sufficient water to provide free access to water 
for everyone. Let us suppose that The God-Land Gran-Vizier loses any hope about 
technological developments that would provide water to the city-state. So, he starts 
to pray. Unbelievably, after two weeks, it starts to rain (maybe because of prayers or 
maybe because of the climate changing). It constantly rains for one month, and God-
Land citizens have sufficient resources to maintain the prescription ‘everyone ought 
to have free access to water’ for six months. Unfortunately, water resources finish 
after a while, and God-Land citizens still lack the technology to provide it. The Gran-
Vizier still tries to pray but nothing happens. After two months of dry climate, it 
starts to rain again and God-Land citizens have sufficient water to satisfy the 
prescription. Briefly, God-Land is characterised by the climatic alternation of rainy 
and dry seasons. Furthermore, God-Land citizens lack any technology to provide 
water during the dry season and this means that they cannot satisfy the prescription 
‘everyone ought to have free access to water’ during the dry season. This means that 
God-Land citizens have not the action ‘to provide water for everyone’ in their 
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option-set in a series of circumstances, namely, during the dry season. Therefore, the 
prescription ‘everyone ought to have free access to water’ has not a full degree of 
feasibility.  
In conclusion, God-Land citizens (as everyone else) never have the technological 
resources to provide water for everyone (for example, the technology to dig a water 
spring does not work in God-Land environment) and this lack of technology 
excludes the action ‘to provide water for everyone’ in a number p of circumstances. 
Therefore, this lack of technology influences the contextual feasibility degree of the 
prescription ‘everyone ought to have free access to water’.  
The second case in which lacked material conditions influence the contextual degree 
of feasibility of prescriptions is given when: C inhabitants have not mr-x in a number 
p of circumstances (now and in a predictable future) and mr-x is always necessary to 
perform a-x. This means that the resource is sometimes lacked in a certain context 
and it is always necessary to perform certain actions in that context. 
Let us consider the context of God-Land, and the material resource ‘rain’. ‘Rain’ is 
the unique resource providing water in God-Land. This means: ‘no rain, no water’. In 
the previous example, rain is lacked in God-Land in certain circumstances (during 
the dry season), and this fact implies that God-Land citizens are not able to provide 
water for everyone in certain circumstances. Consequently, God-Land inhabitants 
have not (now and in a predictable future) the option to satisfy the prescription 
‘everyone ought to have free access to water’ in a certain number p of circumstances, 
because they lack the resource ‘rain in a certain number p of circumstances. 
Therefore, the resource ‘rain’ is lacked in a number p of circumstances, and this fact 
excludes the actions to satisfy the prescription from God-Land inhabitants’ option set 
in a certain number p of circumstances. Hence, it is a soft constraint for that 
prescription in that context. 
The third and last case in which lacked material conditions influence the contextual 
degree of feasibility of prescriptions is given when: C inhabitants have not mr-x in a 
number m of circumstances (now and in a predictable future), mr-x is necessary to 
perform a-x in number q of circumstances (now and in a predictable future). 
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Furthermore, there is a number p of circumstances in which it is necessary to have 
mr-x to perform a-x and C inhabitants have not mr-x.  
Let us assume that God-Land citizens develop a technology to preserve rainy water 
for a period of time. So, they have large silos in which the water is preserved and it 
remains potable for one month. In this situation we know that i) they lack rain during 
the dry season; ii) they have one moth of water autonomy after the rainy season. This 
means that the lacking resource ‘rain’ does not exclude the action ‘to provide water 
for everyone’ in the month after the rainy season. In other words, in that month the 
lacking resource ‘rain’ is not necessary to provide water, because God-Land 
inhabitants use the water they preserved in the silos. This means that ‘rain’ is not 
necessary in any circumstance, but it is necessary just in a certain number of 
circumstances (all those circumstances in which there is not water in the silos). 
Supposing that God-Land inhabitants have ‘rain’ in a number m of circumstances 
and they have ‘water in their silos’ in a number q of circumstances; they do not have 
not the option to satisfy the prescription in a number p of circumstances that is equal 
to 1 – (m+q). So, the lack of ‘rain’ influences the feasibility of the prescription in that 
number p of circumstances and not in any circumstance in which it does not rain. 
Let me show that lacking material resources can influence the contextual degree of 
feasibility of normative political prescriptions since they can be conform to the 
criterion for the selection of soft constraints. That is to say, no-clause of the criterion 
for the selection of soft constraints excludes lacking material resources from the set 
of facts that could influence the contextual degree of feasibility of normative political 
prescriptions. 
 
A lacking material resource is a soft constraint for the prescriptions x 
if: 
a) it influence the ability degree of C inhabitants to act in 
accordance with x in C;  
b) it does (a) despite or because the interactions of C with 
other contexts; 
c) it does (a) now and in a predictable future 
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d) it exists in C independently of what people living in C want 
 
The first clause of this criterion does not exclude all lacking material resources from 
the set of soft constraints, since it is opportune to think some lacking material 
resources influence the degree of ability of people inhabiting certain contexts to act 
in a certain way. When a lacking material resource excludes the actions that a 
prescription demands from the option-set of those people inhabiting a context in 
number p of circumstances, then that lacking material resource could be a soft 
constraint.  
The clauses b and c do not exclude all lacking material resources from the set of soft 
constraints and the reason is quite banal. It is opportune to think that a certain group 
of human beings inhabiting a context lacks some resources even if it interacts with 
other groups; and it is or even in a predictable future.  
Clause d does not exclude all lacking material resource from the set of soft 
constraints, since it is opportune to think that some material resources are lacked in a 
certain context even if all the inhabitants of that context do not want to lack them. 
For example, even if all human beings do not want. So, a certain degree of light is 
lacked in certain circumstances even if all human beings in that circumstance do 
want to lose it. 
In conclusion, none of these clauses excludes that lacking material resources could 
constrain the contextual feasibility of normative political prescription. Therefore, a 
lacking material resource that respects all these clauses is a soft constraint 
 
Human needs 
 
After having ascertained that lacking material resources affect feasibility and after 
having shown how they do it, I pay attention to the frustration of human needs as 
facts influencing the feasibility degree of prescriptions. Different from lacking 
material resources, human needs do not exclude certain actions from agents’ option 
sets. Human needs influence the feasibility degree of prescriptions via affecting the 
agents’ ability to be motivated to perform certain actions. Precisely, the main 
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hypothesis of these paragraphs is that the frustration of human needs affects the 
agents’ ability to be motivated to perform certain actions. Hence, the frustration of 
human needs affects the feasibility of the degree of normative political prescriptions.  
I already sketched the idea that the ability to perform an action is influenced by the 
ability to be motivated to perform that action. The assumption behind this idea is that 
any action (excluding strictly coerced action120) needs a motivation: so, human 
beings do not act without having either a conscious or an unconscious motivation to 
act. In my thesis, I accept that in order to perform the actions demanded by 
normative political prescriptions, human beings need to be consciously motivated to 
perform those actions.  
This means that given the (set of) prescription(s) x demanding the actions a-x, all the 
agents subject to x should have the motivation121 m-x to perform a-x. If the agents 
have not the motivation m-x they will not perform a-x. If the agents are lowly able to 
have the motivation m-x they will not perform a-x in a certain number of 
circumstances. A similar idea is found in Gilabert:  
An agent A has the power [ability] to bring about an outcome O in 
circumstances C if and only if O would occur if A tries, in C, to bring it about 
(and A can indeed try). When we consider specific processes, it is often 
useful to break down the variable for outcomes into several components. 
Three such components are (i) the agent’s deciding to act (ii) the agent’s 
acting; and (iii) the action’s producing the desired consequences. Thus, when 
we consider the feasibility of a group of workers obtaining a salary raise by 
means of strike action we explore the ability of various workers who support 
the strike action to form the intention to strike, to initiate and continue the 
                                                
120 A strictly coerced action is here intended as the one that someone performs when someone else or 
something uses her/him as an object, an action that is physically determined by someone else or 
something else. 
121 I will consider only conscious motivations, so I do not specify that they are conscious anymore. 
Probably agents’ unconscious motivations could be also feasibility constraints given that they do not 
seem dependent on what the agents want and they determine whether or not an agent will perform an 
action. However, this is just a naïf intuition that would need further analysis. 
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strike action throughout the appropriate period of time, and to obtain through 
their actions the concessions from managers they were aiming at122.  
Does this mean that I should reconsider agents’ own motivations as conditions to act 
in accordance with normative political prescriptions? In other words, should I 
consider agents’ own motivations as feasibility constraints? I do not think so: I still 
think that agents’ own motivations are the expression of what agents want. So, it is 
not the case that agents’ own motivations are ‘independent of what agents want’ and 
because of this they cannot be considered feasibility constraints. However, other 
facts such as human needs do affects agents’ abilities to be motivated in certain 
ways, so they can influence agents’ motivations and actions. Hence, in case human 
needs are independent of what agents want, they could be considered soft feasibility 
constraints. 
Here, I pay attention to human needs as factors influencing the ability to be 
motivated to perform certain actions (or using Gilabert’s terminology, I suggest that 
human needs are factors influencing the 'agent’s deciding to act'). That is to say, I 
hold that human needs affect motivations: precisely, their frustration influences the 
ability to be motivated to perform demanded actions. Human needs are the 'elements 
required for survival or for mental and physical health' of human beings123. 
According to a broad psychological definition, these needs are ‘organismic 
necessities’, where the term ‘organismic’ refers to human being. Being necessities, 
needs characterise human beings independently of what they want: they are 
necessary for human beings. In this paragraph, I suggest an argument to hold that i) 
human needs are different from mere preferences expressing what human beings 
want; ii) human needs have motivational force. That is to say, they affect the 
motivations of human beings. Then, the frustration of human needs affects human 
beings’ motivations and consequently it affects the feasibility of prescriptions. 
Despite the intuitive definition above, the notion of ‘need’ deserves a more adequate 
attention, especially in order to distinguish when a claim is a grounded on needs and 
                                                
122 Gilabert, P. (Forthcoming), “Justice and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach”, in K. Vallier & M. 
Weber (eds.), Political Utopias, Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.3. Emphases are mine 
123 Deci, L. & Ryan, M. (2000), “The What and Why of goal pursuits: Human needs and the Self-
Determination of Behaviour”, Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), p. 229 
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when it is merely something that agents want. One of the first aims that an argument 
based on the notion of needs should achieve is to clearly distinguish ‘what agents 
need’ from ‘what agents want’. Hence, it is necessary to define and characterise the 
notion of ‘need’ in a way that nobody can argue that needs are just expressions of 
what agents want. As Wiggins writes, introducing the notion of needs someone could 
argue: 'What do you mean by a need? Is a need just something you want, but aren’t 
prepared to pay for?'124. 
Like any other fact, human needs are good candidates to be soft feasibility 
constraints, only if they are independent of what the agents want. Here, I try to 
provide some reasons to conclude that needs are not the mere expression of what 
people want and at least some needs could be feasibility constraints. Specifically, I 
adopt the Wiggins’ characterisation of need, which clearly distinguishes claims about 
‘what agents needs’ from claims about ‘what agents want’ in virtue of their relation 
with harm. By doing so, I suggest that absolute entrenched needs are feasibility 
constraints candidates.  
Wiggins’ definition of need is formalised in the following way:  
 
I need [absolutely] to have x  
if and only if 
I need [instrumentally] to have x if I am to avoid being harmed  
if and only if  
It is necessary, things being what they actually are, that if I am to avoid 
being harmed 
then I have x.  
 
Simplifying: 'I need [absolutely] to have x if and only if it is necessary, 
things being what they actually are, that if I am to avoid being harmed 
then I have x'. 
That means: I absolutely need x when it is not possible that I avoid of being 
harmed and I have not x. 
                                                
124 Wiggins, D. (1998), Needs, Value, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press., p.5 
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Absolute needs are everything is necessary for the agent in order to avoid being 
harmed125, (independently of what he/she want). They are distinguished from purely 
instrumental needs since the satisfaction of purely instrumental needs is necessary 
just to satisfy other deeper needs, while the satisfaction of an absolute need is 
necessary to avoid of being harmed126. For example, saying that I need five euro in 
order to buy food in order to avoid of being harmed, I say that the five euro is just an 
instrument since I use it to buy food; while the food (or nourishment) is necessary to 
avoid of being harmed. Thus. I have the need of food.  
Hence the relevant distinction between ‘what agents need’ and ‘what agents want’ is 
based on the notion of absolute needs, which implies harm. Where the harm is meant 
in both ways, as physiological and psychological. The discriminatory difference 
distinguishing ‘absolute needs’ from preferences expressing ‘what agents want’ is 
that needs imply physiological or psychological harm when they are not satisfied; 
while, mere preferences do not.  
Furthermore, the fact of being harmed by some unsatisfied need is not an agent 
choice: being or being not harmed by an unsatisfied need does not depend on what 
the agent want. In this sense, absolute needs do not depend in any way on what 
agents (need-bearers) want. Considering the previous example, let suppose that I 
have no money and I cannot buy any food. In that case, the lack of food harms me 
and that harm is independent of what I want. That is to say, if I do not get food I will 
be harmed even if I do not want to be harmed. However, let us suppose that someone 
offers me a basket of carrots to eat: so, I can choose between eating carrots and 
buying a burger in order to get food and avoid of being harmed. In that situation, I 
cannot say that ‘I need five euro’ to buy food because I have food anyway. I could 
just say that ‘I want five euro’ because ‘I want a burger’. In other words, in that 
situation, I do not need nothing more to avoid of being harmed, so whatever I claim 
                                                
125 Similarly, authors such as Deci and Ryan (2000) define needs is everything influencing 
physiological and psychological well-being. Thus, saying that I need x, means to say that x is 
necessary to my physiological or psychological well-being. Accordingly with previous definition, I 
am physiologically or psychologically harmed without x.  
126 When I do not specify if a need is merely instrumental or absolute, I refer to absolute needs. 
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is not a claim of need127. 
I suppose that agents are lowly able to be motivated to perform those actions that 
frustrate their absolute needs because it would be harmful. However, not any 
absolute need is a feasibility constraint: here, I maintain that just entrenched needs 
are. I define entrenched needs as absolute needs necessarily charactering an 
individual, a group of human beings or the whole humanity in certain circumstances 
during a certain lapse of time t. According to the c-clause of the criterion for the 
selection of soft constraints, I define the time t as ‘now and in a predictable future’. 
Hence, x is an entrenched need if an individual or a group of human beings or the 
whole humanity have the need x in certain circumstances now in a predictable future. 
For instance, let us suppose that a group of people have the absolute need of having a 
partner; they are psychologically harmed without having a partner. Furthermore, let 
us suppose that those people and other people in the future have and will have that 
need. In this case, the need of having a partner is an entrenched need for that group 
of people and future groups of people, and it can be a feasibility constraint since 
anyone of them will not fully able to be motivated to perform certain actions clashing 
with their need of having a partner.  
A very important subset of entrenched needs is the one of basic needs. Basic needs 
are features of human nature, they are ‘constitutive of what it means to be a human 
being’128. In the examples above: the need of having a partner could be related only 
to a certain circumscribed group of people, so it is not a basic need. However, it is 
grounded on the basic needs of love/belongingness: need that characterises all human 
beings (except some anomalies). By definition, basic human needs do not depend on 
                                                
127 The question of harm is a gradual one: that is to say, how bad (harmful) is the frustration of a need 
is a question of degrees. The question is, how much harm is necessary to say that someone needs 
something instead of saying that someone wants that thing. To distinguish needs from mere 
preferences in real cases, it seems necessary to fix a standard (or threshold) saying us the appropriate 
degree of harm that occurs when a need is frustrated. The less that standard is demanding (the lower is 
the threshold of harm), the less harm is sufficient to categorize a frustrated claim as ‘need’. So, the 
less the standard is demanding (the lower is the threshold) the more claims will be grounded on 
‘needs’. This could bring to inflation in the use of the term ‘need’. To fix a standard to define needs is 
an interesting question that would deserve more attention. Unfortunately, I cannot suggest any 
standard to define when harm counts as frustration of need. So, I cannot move further analysis in this 
way. 
128 Stewart, C. (2003), “Criminogenic needs and human needs: a theoretical model”, Psychology, 
Crime and Law, 9(2), p.8 
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what human beings want since they are constitutive features of human beings. This 
means that human beings necessarily have those needs if they are human beings. On 
contrary, if an entity can choose between having or not having a basic need, then that 
entity is not a human being at all.  
Even conceding that certain people do not have these needs, we should maintain that 
except some anomalies, basic needs, universally characterise human beings. Hence, 
basic needs characterize human beings independently of what they want, and this 
fact is supported by the rough observation that they are universally shared. 
Therefore, basic physiological needs (such as the need of nourishment or the need 
breath) and basic psychological needs (such as the need of love and belongingness 
and the need of security, the need of autonomy and need of self-esteem) are 
universally shared facts and good candidates to be feasibility constraints. 
Nonetheless, universality is not required to define what is a need and what is not. In 
fact, it is plausible to talk about subject specific needs as well as spread but non-
universal needs. For instance, let us consider the case in which I have need of 
‘having the partner Mrs. X’. This is a subject specific need since it is possible that no 
one else has the same need related to the person Mrs. X. However, it could still be 
absolute and entrenched for me. That means, the lack of Mrs. X could harm myself 
in a relevant way, and my need of Mrs. X could characterise me now and in a 
predictable future. Differently, the need of ‘having a partner’ could be a generally 
spread need: it is generally spread since there is a wide group of people needing to 
have a partner. It could still be absolute and entrenched since its frustration harms 
people belonging to that group, and it is plausible to think that they need a partner 
now and in a predictable future. Both these examples do not regard universal basic 
needs, but it is appropriate to think that they are still absolute and entrenched needs. 
So they could constrain the actions of those agents. 
So far, I have held that both physiological and psychological human needs exist 
independently of what human beings want. Therefore, absolute entrenched 
physiological needs and absolute entrenched psychological needs are good 
candidates to be soft constraints. Now, I try to explain what it means that human 
needs affect the ability to perform actions.  
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‘Human needs affect motivations’: this is a clear and quite uncontroversial 
psychological statement that is widely accepted both in folk psychology and in more 
sophisticated psychological studies (such as those provided by Deci and Ryan). In 
the paragraph regarding abilities, I pointed out that in order to act in a certain way it 
is necessary to be able to be motivated to act in that way (this idea has been 
introduced by Don Locke). Here, I maintain that motivations are the expression of 
what agents want, but such an expression could be influenced by facts which are 
independent of what agents want such as human needs are.  
The idea that I want to introduce is that the frustration of human needs influences the 
ability to be motivated to act in a certain way. Precisely, the degree of ability to be 
motivated to act in accordance with a prescription that demands a certain action is 
influenced by the extent to which that action would frustrate human needs. 
Consequently, the frustration of a need indirectly influences the ability to act in a 
certain way. For this reason, human needs could influence the ability to act in 
accordance with certain prescriptions: by doing so, they influence the feasibility 
degree of prescriptions. The more ‘to perform an action A’ frustrates human needs, 
the less the agents will be able to be motivated to perform that action. The less the 
agents are able to be motivated to perform the action A, the less that action A and the 
related prescription are feasible.  
Let us suppose that a certain (set of) prescription(s) x demands to perform the 
action(s) a-x which requires the motivation m-x. Let us suppose that the performance 
of a-x frustrates one or more of agents’ needs. In this case, the frustration of agents’ 
needs influences the agents’ ability to have the motivation m-x. The consequence is 
that the agents are more frequently ‘amotivated’ to perform a-x: they are weakly 
stimulated to act in accordance with x. So the performance of a-x is unstable and the 
prescription x is often sensitive to defections. Therefore, x is less feasible than 
prescriptions that do not frustrate human needs.  
For example, let suppose that a prescription recommends that ‘everyone ought to 
have the same quantity of food’ and let us suppose that this means that you are 
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allowed to eat only fifty grams of rice per day129. This prescription certainly 
frustrates your basic need of nourishment as well as the need of nourishment of the 
majority of adult human beings. Probably you would agree that the frustration of 
your need of nourishment influences your motivation to eat just fifty grams of rice. 
Even supposing that you agree with the strict egalitarian justification of the 
prescription, after three days of rice diet, probably your motivation to act in 
accordance with that prescription is weaker than at the beginning of the first day of 
rice diet. So, if I offer you a burger (or a delicious basket of carrots in case you are 
vegan) after three days of rice diet, probably your motivation to reject it is weaker 
than at the beginning of the first day of rice diet. The motivation (and the consequent 
choice) to eat or not to eat the burger (or carrots) is of course the expression of what 
you want, but it is influenced by your need of nourishment. That is why the 
frustration of human needs influences the ability to be motivated and consequently 
the performance of an action. 
In case that a prescription demands actions that frustrate absolute and entrenched 
human needs, human beings are not fully able to be motivated to perform those 
actions. This means that it is probable that they are not motivated and do not perform 
those actions. Therefore, the frustration of those human needs affect the feasibility of 
that prescription. 
I want to clarify that the fact that acting in accordance with a prescription frustrates a 
particular need does not mean that ‘to perform’ the demanded action is more costly 
(in terms of needs) than ‘to defect’. A particular need is just one competitor of other 
needs. In the moment in which an agent searches for the motivation to perform an 
action, she could reasonably believe that performing the prescribed action frustrates 
the need a; while do not performing the prescribed action could frustrate the need b. 
Let us suppose that the frustration of b is more burdensome than the frustration of a. 
In this case, the agent would probably prefer to perform a-x. To understand if the 
frustration of a need affects the feasibility of a certain (set of) prescription(s), it 
would be important to compare whether defect from that (set of) prescription(s) is 
                                                
129 Because this is the per-capita quantity of rice ensuring that everyone have the same quantity of 
food in the context in which you live. 
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more harmful than to act in accordance with that (set of) prescription(s). However, 
also this evaluation is a complicated job. 
 
Human needs and feasibility 
 
In this paragraph my aim is to show that absolute entrenched human needs affect the 
general and contextual degree of feasibility of normative political prescriptions. 
Here, I am going to take in consideration only basic human needs, since I assume 
that the universality of these needs simplifies the argument. Thus, in the rest of this 
thesis, when I use the term human needs I mean basic physiological human needs or 
basic psychological human needs, which are universally shared.  
To recap, the main hypothesis of the next two paragraphs is that the frustration of 
human needs influences the feasibility of normative political prescriptions. That is to 
say, normative political prescriptions demands that certain agents perform certain 
actions; the performance of certain actions could frustrate certain agents’ needs; 
since those demanded actions frustrate agents’ needs, those agents are not fully able 
to be motivated to perform the demanded actions; since motivations are necessary to 
perform actions, the frustration of needs indirectly influences the performance of 
those actions; that is to say, the agents could more easily defect to perform the 
demanded actions because it is highly costing to perform them. Therefore those 
prescriptions demanding actions that frustrate human needs have not a full degree of 
feasibility.  
In this paragraph, my first aim is to show that some prescriptions could demand 
actions that would frustrate human needs and this fact affects the feasibility of those 
prescriptions in general circumstances: namely, in a certain number of worldwide 
spread circumstances now and in a predictable future. This can happen in two cases: 
first, when the recommended actions frustrate human needs in a certain number of 
generally-spread circumstances. The recommended actions are those actions that are 
part of the content of a prescription. For example, given prescription ‘you ought to 
pay taxes’, the action ‘to pay taxes’ is the recommended action; second, when the 
actions that are necessary to implement or maintain the prescription frustrate human 
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needs in a certain number of generally-spread circumstances. The necessary actions 
to implement or maintain a prescription are not part of the content of the 
prescription; alternatively, they are actions that we need to perform in order to be 
able to act in accordance with the prescription. For example, given the prescription 
‘you ought to pay taxes’, you probably need to know in which way you have to pay 
taxes and how to do it. This presupposes that we should implement and maintain 
procedural rules, employers and structures warranting that everyone can pay taxes. 
All the actions that we have to perform in order to implement and maintain (and 
facilitate) the possibility that everyone can pay taxes are necessary for the feasibility 
of the prescription. 
In the first case, let us suppose that a certain (set of) prescription(s) x recommends 
that human beings (in general) ought to act in a-x way. Let us suppose that acting in 
a-x way frustrates a certain human need in certain number of generally-spread 
circumstances. Given the assumption that the frustration of human needs influences 
the ability of being motivated, human beings are not fully able to be motivated to 
perform the prescribed action a-x in certain number of generally-spread 
circumstances. Therefore, they would violate x in a certain number of generally-
spread circumstances: they would transgress x in a certain number of circumstances. 
In the second case, let us suppose that human beings have to perform the action a-x 
in order to implement or maintain the prescription x. Let us further suppose that 
performing a-x would frustrate human needs in a certain number of generally-spread 
circumstances. Still, I would conclude that human beings are not fully able to be 
motivated to perform the action a-x, which are necessary to implement or maintain x. 
Therefore, human beings would violate x in certain number of generally-spread 
circumstances: they would not act in a way to implement and maintain x in a certain 
number of circumstances. 
I consider the case in which a certain (set of) prescription(s) x recommends the 
action(s) a-x: so, human beings should perform a-x, but performing a-x frustrates a 
certain human need in any part of the world. Thus, I say that human beings are not 
fully able to be motivated to perform a-x in certain circumstances. For example, let 
us suppose the catholic prescription ‘all those people who are not married ought to 
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avoid sex’, namely, no unmarried people are allowed to engage in sexual activities, 
neither with other people nor by themselves. In this case, all unmarried people ought 
to avoid any sexual practice, and we can agree that this radical sexual deprivation 
can be psychologically (and maybe physiologically) harmful. That is to say, sexual 
deprivation frustrates human beings’ need for sex (except in some anomalous 
subjects). So, the frustration of the need for sex does affect our ability to be 
motivated to act in accordance with the recommendation of that prescription in 
certain generally-spread circumstances. Consequently, the sexual frustration does 
influence the probability that human beings act in accordance with that prescription 
in certain generally-spread circumstances. Therefore, the sexual frustration 
influences the general degree of feasibility of that prescription.  
Let us consider the second case now. Suppose that a certain prescription x can be 
maintained or implemented through the actions a-x, but performing the actions a-x 
frustrates a certain human need in any part of the world now and in a predictable 
future. So, human beings are not fully able to be motivated to perform a-x in certain 
circumstances. For example, suppose that we are firmly convinced that any human 
being has the right to sufficient primary goods. Suppose that the only way to warrant 
that all human beings have sufficient primary goods is to coordinate and organize 
any productive activity, independently of what people would like to do. So, let us 
suppose that a World Labour Authority plans what human beings should do for the 
next ten years. That means, in order to satisfy the prescription ‘anyone has a right to 
sufficient primary goods’, human beings have not the freedom to choose their jobs. 
Or, more precisely, they have not the freedom to reject the jobs that the Labour 
Authority gives out to them. That means, human being have to do the job that the 
Labour Authority decides. We can agree that this frustrates the need of autonomy of 
human beings130. Hence, the general frustration of such a need influences the human 
beings’ ability to be motivated to perform the actions that their jobs require. So, the 
frustration of autonomy influences the probability that human beings perform the 
                                                
130 The need of autonomy is seen as a fundamental psychological need in Deci and Ryan analysis. 
Deci, L. & Ryan, M. (2000), “The What and Why of goal pursuits: Human needs and the Self-
Determination of Behaviour”, Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), pp. 233-234 
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actions that their productive positions require, and consequently they influence the 
feasibility of that sufficientarian prescription. 
 
After having shown how frustrated needs affect the general degree of feasibility, I 
want to show that human needs could affect the contextual degree of feasibility of 
normative political prescriptions. The hypotheses are two. First hypothesis, given the 
features of a certain context, the performance of certain demanded actions frustrates 
some needs of those who inhabit that context. In this case, the contextual frustration 
of universal human needs depends on the fact that the implementation of a 
prescription (which content is general) produces some needs-frustrations in certain 
specific contexts, because of the features of those specific contexts. For example, I 
will show that a prescription prescribing to share food in a context in which there is 
not sufficient food for everyone frustrates the need of food of people living in that 
context. Second hypothesis, given the contextual content of certain prescriptions, the 
performance those actions that the prescriptions demand frustrates some needs 
context inhabitants. In this case, the contextual frustration of human needs depends 
on the fact that the content of the prescription is contextual (the prescription itself 
specifies in which contexts it should be implemented) and it demands actions that 
frustrate some human needs.  
Thus, some prescriptions could demand actions that would frustrate human needs in 
certain contexts and this fact affects the feasibility of those prescriptions in certain 
contextual circumstances. As in the case of generally-spread frustration, this can 
happened in two ways: first, when the recommended actions frustrate human needs 
in a certain number of circumstances contextually-circumscribed; ii) when the 
actions that are necessary to implement or maintain the prescription frustrate human 
needs in a certain number of circumstances contextually-circumscribed.  
In the first case, let us suppose that a certain (set of) prescription(s) x recommends 
that C inhabitants ought to perform the actions a-x. Let us suppose that the 
performance of a-x frustrates a certain human need in a certain number of C 
circumstances. Given the assumption that the frustration of human needs influences 
the ability of being motivated, C inhabitants are not fully able to be motivated to 
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perform the recommended actions a-x in certain number of C circumstances. 
Therefore, they would not act in accordance with x in a certain number of C 
circumstances. In the second case, let us suppose that C inhabitants have to perform 
the actions a-x in order to implement or maintain the (set of) prescription(s) x. Let us 
still suppose that performing a-x would frustrate human needs in a certain number of 
C circumstances. Still, I would conclude that C inhabitants are not fully able to be 
motivated to perform the action a-x, which are necessary to implement or maintain x. 
Therefore, C inhabitants would not act in accordance with x in certain number of C 
circumstances. 
Now, I am going to describe four examples in which the frustration of basic needs 
influences the feasibility of prescriptions. 
First case. Let us consider the case in which a certain (set of) prescription(s) x 
recommends the action a-x in the context C. So, C inhabitants ought to perform a-x; 
but given C features, the performance of a-x frustrates C inhabitants’ human needs in 
a certain number of C circumstances. So, C inhabitants are not fully able to be 
motivated to perform a-x in certain C circumstances.  
For example, let us suppose that God-Gran-Vizier is quite sure that God is grumpy 
because too many God-Land inhabitants suffer from starvation. Suppose the Gran-
Vizier prescribes that ‘everyone ought to have the same quantity of primary goods’ 
(the content of this prescription is general. It does not specify the place in which that 
prescription is valid). However, given the extreme scarcity of God-Land, all God-
Land inhabitants start to suffer starvation because no one has sufficient food once 
they act in accordance with that recommendation. So, I can say that the performances 
that the prescription recommends influence God-Land inhabitants’ need of food. The 
frustration of need of food does influence the ability of God-Land inhabitants to act 
in accordance with the prescription in certain circumstances. Consequently, the 
frustration of need of food does affect the probability that God-Land inhabitants do 
act in accordance with that prescription in certain circumstances. Therefore, the 
frustration of the need of food influences the degree of feasibility of that prescription 
in God-Land. 
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Let us consider a second case in which a certain (set of) prescription(s) x necessities 
the action a-x be performed in order to be implemented or maintained in the context 
C. So, C inhabitants ought to perform a-x, but given C features, the performance of 
a-x frustrates C inhabitants’ human needs in a certain number of C circumstances. 
So, C inhabitants are not fully able to be motivated to perform a-x in certain 
circumstances.  
For example, let us suppose that God-Land Gran-Vizier understands that the strict 
egalitarian prescription does not reduce starvation and it also frustrates everyone’s 
need of food. So suppose, the Gran-Vizier prescribes that ‘Primary goods 
productivity ought increase until everyone has a sufficient amount of primary goods’ 
(the content of this prescription is general. It does not specify the place in which that 
prescription should be implemented). However, given the extreme scarcity of God-
Land, it is necessary to implement a servitude regime in order to achieve that goal. 
So, the actions that are necessary to satisfy that prescription frustrate the need of 
autonomy of God-Land inhabitants in a certain number of circumstances. The 
frustration of the need of autonomy does influence the ability of God-Land 
inhabitants to be motivated to act in accordance with the prescription in certain 
circumstances. Consequently, the frustration of autonomy does affect the probability 
that God-Land inhabitants do act in accordance with that prescription in certain 
circumstances. Therefore, the frustration of the need for food influences the degree 
of feasibility of that prescription in God-Land. 
Let us consider a third case in which a certain (set of) prescription(s) x recommends 
the action a-x in the context C. So, C inhabitants ought to perform a-x, but given the 
content of x, performing a-x frustrates C inhabitants’ human needs in a certain 
number of C circumstances. So, C inhabitants are not fully able to be motivated to 
perform a-x in certain circumstances. 
For instance, let us suppose that God-Gran-Vizier is depressed by all these failed 
attempts to have a normal city-state. Then, he prescribes that ‘only those people or 
families producing sufficient primary goods to satisfy their basic necessities have the 
right to inhabit in God-Land’ (the content of this prescription is already contextual). 
Such a prescription implicitly recommends that ‘all those people or families who 
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does not produce sufficient primary goods for themselves have the duty to leave 
God-Land’. Of course, acting in accordance with the content of this 
recommendation, some God-Land inhabitants ought to emigrate: they ought to leave 
their family, their friends, their houses, their pets, etc. All these actions frustrate the 
needs for love and belongingness of some God-Land inhabitants. Those God-Land 
inhabitants that should emigrate are not fully able to be motivated to act in 
accordance with that prescription. So, the frustration of needs of love and 
belongingness influences the probability that unproductive individuals or families 
voluntarily leave God-Land. Therefore, the frustration of needs of love and 
belonging influences the feasibility of that prescription. 
Last case. Let us consider that a certain (set of) prescription(s) x necessities the 
action a-x in the context C in order to be implemented and maintained in the context 
C. So, C inhabitants ought to perform a-x, but performing a-x frustrates C 
inhabitants’ human needs in a certain number of C circumstances. So, C inhabitants 
are not fully able to be motivated to perform a-x in certain circumstances.  
Let us consider that the Gran-Vizier recognises that unproductive inhabitants would 
not voluntarily leave God-Land, then he implements a special Emigration Bureau 
which role is to organize emigration and constrain people to emigrate. More 
explicitly, the task of this Bureau is to deport unproductive inhabitants. So, let us 
suppose that the Bureau members have to perform certain actions in order to 
implement and maintain the prescription ‘all those people who does not have 
sufficient primary goods have the duty to leave God-Land’. For examples, they 
should force people to leave their houses, they should force people to take a ship and 
finally they should bring people in other places. Let us suppose, that these actions 
frustrate the moral needs and other basic needs of Emigration Bureau officers. Then, 
such a frustration influences officers’ ability to be motivated to perform those 
actions. Consequently, the frustration of Bureau members’ psychological needs 
influences the probability that they act in accordance with the prescription in a 
certain number of circumstances. Therefore, the frustration of Bureau members’ 
needs influences the feasibility of the prescription. 
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All these cases show that human needs frustration could affect the degree of 
feasibility of certain prescriptions in certain contexts. Therefore, human needs can 
still be considered a soft constraints.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this last chapter, I suggested two different kinds of soft feasibility constraints, 
namely, lacking material resources and frustrated human needs.  
Lacking material resources affect the feasibility of normative political prescriptions 
since they exclude some actions from the agents’ option set in a certain number of 
circumstances. Those circumstances can be generally-spread as well as contextually-
circumscribed. This means that lacking material resources can undermine both the 
general and the contextual feasibility of prescriptions now and in a predictable 
future. Furthermore, they can influence both the general and the contextual degrees 
of feasibility of prescriptions. Frustrated human needs influence the feasibility of 
normative political prescriptions via influencing the agents’ ability to be motivated to 
act in accordance with prescriptions. The circumstances in which it happen can still 
be generally-spread as well as contextually-circumscribed. That means that frustrated 
human needs can influence both the general and the contextual degrees of feasibility 
of prescriptions. They cannot undermine the feasibility, since the frustration of 
human needs never determines motivations or actions. So, they never exclude some 
actions from the agents’ option set, but they affect the probability (never equal to 
zero) that agents would perform certain actions.  
Suppose that you agree with me: suppose that you agree with idea that lacking 
material resources and frustrated human needs affect the feasibility of normative 
political prescriptions. In this case, you could still argue that there is no way to 
measure the lacking material resources or frustrated human needs. Hence, in the 
moment in which someone wants to implement or to maintain a set of prescriptions 
in a certain context, nobody could be able to evaluate the degree of feasibility of 
those prescriptions. The reason is that nobody can know: first, how many times a 
lacking material resource excludes the demanded actions from the agents’ option set; 
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second, how much the frustration of human needs influences the agents’ ability to be 
motivated to perform the demanded actions, and how many times that frustration 
influences actions. Both these criticisms are plausible. I think we cannot currently 
know for which degree lacking material resources and human needs influence the 
feasibility degree of prescriptions. For sure, nobody can exactly predict them; 
furthermore, I am not sure that there exist theories or disciplines that could provide 
some probabilistic predictions about. 
This same criticism can be also addressed against those theories that consider social 
facts as feasibility constraints. In that case, the criticism is that nobody can exactly 
know how much the currently existing social facts do affect the implementation of 
certain prescriptions. That is to say, in the moment in which a policy maker is trying 
to understand if a certain prescription will have success, nobody is able to suggest 
him the degree of success of that prescription. However, in this case, theorists could 
suggest that social sciences can probabilistically foresee the impact of social facts on 
the success of prescriptions: thanks to social sciences, we could (probabilistically) 
predict whether a prescription will have a satisfying degree of success or not. I do not 
know if it is the case to be so optimistic about the predictive capabilities of social 
sciences, but they are still the most appropriate disciplines to evaluate how social 
facts affect the probability of success of certain prescriptions. However, I already 
rejected the idea that social facts affect the feasibility; so, it is not the case to spend 
more time about the epistemic troubles of this account. 
The point here is to understand whether there are disciplines or theories that can 
provide tools to evaluate the impact of lacking material resources and frustrated 
human needs over the feasibility of normative political prescriptions.  
I do not know if certain disciplines can be useful to estimate the impact of lacking 
material resources over prescriptions. On the one hand, being conscious human 
beings, we are more or less able to evaluate which actions are excluded from our 
option-set, given the material features of the circumstance in which we are. For 
instance, I am more or less able to evaluate if I can build up a castle or climb the 
Everest tomorrow morning, and I can more or less predict that those actions are not 
part of my option set in a relevant number of circumstances. Those evaluations are 
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necessary to perform any action and to live a normal life. On the other hand, I do not 
know whether there is a formal kind of knowledge that can inform us about this kind 
of predictions when they regards political prescriptions. That is to say, I am not sure 
that there is a formal knowledge that informs policy makers about the probability of 
success of prescriptions, given a certain amount of lacking material resources. 
Intuitively, it seems that the more this kind of prediction is made about involving a 
network of technical expertise the more they are reliable. Obviously, politicians are 
used to considering the opinions of technicians before they make decisions: 
specialists from natural sciences, engineers, architects and other technical consultants 
are often part of task forces evaluating implementation costs of prescriptions. It 
could be interesting to analyse: if and how this expertise can foresee the practical 
success of political decisions; whether and how these predictions are reliable; how 
we should integrate opinions coming from different kinds of technical expertise. 
However, I do not know anything about this topic and whatever hypothesis would be 
at least naïf.  
Differently, evaluating the impact of the frustration of human needs on the feasibility 
degree of prescriptions, we should probably base our predictions on psychological 
theories. Psychological research analysing whether needs frustration implies 
defection from normative prescriptions could say something more about the 
correctness my hypothesis. They could provide methodological advices to predict the 
feasibility of prescriptions. Finally, they could concentrate their aims on the 
evaluation of the feasibility of prescriptions. Maybe, humanistic psychological 
research adopting quantitative methods (as those purposed by self-determination 
theory scholars) could provide more or less accurate estimates about the feasibility 
degree of prescriptions. However, in this case, too, I cannot say anything more about 
this epistemic challenge. That is to say, I have not a good answer to the question, 
how should we evaluate the impact of frustrated needs on the feasibility of 
prescriptions?  
In conclusion, further analyses are necessary to understand if and how it is possible 
to predict the feasibility of prescriptions, given the constraints of lacking material 
resources and frustrated human needs.  
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The epistemic challenge is meaningful in order to predict the feasibility degree of a 
(set of) prescription(s). That is to say, it is important to understand if and how it is 
possible to predict the impact of frustrated needs and lacking resources on the 
feasibility of prescriptions, because it is relevant to understand if my account can 
play a role during the political practice. However, my aim here was not suggest how 
we should estimate the impact of these constraints on the feasibility of prescriptions, 
neither was it to suggest a way to obtain reliable predictions. Hence, I do not have 
any good argument about these questions and I cannot provide any serious advice. 
The aim of my thesis has just been to identify feasibility constraints. I think my 
contribution is useful in order to interpret and criticize those arguments based on 
feasibility that often occur during public debates. We are used to arguments trying to 
evaluate the opportunity to implement certain prescriptions in virtue of their 
feasibility. In these cases, politicians, decision makers, political reporters, social 
scientists and people around us in general often argue that something is unfeasible or 
lowly feasible since it clashes with our institutions, our culture, or our economy. 
Here, I wanted to analyse if these are good arguments. 
I maintained that logic rules, physical and biological laws are hard constraints since 
they make impossible for human beings (at any place and time) to act in accordance 
with prescriptions that clash with them. In addition to these facts, I held that certain 
generally lacking material resources could be hard constraints too, but we cannot 
know it. By contrast, I held that others’ motivations, frustrated human needs and 
lacking material resources are soft feasibility constraints since they make it 
impossible to act in accordance with prescriptions in certain contexts, or they affect 
the degree of ability to act in accordance with prescriptions.  
These facts are feasibility constraints131 and can be used to argue about the feasibility 
of prescriptions. Differently, we should reject the idea that it is not opportune in 
terms of feasibility to implement or maintain certain prescriptions just because they 
clash with our culture, our economy or our institutions. In case we think that some 
                                                
131 I do not exclude that other facts can count as feasibility constraints too. However, I suggest that 
other feasibility constraints could be reduced in terms of logic rules, physical laws, biological laws, 
human needs, lacking material resources and others’ motivations.  
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state of affairs is desirable, our challenge is to find the adequate institutions and to 
modify our culture and economic activities supporting it. Culture, economy and 
institutions are not constraints for desirable states of affairs; they are tools to enforce 
them. 
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